*Udit Jain & Ruhee Tandan Recently, the Gujarat government proposed an amendment  to the Gujarat Registration of Marriages Act, introducing a stricter multi-stage verification process. The mandate stipulated that the couple seeking to register their marriage must submit their parents' identity documents and declare that they have informed their parents of the marriage. The proposed amendment, in the light of already established constitutional jurisprudence, appears to be a constitutionally dubious proposal. The proposal established an obligatory requirement that children obtain parental consent to marry. There is established jurisprudence to the effect that there is no requirement of parental consent to marry; the Gujarat proposed amendment and the reasoning behind it stand constitutionally anomalous. The proposal reflects and augments the already existing socio-religious discrimination in Indian society. The recent initiative of the Gujarat government escalates the already existing religious and caste disharmony that exists in Indian society. While there have been efforts to develop schemes to promote interfaith marriages and thereby foster social harmony, the particular decision undermines that spirit . The decision also reflects the legitimisation of religious bigotry, such as “love jihad”, as observed in the speech of the minister introducing the proposed amendment. While introducing the bill he stated that ““under the name of love jihad, a game is being played in the state” and “a strong armour… needs to be created for young girl s”  While there have been established judicial precedents that evidently stipulate that the consent of clan family or parents stands superfluous, the decision, as argued here, stands constitutionally unsound. Building on the articulated argument, this article seeks to highlight the socio-legal issue posed by this decision. The article, firstly, looks into the background of the “proposed decision” and then further manoeuvres into the constitutionally established jurisprudence on the right to choose. The article then further manoeuvres into the socio- legal reality of honour killings and demonstrates how this judgment exacerbates the existing problem by granting the clan authority to decide for their children. Thus, this article examines the consequences of paternalism and the constitutional flaws of the decision. The article delves into the intricate debate between constitutional morality and social morality. The article ultimately concludes with a practical, more just and constitutional approach that could have been taken.  A. Marriage in India: A Historical Legal Transformation Classical Hindu law treated marriage as a religious duty  rather than a civil contract. The sanctimonious nature of the marriage disparaged the requirement of consent and focused on the sanctity of the ritual. The father or male guardian of the bride held near-absolute authority over the bride, which was treated as a gift to the groom as part of the kanyadaan ceremony.  Women, under this framework, were not considered independent subjects capable of independent consent. Progressive interpretations of Muslim personal law, which granted women autonomy, though present, were rarely followed in practice, giving way to a more conservative tradition.  The Special Marriage Act, 1954,  was the first statutory measure towards a consent-based framework for marriage. Under Section 4 of the SMA, individuals of any religion may marry without the sanction of personal law and without caste or religious restrictions. However, there were still many procedural requirements, such as the thirty-day notice period mentioned in Section 5 of the SMA, which exposed couples to harassment and functioned as a parental veto . Various scholars and academics have argued that this notice regime disproportionately harms interfaith couples and women. For instance, Mrinal Satish noted that procedural exposure increased the risk of honour-based violence. (Read -  How the Special Marriage Act is Killing Love)  The jurisprudential shift relied heavily on Article 21 expansion. The first major recognition of inter-caste marriage autonomy was upheld in the case of Lata Singh v State of Uttar Pradesh. The judgment held that inter-caste marriages were propitious to the indian social harmony, and those who are involved in the daunting act of honour violence on the premise of inter-caste marriages shall be severely punished. The court (see p. 16) also stated that if parents disapprove of the marriage, they can, at full capacity, sever the social relationship between them. Thus, this judgment evidently established that parental consent to marry is irrelevant and is against the constitutional right to choose. It was further supported by Shakti Vahini v. Union of India, in which the Supreme Court expressly condemned the authority of khap panchayats and family bodies to dictate matrimonial choices and held that such authority was not legally cognisable. In the case of Arumugam Servai v. State of Tamil Nadu, the court strongly condemned khap panchayats and caste councils for interfering with marriages. The judgment of  KS Puttawamy  (para 298) manifestly illuminates that privacy includes decisional autonomy in intimate matters. Furthermore, in the landmark judgment of Navtej Singh Johar v Union of India, it was laid down that sexual orientation and choice are rooted in dignity. Progressive interpretations of Article 21, Right to Life and Personal Liberty, have led to the recognition of the right to choose a life partner as a Fundamental Right under Article 21.  In  Shafi Jahan v K.M Ashokan (para. 45), the court overruled the High courts annulment of an interfaith marriage on paternalistic protection grounds. In parts of Gujarat and Northern India, social stigma against marriage crossing caste and religion remains strong, occasionally resulting in community backlash or threats to couples, as seen in recent threats  against an interfaith couple in Surat. The Gujarat government's recent proposed decision is rooted in the paternalistic model of governance, where the state, excessively in the guise of protection of women, has chosen to overlook the personal autonomy and dignity aspect of women. The amendment reflects demands from community organisations in Gujarat, where some village bodies have even imposed a social boycott on couples marrying without family approval. Some other laws, such as the UP Prohibition of Unlawful Conversion of Religion Act 2021, shared the same vision. While the marriage in India has always been linked to concepts of caste continuity, religious identity and family honour, this decision serves as an alignment with the conservative vote base and retrogressively reinforces community control structures.  B. The Right to Choose: Marriage, Caste, and Constitutional Liberty in India” The right to choose a marital partner, while seemingly just a question of personal liberty, cannot be adjudicated in isolation from the specific social realities of gender, caste and religion in the Indian framework. These hierarchies determine which choices are systematically and violently suppressed. Thus, the suppression of the right to choose is both the suppression of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21, as well as a form of discrimination based on caste and gender. In his essay, Annihilation of Caste, Dr B.R. Ambedkar argued that inter-caste marriage, in particular, along with inter-caste dining was one of the ways of eradicating the caste system ( see) . He stated that:   “Where society is already well-knit by other ties, marriage is an ordinary incident of life. But where society is cut asunder, marriage as a binding force becomes a matter of urgent necessity. The real remedy for breaking Caste is intermarriage. Nothing else will serve as the solvent of Caste.” Furthermore, in the case of Shafin Jahan v. Ashokan K.M., the Supreme Court highlighted the right of every individual to marry a person of his or her choice. This also ensures that the choice of a partner is not influenced by religion or faith. In this case, although the family initiated a habeas corpus writ, the Supreme Court held that it could not interfere in this matter. This landmark judgement nullified the Kerala HC’s decision, which stated that parental permission was a necessary component of marriage.  Thus, the right to choose a life partner is a fundamental right of a person and is protected under Articles 21, 19(1)(a) and 14 of the Constitution, as held in the case of Shakti Vahini v. Union of India. Interference in such a choice constitutes an encroachment on the freedom of choice of an individual, and thus parental and community consent in such a decision is not a necessary component. C. From Honour to Law: Re-Legitimising Community Control Honour killings in India don't exhibit incidents of interpersonal violence but are stark manifestations of deeply entrenched social hierarchies, legitimised through patriarchy, caste supremacy and communal dominance. The honour killings official data remains low,  due to its structural invisibility,  which means many cases go unrecorded as such. The official data indicates that there are at least 30 cases of honour killings every year, and these honour killings are a direct reflection of existing patriarchal norms and caste and community boundaries pervasive in Indian society. The Gujarat proposed amendment shares its affinity to such paternalism and serves as the most blatant attempt to control the choice, sexuality and autonomy of the young people.  It is unfortunate to see that the ruling government and the leaders have tried to justify such an unconstitutional decision by citing it as an attempt to obliterate love jihad. While the Indian courts have persistently declared the concept of “love jihad” as a legal basis to override an adult’s fundamental rights to marry, the indian state and some of the most popular leaders have often used this to satisfy their voter base. In the landmark judgment of S hafin Jahan v Asokan K.M, (para 28)t he Supreme Court declared that a marriage cannot be annulled on stereotypical fears devoid of evidence, and that an adult has the unmitigated right to choose their spouse. The Bombay High Court has also held that   “just because boys and girls are from different religions, it's not from love jihad.” The apex court in  Re vs Indian Woman said that it's the duty-bound role of the state to protect freedom bound choice of marriage, which is an integral aspect of Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. In the case of V ikas Yadav v. State of Uttar Pradesh  and others, the court reiterated that the freedom and independence of women cannot be violated by self-imposed honour. When a state policy seeks to reintroduce parental notification or community oversight in adult marriage, it risks legitimising the very social control structures that the courts have sought to dismantle. Thus, by formally empowering families to intervene, such measures may embolden honour-based resistance, increase surveillance of couples, and create conditions where coercion or violence becomes more likely, thereby indirectly reinforcing the ecosystem in which honour killings thrive. D. Paternalism, Constitutionalism, and the Limits of Social Morality. Women have perpetually faced systematic discrimination throughout modern history when compared to men. This interference and evident discrimination have been justified as a protection of their own rights or “ for their own enhancement ”. Dworkin defines paternalism  as the interference by a state or an individual with another person, against their will, and justified by the claim that the person interfered with will be better off or  protected from harm . Indian family law is closely linked to religious codes and social morality. Such instances of subjugation are ubiquitous in almost all personal laws of India.  The  feminist critique of paternalism  rests on the fundamental recognition that women are autonomous agents capable of making informed decisions about their own lives. The critique rebuts the thesis that there is a singular, uniberal understanding of what constitutes women’s dignity, equality, or freedom.  In the controversial Sabrimala case  (para 112) Justice Chandrachud endeavoured to undermine the value of the “ essential religious practise test ”, and rather adopted a version of an “ anti-exclusionary principle ”. This reflected a progressive shift away from the normative traditional laws that accorded supremacy to morality over constitutionality. However, a distinction should be made between paternalistic and judicial overreach.  In the context of the recent proposed amendment, when courts validate or entertain parental objections to adult relationships on grounds of safety or social harmony, they treat adults as incapable of making autonomous marital decisions and shift authority from the individual to the family. Indian jurisprudence has evolved constantly and reflects a commitment to transformative constitutionalism rather than a disposition toward social morality. While the Indian society still struggles sociologically with honour killings, khap panchayat interference and family surveillance of women, the proposal reflects entrenched socio-legal paternalism. The proposal leans into the past, carrying personal laws years backwards on the reluctant tide of retrogression.  E. TOWARDS CONSTITUTIONAL PRAGMATISM: RECONCILING SOCIAL ANXIETY WITH TRANSDORMATIVE MORALITY The debate surrounding the proposed amendment at length speaks about a deeper anxiety that exists in the indian society, a state of despair stuck in the intricacies of caste continuity, religious endogamy and patriarchal controls. But through this piece, we contend that the shocks of social discomfort cannot dictate constitutional decisions and adjudication. As the founding father of our constitution, Dr B.R. Ambedkar  stated,  “ The constitution is not a mere lawyer’s document, but it's a vehicle of life and its spirit is always the spirit of the age  ” the indian constitution should be pictured as a figure of social transformation. As discussed previously in the piece, and from the discourse affirmatively established in judicial precedents. Individual dignity, decisional autonomy and privacy are not predicated on family approval.  But a purely asolusist framing might also not serve as a propitious framework, as there have been genuine concerns regarding religious coercion or fraudulent inducements in certain matrimonial contexts. Pragmatism surfaces in strengthening institutional safeguards that protect choice without controlling it. Instead of mandating parental consent, the State could invest in neutral counselling mechanisms, safe-house infrastructures, and expedited police protection protocols for consenting adults facing credible threats, measures already contemplated in Shakti Vahini .  Procedural reforms to the Special Marriage Act, specifically in relation to the 30-day notice, would conform to constitutional morality. The state must act in accordance with its positive obligations under Article 21 to protect life and liberty without regressing into paternalism.  The debate between social morality and constitutional morality is neither novel nor easily resolved. However, Indian constitutionalism, through repeated judicial pronouncements, has privileged dignity over majoritarian sentiment.  A balanced constitutional approach lies in reinstating that marriage between consenting adults remains a matter of individual choice while simultaneously strengthening protective mechanisms against coercion and violence. A balanced approach rooted in pragmatism would neither romanticise social morality nor dismiss it recklessly, but would be situated in a commitment to the constitution. The constitution was conceived as a transformative charter, not a conservative compromise. To privilege clan consent over adult choice would be to invert that vision. *Udit Jain is a third-year law student pursuing B.A. LL.B (Hons.) at National Law University, Jodhpur. *Ruhee Tandan is a first-year law student pursuing BBA LL.B (Hons.) at National Law University, Jodhpur. The views expressed above are the author's alone and do not represent the beliefs of Family Law Chronicle: The CFL Blog.

*by Yutika Jain INTRODUCTION The tort of alienation of affection (AoA), also referred to as ‘ heart balm action’ , is an Anglo-Saxon common law tort which based action against third parties guilty of tortious interference with the marital relationship. Typically, a heart-balm action is a civil remedy where the aggrieved party seeks monetary compensation for the termination or disruption caused to their romantic or marital relationship. The essence of the tort lies in intentionally enticing or influencing one spouse to abandon the affection, companionship, and support owed to the other. The aggrieved spouse may seek monetary damages for the emotional distress, humiliation, or loss of marital happiness suffered due to such interference. The objective behind the damages is to preserve marital harmony by deterring wrongful interference, and saving the marital tie. The law imputes that since the spouses have a valuable interest in the married relationship (such as, marital intimacy, companionship, support, mutual affection, welfare of children etc.), the marriage ought to be protected against any such third-party interferences . The Apex Court in Indra Sarma v. V. K. V. Sarma , observed that where a woman knowingly develops a relationship with a married man, and encourages the bigamous relationship, such conduct amounts to commission of an intentional tort, i.e. interference of a third party in the marital relationship by alienating the husband from his spouse and children. The Court noted that such interference results in loss of marital companionship, consortium, and spouse’s familial association, and therefore, a cause of action lies with both, the wife and children. The Court however restricted its view in assessing AoA as a standalone tort/ settled cause of action, and demanded legislative interference to address the same.  Through providing monetary damages, the tort seeks to balance two compelling interests; firstly, to protect the sanctity of marriage and aggrieved spouse’s emotional interest and secondly, to not treat the spouse as a property. ELEMENTS OF THE TORT For a person to be guilty of AoA, the following essentials must be met: Firstly , the spouses must be under a legally valid marriage, with genuine companionship, intimacy or consortium. Where the marital tie was already affected by instances not associated with third party’s interference, or parties lacked genuine affection or companionship between each other, no action for AoA shall be successful. Secondly , there must be a third-party’s ‘intentional and wrongful interference’ in that marital relationship (for example: cultivating a relationship with one spouse knowing that it will affect the marriage, encouraging separation from spouse etc.). The Supreme Court in Pinakin Mahipatray Rawal v. State of Gujarat,  observed that “ A person can be held liable for the action of alienation only when there is any active participation, initiation, or encouragement on the part of the Defendant. ” Acts leading to the loss of affection must be wrongful, designed and deliberately calculated in a manner to entice the affection of one spouse away from the other. However, if the spouse’s conduct is completely voluntary and uncoerced, the third party shall not be liable for the acts (i.e. alienation resulting because of consent is a complete defence ). The action for AoA does not require proof of adulterous conduct, any proven intentional interference in the marital relationship is sufficient for the suit. The Plaintiff is not required to show Defendant’s intent to destroy the marriage; merely establishing the malafide intent to interfere is sufficient.  Thirdly , there must be a causal link between the interference and the loss of the marital relationship’s affection. The respondent’s wrongful conduct must be the primary reason for the alienation ; it must be established that the spouse withdrew himself emotionally or became distant. For a successful prosecution for the tort, there must be an evident loss of marital relationship, companionship, assistance, and consortium for the couple. Additionally, there must be compelling evidence that the third party actively participated in, initiated, or encouraged the alienation, such that they played a substantial role in inducing or causing one spouse to lose the affection of the other. Mere association, or liking as such do not become tortious. An action for alienation of affection can be brought for all improper intrusions on the marriage by another, including, but not limited to extramarital sex, spouse’s continued overtures or sexual liaisons, etc. The liability arises only when the defendant has actively participated in, initiated, or encouraged the conduct in question. The Delhi High Court in the recent case of Shelly Mahajan v.  Ms Bhanushree Bahl & Anr  took a progressive stance of the tort. Here, the wife, (Plaintiff herein) was married to the husband (Defendant 2) and they had twin children. Defendant 1 joined the same venture with Defendant 2 and despite being aware of the marital relationship, she developed a close and personal bond with the Defendant. It was found that Defendant 1 frequently visited their marital home, accompanied Defendant 2 on work trips, and even became his exclusive travel companion, causing the Plaintiff serious apprehensions. The Court here applied the Hohfeld’s analysis and noted that if a spouse has a protectable interest in the marital consortium, the third party has a legal duty to not intentionally and wrongfully interfere with that relationship. (Hohfeld’s analysis states that if a person has a right over something, the other has a correlative duty to act or refrain from acting in a certain way.) LACUNAE The tort of Alienation of Affection has an evolving jurisprudence in the Indian legal system. The Shelly Mahajan case was the first case where damages were awarded only on the basis of the tort, not coupled with any other marital offence. The tort primarily assumes that the affection between spouses can be ‘stolen’ or ‘enticed’ by a third-party, which is contrary to the realistic scenario where affection is voluntary and inherent. It ignores to consider the fact that the marriage may not be alienated solely by action of a third party without any consent (whether express or implied) on part of the spouse.  Further, by using words such as ‘third party’s interference’ or ‘incitement by third party’, the law disregards the decisional autonomy of Defendant spouse. The Defendant spouse, not being a minor, is legally eligible to make informed decisions for himself, and in such cases using the tort as enforceable only against the third party disregards the plausible knowledge and intention that the Defendant spouse may possess while participating in any such acts. Moreover, through imposing pecuniary damages on the Defendant, it forces people to continue in unhappy marital ties which has an effect of discouraging separation in an instance where the marriage has broken to the extent that one of the spouse is already alienated to the marital tie and rather connected with a third party.  Further, the nature of remedy sought by an action of AoA is merely compensatory. By allowing monetary compensation for commission of acts so gravely prejudicial to the spouse, the Courts reduce the sanctity of the marital tie. Companionship and affection would be seen as quantifiable legal goods and the marital tie shall be reduced not to a sacred relationship, rather a Court-bound forcing. The tort may as well, disproportionately affect women. In patriarchal societies like India, where only the third party is held liable, women may be selectively targeted in lawsuits exposing them to further social stigma and reputational harm. There may be instances of misusing the tort vindictively against the vulnerable spouse as a means of extracting money in the name of damages.   Since there are no standard guidelines or directions specifying what does or does not amount to commission of the tort, the Courts may be slugged in several vindictive suits filed merely out of greed and not genuine affection. This could lead to a shift in the actions for tort being towards vendetta legislations, which are socially corrosive. Further, the damages are awarded according to the ‘harm suffered by the other spouse’, which is difficult to assess. The level of mental cruelty inflicted on spouse because of any such act of the Defendant spouse may be difficult to assess. What may be acceptable to some, may not be acceptable to others. The monetary compensations thus being awarded can be arbitrary and unjust. Since the Apex Court has not yet dealt with the matter in full course, no clear directives binding on all Courts are available. The High Courts on their own interpretation seek to resolve the disputes which leads to lack of uniformity.  SUGGESTIONS Firstly, the author suggests expanding scope of the tort to cover not only valid marriages but also voidable marriages and live-in relationships where parties share genuine intimacy and affection towards each other. Mental cruelty has been defined as such a conduct by the spouse which inflicts upon the other spouse such mental pain and suffering which would make it impossible for the parties to live together. In Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddy , the Apex Court held that “ Where the conduct complained of itself is bad enough  and per se unlawful or illegal, the impact or the injurious effect on the other spouse need not be enquired into or considered.” With this regard, commission of alienation of affection, itself being prejudicial to the marital tie and the petitioner spouse, subjects the spouse to mental cruelty. The other spouse may be subject to mental agony and stress on discovering the extra-marital conduct of the Defendant spouse. Further, if any spouse is found guilty for the tort, it is clear that the marital bond has or shall fail in some due time. The tort, though not completely alike, but is similar to adultery. While torts like romantic relationship without sexual intercourse, flirting, Alienation of Affection are categorised as non-adulterous infidelity, Adultery can be regarded as a higher degree of infidelity. Section 13(1) of the Hindu Marriage Act  recognises divorce on fault grounds. Adultery being one of such grounds has been recognised but non-adulterous infidelity including emotional infidelity, flirting, alienation of affection etc., which do not involve any sexual intercourse but cause serious prejudice to the marital bond has not been recognised per se. The author suggests inclusion of such non-adulterous infidelity as offences against marriage with grant of matrimonial reliefs and not mere pecuniary damages. The author suggests that Courts must employ principles of equity to balance the conflicting interests of both the spouses. It is suggested that only granting pecuniary damages further creates a class within the society where the rich can easily abuse the marital sanctity by engaging in non-adulterous infidelity and escaping the same by dispensing off some monetary compensation. Such a practice inherently violates our core social and moral values and would degrade the society. Lastly, the author suggests expanding the definition of Alienation of Affection, with proper directives as to what exactly constitutes such commission, and its interaction with other matrimonial offences. There must be a clear stance on controlling vindictive suits against a particular class or group of people to avoid misuse of the remedy.  CONCLUSION The tort of Alienation of Affection represents a significant yet contentious shift in Indian matrimonial jurisprudence, attempting to address emotional harm caused by intentional third-party interference in marital relationships. Its adoption from common law jurisdiction in Indian legal system however, has occurred without sufficient adaptation to existing matrimonial laws, social realities, and constitutional values of autonomy and equality. While recent judicial developments reflect a growing recognition of the protectable interest spouses hold in marital consortium, the application of tort remains debatable. Its reliance on monetary compensation neither adequately captures the nature of emotional loss nor effectively safeguards the marital bond. Rather, it may inadvertently commercialise marital fidelity and encourage vindictive litigation. The absence of clear standards governing parties’ intent, causation, and assessment of damages renders the tort susceptible to arbitrariness and misuse. By fixing liability primarily on the third party and offering only compensatory damages, the tort fails to address the core cause of marital breakdown; alienated spouse’s conduct, which not only diminishes individual agency but also risks moral policing and selective targeting, particularly of women. Thus, comprehensive legislative/ judicial action is required for the tort to serve a legitimate purpose; its scope must be clearly defined, misuse strictly controlled, and its interaction with matrimonial remedies must be properly addressed. Such clear guidelines are necessary to prevent abuse and ensure uniformity. More importantly, integrating non-adulterous infidelity and alienation of affection within the framework of matrimonial reliefs rather than confining them to tortious liability would better align legal remedies with societal standards, and moral considerations. Without such reforms, the tort risks becoming an instrument of retaliation rather than a principled mechanism of justice. *Yutika Jain is a second year student pursuing BBA LLB Hons from Integrated Law Course, Faculty of Law, University of Delhi. The views expressed above are the author's alone and do not represent the beliefs of Family Law Chronicle: The CFL Blog.

*by Rohan Yadav Introduction  A landmark event occurred in the regulation of personal laws in India when the Uniform Civil Code (UCC), enshrined under Article 44   of the Indian Constitution, was enforced in Uttarakhand on January 27th, 2025. This watershed moment marked the first time in Independent India, when a civil code was enforced to regulate all the matters related to personal laws such as marriage, divorce, adoption, succession and inheritance, for everyone in a uniform manner, irrespective of religion, caste or creed. A unique feature of this law is its application under  Part III of the Act, which regulates Live-in relations in Uttarakhand and among the residents of the state living elsewhere in India. This code also marks only the second time the Uniform Civil Code has been enforced in any part of India, after the Portuguese Civil Code   of 1867 in Goa. Although   the  UCC Act in Uttarakhand   seeks to holistically regulate the legal framework governing marriage, live-in relationships, succession, divorce and matters incidental thereto as reflected in its long title , it poses serious concerns regarding autonomy, privacy and the viability of government involvement in intimate relationships such as live-in relationships. Concerns about the enforcement of the UCC Code on Live-in relationships:  The UCC defines a live-in relationship as a relationship between a man and a woman, both of whom have achieved 21 years of age. All Uttarakhand residents, including those who reside outside the state, as well as non-residents who live together in Uttarakhand, are covered by the Uttarakhand UCC Act of 2024. It mandates young couples who are currently in a live–in relationship or considering the same to register themselves with the registrar of their respective jurisdiction by giving “a statement of live-in relationship”, which is defined as per section 3(4)(d).   The enforceability of the Uniform Civil Code of 2024 in Uttarakhand, especially on the Live-in relationship couples, has some very beneficial impacts, such as the fact that children born to them are now as legitimate  under  Section 379   and it prioritises consent as well as the overall well-being of women by including maintenance under  Section 388 .  In spite of these benefits, it still raises some serious concerns regarding the regulation of Live-in relationships, a concept whose legal contours were discussed in principle by the Honourable Supreme Court in Indra Sarma vs. V.K.V. Sarma 2013 . It is pertinent to note that the judgment primarily focused on examining the scope and limits of protection provided under the   Domestic Violence Act 2005 , rather than granting an affirmative and universal legitimacy to every form of live-in arrangement. The UCC  indirectly overlooks the established jurisprudence on Live-in relationships as laid down by the Apex Court, comprising principles of dignity, autonomy and privacy by provisions such as mandating registration and parental consent before the age of 21.  Some of the most essential gaps and concerns in the newly enforced code are as follows:  Exclusion of the LGBTQIA+ community: One of the most striking gaps in the formation of this code is the exclusion of LGBTQIA+ people or those who do not fall under the category of binary, thereby undermining the very notions of inclusivity, uniformity and equality, which the code seeks to achieve. The UCC Act in Uttarakhand in entirety excludes non-binary and explicitly recognises only heterosexual unions between a “male” and a “female” as defined under Section 3(4)(b) of the code. This straightforward exclusion of the LGBTQIA+ community is particularly regressive in light of the recent landmark Supreme Court judgments that have upheld the rights of queer communities to cohabitate freely with consent, such as Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018)  and Supriyo v. Union of India (2023) .  Several contradictions between the law related to marriage and Live-in relationships:  There are some key dichotomies between the laws and statutes governing the institution of marriages and those of UCC  regulating live-in relationships in Uttarakhand such as the legal age of marriage for girls is 18 as per Hindu Marriage Act 1955 and Special Marriage Act 1954   whereas under the Uttarakhand UCC , girls have to wait until the age of 21 years to get the legal recognition of their live-in relationships. There has been neither a rational justification given to explain this flaw by the lawmakers, nor is there any record of Assembly debate addressing the legislative inconsistency whereby a girl legally permitted to marry at 18 must nevertheless wait until 21 to enter a legally recognised live-in relationship without parental consent. Moreover, non-registration of marriages has no serious penalties or imprisonment, while the same is not the case with live-in relationships. Another important contradiction is that Rule 6(4)(f) under the UCC Rules  makes compliance impractical for live–in relationship couples, falling within prohibited degrees of relationship, due to the condition of having a certificate by the partners, certified by a religious head stating that the customs and norms which govern the respective partners allow them to marry. The secularism outlined in the  Preamble   gets undermined as such a requirement introduces religious validation into a secular civil framework. Another major concern arises that neither the legislation nor the judiciary has, to date not satisfactorily disclosed how to ascertain the date from which a live-in relationship is considered to have started, as people who fail to submit the statement of such a relationship within a month of entering such a relationship may be punished under Section 387(1) . Dignity and Privacy of Live-in relationships couples: The Fundamental Right to Privacy, as enshrined in the Justice K.S.Puttaswamy (Retd) vs Union of India (2018)   and the Fundamental Right to Dignity under Article 21 ,   get seriously undermined under this code, especially for live-in couples. Mandatory live-in relationship registration is an invasive state intrusion into people’s personal lives, where couples are forced to divulge sensitive personal information to the government apparatus. The right to privacy is violated when the state puts a similar degree of restrictions upon the live-in relationships as those under marriage, by equating the two. The sharing of registration details with local police authorities is mandatorily required by the UCC  . Police involvement in confirming the legitimacy of relationships might deter couples from registering or living together due to the possibility that sensitive personal information being misused or shared without authorisation can cause people to experience discrimination, blackmail, or targeted harassment, which undermines confidence in government agencies. Such measures even strike at the heart of the Right to Dignity as enshrined under Article 21 , which comprises Individual Autonomy and the freedom to make intimate personal decisions free from disproportionate state interference. The present regulatory framework risks undermining the dignity of consenting live-in relationship couples by institutionalising coercive surveillance, stigma and moral scrutiny through mandatory verification mechanisms. Also, there is a great chance that family members who don’t support interfaith, inter-caste or nonmarital relationships will engage in moral policing and intrusion. Even via obtaining information from landlords, people may attempt to harass these couples by making fictitious complaints to the local police. Moreover, the dignity of young adults (18-20 years) also gets violated due to the mandatory condition of obtaining parental consent, thus obstructing their independent decision-making power about their personal relationships .  Hardships created by the UCC Act for Women in live-in relationships:   The live-in relationship provisions under the Uttarakhand UCC , especially related to mandatory registration, a wide range of verification powers to the registrar and denial of registration on grounds such as "public policy" and "morality," which are vaguely defined, have the potential risk of being enforced more as surveillance rather than as recognition. The Code violates the privacy and dignity of the couple by putting an obligation upon them to disclose their personal information to the officials. This can lead to women being subjected to increased family pressure and societal stigma in situations wherein the concept of live-in relationships is still not accepted by society . The provisions related to making non-registration illegal and giving wide discretionary powers to the registrar   negatively obstruct the dignity, privacy and autonomy of a woman as well as make it difficult for her to engage in an interfaith live-in relationship. This is because often women are construed as being responsible for maintaining the sanctity of a family and sexual morality, which eventually leads to the defeat of one of the main provisions of this code, i.e. ensuring greater dignity and autonomy for women.  Moving towards bridging the gaps and concerns under the Uttarakhand UCC Act for live-in couples:  Replace Mandatory Policing with Incentivised Registration:  An amendment should be made to replace compulsory registration of live-in relationships with a voluntary but beneficial model which encourages participation without coercion. This approach reflects the 21st Law Commission’s Report  that cautioned against over-interference by the State into private unions. Moreover, registration should provide benefits such as providing simplified joint tenancy, easier access to maintenance and automatic nomination rights in banking and insurance to the live-in couple by drawing inspiration from the Portuguese Civil Code of 1867.   This ensures compliance with the registration process by providing benefits rather than fear and also ensures dignity and legal protection to Live-in relationship couples.  Modify the Age of autonomy from 21 to 18 years:  The age requirement for independent registration and applicability of this act should be changed for both partners from the present 21 years to 18 years in order to comply with marriage laws and the legal age of majority as per the Portuguese Civil Code of 1867  and  the Indian Majority Act 1875.   This eliminates the paradoxical requirement that women who are otherwise legally able to vote and get married upon attaining the age of 18 have to obtain parental consent to enter into a live-in relationship. Bring Gender-Neutral Terminology by modifying "man and woman" to "two persons" : This change in definition under Section 3(4)(b)   of the present Code would immediately give statutory recognition and legal protections in matters of maintenance and succession to LGBTQIA+ couples. This shall ensure that the UCC Act becomes compliant with various Supreme Court rulings, such as Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018)   and   Supriyo v. Union of India (2023)   and promote uniformity and inclusivity.   Secular Affidavit over Religious Certification: There should be an amendment made that states that religious leaders should no longer be required to certify the allowance and this should be substituted by a Self-Declaration Affidavit in which Live-in relationship partners attest to their consent and unmarried single status. This amendment is also in line with the   Portuguese Civil Code of 1867 , which prioritised a civil registrar over religious authorities. This reform is crucial in order to ensure that live-in relationships are not impeded due to traditional religious norms and strengthen the notion that the Uniform Civil Code must be based on constitutional morality rather than religious consent and customs. Protecting Privacy and Dignity along with empowerment of women: There needs to be an amendment that prevents sharing personal data with the police without a court order, which ensures privacy and dignity by preventing misuse of state machinery. Women-led Fast Track tribunals can be established under Section 388   in order to empower women more financially. This amendment is also in consonance with the fundamental right to Dignity, which was laid down in the   Justice K.S.Puttaswamy (Retd) vs Union of India (2018) . Conclusion In conclusion, although Uttarakhand’s UCC   aspires to fulfil the constitutional mandate as given under Article 44 , its current framework regulating live-in relationships risks transforming a shield of protection into a sword of state surveillance. The Code creates a constitutional paradox by institutionalising moral policing and violating the autonomy as well as privacy of live-in relationship couples, which ultimately contradicts the progressive jurisprudence laid down by Justice K.S.Puttaswamy (Retd) vs Union of India (2018)   and   Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) .  The Code must draw inspiration and adopt the secular inclusivity from the 21st Law Commission’s Report   and   Portuguese Civil Code of 1867   to truly reflect the constitutional moralities of ensuring dignity, privacy and autonomy to the couple and preventing state overreach in the private matters of its citizens under the altar of legislative uniformity. *Rohan Yadav is a 2nd Year Law Student pursuing B.A. LL.B (Hons.) at Maharashtra National Law University, Mumbai. The views expressed above are the author's alone and do not represent the beliefs of Family Law Chronicle: The CFL Blog.

*by Y. Leela Krishna Reddy & Udit Jain The right to inherit property has traditionally been a privilege accorded to sons , deeply rooted in India's patriarchal history. The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, passed in 2005, aimed to rectify the discrimination against daughters by granting them equal coparcenary rights under the Hindu Succession Act. However, pursuant to Section 2 (2) of the Act, members of Scheduled Tribes were explicitly excluded, unless the Central Government issued a special notification bringing the Act into force for these tribes. Accordingly, tribal women remained governed by customary practices, depriving them of inheritance rights. These customs remain deleterious to women because of their patrilineal nature, and women of tribes often find their property rights subordinated.   The present blog reflects on the issue of tribal women’s right to inheritance, analysing the recent Supreme Court judgment in Ram Charan v. SukhRam and Ors  (Ram Charan). The judgment serves as a turning point, advancing gender justice for women belonging to the Scheduled Tribes. The constitutional guarantee provided within Article 14 is given due regard while interpreting that the judiciary must accord women equal inheritance rights unless a contrary custom specifically excludes. Thus, the article argues that Ram Charan represents a constitutionally significant precedent for gender justice within tribal communities.  Part A examines the historical legal framework governing the inheritance rights of women. Part B argues for the pre-eminence of constitutional provisions and values over discriminatory customary law. Part C analyses the rationale adopted by the Supreme Court in the Ram Charan  case while granting tribal women inheritance rights. Part D discusses the barriers to implementation and proposes possible administrative solutions to ensure the realisation of tribal women’s inheritance rights. A. Historical Legal Framework Inheritance under traditional Hindu Law has been structured through the dual lenses of the Mitakshara and Dayabhaga schools of thought. Both were patriarchal, though in distinct ways: the prevalent Mitakshara system was patrilineal, and women were not allowed to be coparceners. The property devolved according to survivorship, and with each birth and death, the share of the surviving male either diminished or enlarged. Whereas the Dayabhaga school of thought allowed widows to inherit property when there was no male heir, but that right ceased to exist as soon as the widow who got the property died, ensuring property eventually reverted to male lines. Innumerable attempts were made thereafter to provide women with their property rights, culminating in the HSA, 1956, which made widows and sons equal heirs. The 1956 Act, however, did not recognise daughters as coparceners, preventing women from having equal rights to ancestral property. The  2005 amendment  corrected this injustice, granting daughters equal rights to ancestral property, marking a historic recognition of gender parity in inheritance rights.   Yet, for tribal women, Section 2(2) of the HSA remained an impenetrable barrier. This meant that, despite the 2005 amendment granting equal coparcenary rights to daughters, tribal women can not claim inheritance as a statutory right. Instead, they are governed by their own customary law, which has historically been exclusionary to women, only allowing them limited rights over property. While customary practices vary among different tribes, the underlying framework remains predominantly patrilineal . In the Angami and Adibasi community, women were expressly excluded from inheriting clan land, legitimised by the notion that daughters would join their husband’s household, where property rights lay with men. Interestingly, in matrilineal tribes like the Garo or Khasi, where daughters ostensibly inherited ancestral property, the real control of such property was often exercised by the male relatives, relegating women to mere custodians rather than proper owners. Thus, through the 2005 amendment, Hindu women continued enjoying statutory relief and protection, but tribal women’s situation remained pernicious on account of exclusionary customs. B.     Constitutional Principles Governing Gender and Custom The Constitution of India meticulously prioritises fundamental rights over discriminatory customs, securing constitutional promises precedence over archaic traditions. Articles 14  and 15  affirm equality before the law and prohibit discrimination on the grounds of sex. Article 38  and Article 46  direct states to preclude inequalities and concomitantly to endeavour for the protection and promotion of economically and socially disadvantaged individuals, thus discharging their duty as per the parens patriae  concept. Consequently, these provision mandates states and the judiciary with positive obligations in establishing that customs and personal law do not contribute to perpetuating gender inequality.  The Indian judiciary has consistently applied these principles in its interaction with exclusionary tribal customs. In the judgment of Madhu Kishwar v. State of Bihar ,  it was observed by Justice Ramaswamy that local customary law is biased and denying women inheritance would reinforce existing inequalities. In the State of Nagaland & Anr v. Rosemary Dzuvichu  (Naga Mothers case), the Gauhati High Court clarified that customs cannot be ossified dogmas undermining constitutional guarantees. Similarly, in Sarwango v. Urchamin , the absence of a binding exclusionary custom allowed the Court to uphold the daughters’ inheritance on the grounds of equity, justice, and good conscience. In Bahadur v. Bratiya , the Himachal Pradesh High Court, adopting a revisionist approach, held that customs excluding females from inheritance are manifestly contrary to public policy and such arbitrary customary practices cannot be upheld under the guise of tradition.  The Rajasthan High Court grappled with the social and economic impact of the exclusion of tribal women from inheritance rights and the protection of the HSA in the case of  Manni Devi v Rama Devi . In this case, the claim of a woman belonging to the Meena community seeking inheritance rights over property that her father had alienated through a gift deed had been dismissed by the Board of Revenue basis of section 2(2) of the HSA. Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand called Section 2(2) a “formidable barrier” and “manifestly unjustified”   when compared to the rights of non-tribal daughters. The court strenuously restored Manni Devi’s claim and urged Parliament to act so that women of the Scheduled Tribes are not dependent on judicial discretion. Contrastingly, the judiciary in Butaki Bai v. SukhBati  developed the problematic ‘ Test of Hinduization ’ – to claim benefits under the HSA, a tribal woman must prove with proper legal evidence that she has abandoned her customary succession law and has fully adopted Hindu law to be governed by it in matters of inheritance. Yet, the larger jurisprudential trend has been towards maintaining constitutional equality as the standard against which customs must be judged. By the time the Ram Charan  case reached the Supreme Court, this trajectory of cases clearly indicates that gender-exclusionary customs have been interpreted as antithetical to constitutional morality. C. The Pivotal Supreme Court Judgment in Ram Charan & Ors. v. Sukhram & Ors. (2025) The Supreme Court’s decision in Ram Charan marked a progressive approach towards reconciling customary law with constitutional guarantees of gender equality in matters of succession in tribal communities. The case concerned ancestral property belonging to a Gond family, in which the legal heirs of Dhaiya, a tribal woman, were excluded from succession on the grounds of a customary prohibition against women inheriting property. Both the trial court and the High Court upheld this exclusion, reasoning that customary law governed tribal succession and that HSA was inapplicable to Scheduled Tribes by virtue of Section 2(2). The issue before the Supreme Court, therefore, was whether such a custom could withstand constitutional scrutiny and displace the equal rights of women and their heirs. The Court reaffirmed the principle that customs must be strictly proved and cannot be presumed merely based on sporadic practice. It held that the defendants had failed to demonstrate the existence of a uniform, obligatory custom barring women from succession. More fundamentally, the Court emphasised that customs are not static but must evolve in consonance with constitutional morality. It rejected the argument that exclusionary practices, even if claimed as custom, could survive the scrutiny of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. The Court further clarified that the statutory exclusion in Section 2(2) of the HSA cannot legitimise sex-based discrimination in succession, particularly when such practices undermine fundamental rights. In allowing the appeal, the Court declared that Dhaiya’s legal heirs are entitled to an equal share in the ancestral property. Further, the apex court also urged Parliament to consider extending the Hindu Succession Act to Scheduled Tribes to prevent similar exclusions in the future ( See   LiveLaw Report ). The judgment thus reaffirms the constitutional morality that customs, however longstanding, cannot be permitted to perpetuate discrimination against women. D. Barriers to Implementation, and the pathway to realisation of Rights The judgment in Ram Charan  carries profound implications for tribal communities and gender parity through women's empowerment. By recognising tribal women and their heirs as entitled to equal succession rights, the Court has not only delivered justice in an individual dispute but also set a precedent with the potential to reshape succession in tribal societies. Secure inheritance rights are closely linked with economic agency, enabling women to access land, credit, and state entitlements. ( See   generally OHCHR Report ) In the Indian society where land ownership is the basis of livelihood and identity, the recognition of women’s rights represents both material empowerment and a symbolic break from entrenched patriarchy. Legislative action could provide uniformity and certainty, while ensuring that tribal women are not deprived of rights available to women elsewhere. Yet, the path to effective implementation is fraught with challenges ( See   here ). Local revenue systems often fail to capture women’s claims, and enforcement of court decrees may be hindered by administrative inertia. Moreover, resistance from traditional leaders and patriarchal community structures is foreseeable, as the decision disrupts power hierarchies embedded in customary governance, while justifying their opposition under the garb of ‘cultural preservation.’ This unrest can escalate tensions, leading to conflict and reluctance to execute court orders recognising female heirs. Further, many tribal women lack awareness of their rights post the Court’s ruling. Even if they were aware, they face immense familial and social pressures discouraging assertion of their inheritance rights. Alongside legal reform, sustained efforts toward raising legal literacy and sensitising tribal communities about gender equality will be essential to translate the ratio of Ram Charan  into meaningful social change. Such initiatives can empower tribal women to claim their rightful inheritance, advancing their autonomy and social status. Sensitisation campaigns, paralegal support, and accessible legal aid are necessary to translate rights into reality. Equally important is the training of revenue and judicial officers to ensure fidelity to the Supreme Court’s constitutional reasoning at the grassroots. Ram Charan is an important breakthrough, but it is only the beginning of a longer struggle for tribal women’s property rights. The judgment opens the constitutional door to equality, yet it does not by itself dismantle the deep legal, social, and administrative barriers that still restrict tribal women’s lives. Clear legislative reform, and sustained efforts to change social attitudes are necessary to ensure that the promise of this judgment is fulfilled. * Y. Leela Krishna Reddy is a fourth-year law student pursuing B.B.A. LL.B (Hons.) at National Law University, Jodhpur. *Udit Jain is a third year law student pursuing B.A. LL.B (Hons.) at National Law University, Jodhpur. The views expressed above are the author's alone and do not represent the beliefs of Family Law Chronicle: The CFL Blog.

*by Khushi Jain What happens if a Sikh solemnises marriage through Anand Karaj only to be told later that they can get their marriage registered solely under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955  ( “HMA” ). This dissonance exposes a deeper structural issue within India’s personal law regime. It remarks the persistent gap between symbolic recognition and substantive legal autonomy. There have been widespread debates centred on comprehensive legal frameworks for asserting their religious and cultural identity and obtaining complete legal protection. The Anand Marriage Act, 1909  ( “The Act” ) was thus enacted to recognise the validity of marriages solemnised through the Sikh religious ceremony known as Anand Karaj. However, the statute initially lacked a framework for registration. Parliament amended the Act in 2012 to address certain gaps. It directed states to frame rules for registering Anand Karaj marriages, maintain a Marriage Register, and issue certified extracts, while clarifying that non-registration does not affect the validity of the marriage. Despite this mandate, several States and Union Territories failed to notify the required rules. In light of the debate, in Amanjot Singh Chadha v. Union of India & Ors. ,  the Supreme Court directed states and UTs to frame rules of registration of Sikh marriages.  The blog analyses the framework and provision of the Anand Marriage Act post- 2012 Amendment . Centred on the precise conundrum, the blog addresses whether the interim requirement that couples be allowed to register Anand Karaj marriages under existing registration laws until States notify rules unduly burdens the Act’s purpose or whether it is a necessary protective measure to prevent administrative denial. The piece highlights the limitations of the Act, including gaps in substantive matrimonial rights as well as administrative challenges arising from inconsistent state-level implementation. Towards the end, the blog analyses the practical and symbolic implications of the Act for the Sikh community and proposes reforms to transform it from a procedural recognition statute into a comprehensive, enforceable framework that balances religious identity with legal protection. FROM CEREMONY TO REGISTRATION: LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ANAND MARRIAGES The legal framework governing Sikh marriages in India is primarily shaped by the Anand Marriage Act, 1909, and its 2012 amendment, alongside HMA. Under Section 2 of the HMA , Sikhs are formally recognised as a community within its ambit, meaning that historically Sikh couples were required to marry according to the procedures established under the HMA. The Act particularly the post-2012 amendment, ensures that Sikh couples no longer need to fall back on the HMA for administrative recognition. It has two major implications. First, it reinforces the symbolic autonomy of the Sikh community by legally acknowledging its unique marriage rites. Second, it removes the practical inconsistencies created when couples had to navigate Hindu-centric provisions for something as basic as a marriage certificate. The jurisprudence surrounding the Anand Marriage Act has recently acquired sharper constitutional contours in Amanjot Singh Chadha v. Union of India & Ors . , where the Supreme Court addressed the long-standing administrative vacuum in implementing the 2012 Amendment. The Court took judicial notice of the fact that, despite Parliament’s mandate under Section 6 directing States and Union Territories to frame registration rules, several governments had failed to do so even a decade later. The Court observed that such inaction effectively rendered the amendment nugatory and denied Sikh citizens the ability to secure official recognition of their marriages solemnised through the Anand Karaj ceremony. Exercising its constitutional authority under Articles 32 and 142 , the Bench directed all States and Union Territories to notify their respective rules within a fixed timeframe and to ensure that registration officers were designated at the district level. This judgment repositions the Anand Marriage Act within the domain of enforceable constitutional compliance rather than symbolic legislative intent, transforming it into a living instrument of minority religious autonomy. The Court’s directive in Amanjot Singh Chadha  also marked a jurisprudential shift from treating the Act as a static declaratory statute to recognising it as a vehicle for operational equality under Article 14 . The decision implicitly extended the logic of Vineet Narain v. Union of India  by holding that continued executive inaction on statutory duties could invite judicial mandamus. Consequently, the case situates the Anand Marriage Act at the intersection of religious identity, administrative accountability, and constitutional governance. Earlier, in Dolly Rani v. Manish Kumar Chanchal , the Supreme Court has emphasised that ceremonies are essential to constitute a valid marriage and registration is insufficient if the former is absent. Section 2  also explicitly defines a Sikh marriage as one solemnised through the Anand Karaj, establishing the primacy of ceremony over mere registration affirming Section 25 of Constitution . The stance affirms that Anand Karaj is legally valid, but the absence of registration creates practical vulnerabilities. Similarly, in Aman Preet Kaur v. State of Punjab (2015),  the Punjab and Haryana High Court confronted the procedural lacunae arising from the absence of notified rules under the 2012 Amendment. The Court held that until such rules were framed, marriages solemnised through Anand Karaj could be registered under general marriage registration frameworks, though it acknowledged that this was only a stop-gap arrangement. The decision illustrated the legal uncertainty produced by executive inaction while the ceremony was recognised in substance, its administrative enforceability remained fragile. Read together, these cases trace an evolution from symbolic recognition of Sikh matrimonial customs to a constitutionally enforceable right to registration and equal treatment. The trajectory from Dolly Rani  to Amanjot Singh Chadha  reveals a gradual judicial effort to bridge the gap between religious autonomy and legal protection.             GAP BETWEEN CEREMONIAL VALIDITY AND CIVIL ENFORCEMENT While other personal laws like HMA, Special Marriage Act holistically covers registration, divorce, maintenance, alimony, and adoption, the scope of Act remains narrow. It fails to address related matrimonial issues such as divorce, maintenance, child custody, adoption, or inheritance. Thereby, even if marriage is registered under the act, parties have to rely upon HMA or civil law for dissolving other disputes. It creates a façade of legal completeness, when in reality it offers only a skeletal framework. Sikh would find themselves caught in a web of overlapping legal systems inculcating registration under the Anand Marriage Act, but dissolution or ancillary relief under the Hindu Marriage Act. This duality undermines legal certainty and adds to procedural burdens. Scholars such as Tahir Mahmood  and Flavia Agnes  have argued that personal laws which recognise ceremonial identity but withhold substantive remedies constitute what “ symbolic pluralism ”. It is a superficial form of recognition that neither empowers communities nor ensures justice. The Anand Marriage Act exemplifies this paradox. The Act’s provisions for registration are minimal and largely deferential to state governments, mandating that rules be framed under Section 6.  In practice, this has led to long delays, inconsistent procedures, or complete non-notification in many states. As a result, Sikh couples often lack a uniform administrative mechanism to obtain marriage certificates. Consequently, while the Act affirms the ceremonial validity of the Anand Karaj, it falls short of converting that legitimacy into enforceable civil recognition and tangible legal protection. Similarly, in Charanjit Kaur v. State of Punjab (2017),  the same court lamented that couples married under the Anand Karaj ritual often faced procedural obstacles in securing certificates, resulting in legal uncertainty during disputes relating to inheritance or matrimonial relief. The Act assumes that state-level compliance will suffice for uniformity. It raises a matter of concern under Article 14  since framing own rules risks inconsistent procedures, varying fees, and unequal access to registration. Such variation can lead to practical inequities for Sikh couples, undermining the Act’s intent to provide clear and enforceable legal recognition across the country. Thus, administrative divergence may erode both legal certainty and the principle of equality before the law without centralised guidelines or oversight.     CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS Analysing the current framework, following observations can be made. Reforms must proceed in three prong manner including statutory consolidation, administrative standardisation, and rights-based protection. Primarily, the Act should contain a clear non-obstante clause declaring its overriding applicability to Sikh marriages and transitional provisions to allow couples married under the HMA to shift to the Anand Marriage Act subject to their consent. The Act must also incorporate protective safeguards aligned with constitutional principles, especially gender equality, by guaranteeing equal rights in matters such as maintenance, guardianship, and property, while simultaneously preventing provisions that could perpetuate discrimination or conflict with constitutional morality. Second, directives must be operationalised through a central model framework of rules issued by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs, providing standard templates for registration procedures, timelines, and record formats. Each State and Union Territory could then adapt these rules to local conditions while maintaining core uniformity. A National Anand Marriage Registration Portal (NAMRP) should be developed under the National e-Governance Plan, interlinking State registries and ensuring that marriage certificates carry nationwide legal validity. This would prevent inter-state discrepancies, facilitate verification in inheritance or immigration matters, and enhance administrative transparency It needs to be complimented with strengthening of institutional mechanisms, with family courts being specifically empowered to adjudicate disputes under this Act with designated registration officers at the district level, under the supervision of family courts, can provide local accessibility and accountability. Third, awareness campaigns and legal literacy initiatives by Union and State Governments, in collaboration with the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC)  and community organisations within the Sikh community, would further enhance its practical utility, transforming it into a living piece of legislation rather than a relic of identity politics. In consonance, states must be bound by statutory deadlines to frame rules, and couples facing denial of registration must have access to quick grievance redressal mechanisms before family courts or tribunals. Finally, judicial clarity is equally essential in ensuring the effective functioning of the Anand Marriage Act. Currently, the absence of comprehensive provisions often forces courts to rely on the Hindu Marriage Act or general civil law, resulting in inconsistent outcomes and uncertainty for litigants. Courts must adopt a consistent interpretive approach in determining jurisdiction over disputes arising from marriages solemnised under the Act. Clear judicial reasoning on whether such disputes should be exclusively governed by the Anand Marriage Act or by parallel personal laws would create predictability, reduce procedural confusion, and protect parties from the hardships of navigating multiple legal frameworks. *Khushi Jain is a 2nd Year Law Student studying B.A. LL.B (Hons.) at Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, Lucknow. The views expressed above are the author's alone and do not represent the beliefs of Family Law Chronicle: The CFL Blog.

*by Shivansh Singh Having recognised the concurrence of NFTs with the existing property framework under HSA in the previous part  of the article, the second part of the article shall continue by inquiring into the legal roadblocks that hinder the incorporation of NFTs and blockchain-based digital assets at large within the Inheritance landscape in India.  I.     CHALLENGES IN APPLYING HINDU LAW TO NFT INHERITANCE? Unlike physical property, which is well-regulated under the HSA, digital assets exist in decentralised networks and beyond Indian jurisdiction, which delegitimises them under inheritance law. A.    The Decentralised Operational Framework of Blockchain The blockchain transaction log is kept in real-time synchronised on a decentralised network of autonomous computers or servers, otherwise known as nodes, which are like a database spread in thousands of identical copies on several systems. A block is only added to the blockchain when these nodes (computationally compelling blockchain network members) agree to its legitimacy. The blockchain acts as a dynamic and exhaustive ledger, whereby every transaction is irrevocably logged and gathered into blocks. However, before its inclusion in a prospective new block, the transaction must initially be validated  as genuine by every node in the network. To verify the integrity of the proposed block, there are dedicated participants known as miners who compete to solve complex cryptographic procedures. Thus, blockchain functions as an operating system with smart contracts created  for its practical use. It is also a self-maintaining database with an app development platform. Therefore, this eliminates the need for a traditional middleman, such as a bank, central authority, or other reliable third party, to track and store assets and transaction information.  B.    The Jurisdictional Dilemma in Blockchain and NFTs This aspect of blockchain technology gives rise to its lack of specific jurisdiction, owing to the highly dispersed nature of the nodes on a blockchain, which can be positioned anywhere around the globe, with no means to pinpoint its specific location  due to its algorithmic randomisation.  However, regarding legal considerations, the non-demarcated jurisdiction of blockchain-based assets like NFTs poses complex jurisdictional issues that require careful deliberation regarding the relevant legal relationships. The principles of title and ownership of assets differ across jurisdictions; therefore, identifying the appropriate governing law, especially regarding inheritance becomes paramount. Under ordinary circumstances, for instance, if a dispute arises in the inheritance of property situated in India, then irrespective of the mechanism of devolution of the property or the physical location of the heir, the courts having appropriate jurisdiction with respect to the area of the disputed property can be approached. The applicable laws of that jurisdiction within India would govern the dispute. However, identifying the applicable rules according to the appropriate jurisdiction becomes extremely difficult in a decentralised environment, which forms the backbone of NFTs and blockchain. Therefore, to regulate the breakups in the system, every transaction could fall under the jurisdiction of the location of every node in the network, resulting in a multiplicity of concurrent jurisdictions, yielding a vast number of legal and regulatory regimes. This means it may be challenging to identify the location of a disputed transaction inside the blockchain. Because blockchain deinstitutionalises the ledger  administrator and disperses the verification nodes globally, it becomes very challenging to determine whether a transaction was conducted on the blockchain. II.   THE PROBABLE ROAD AHEAD: FRACTIONALISATION SOLUTION The provisions for succession and inheritance are based on the divisible nature of property. Upon death, people devolve their properties, including their interests, to their legal heirs. This is known as the fractionalisation of property  concerning the property’s succession.   However, fractionalisation becomes particularly challenging for digital assets like NFTs due to their virtual and intangible nature. While Hindus can devolve their properties under HSA and ISA, there are no specific guidelines for digital assets. Therefore, if a Hindu dies intestate (without a will), the question surrounding the inheritance of their digital assets, like NFTS and how they should be distributed among Class I heirs remains unresolved and largely unexplored. For the transmission of intangible digital assets, traditional inheritance frameworks that are based on centuries-old property rights concepts are insufficient. When an owner passes away, these virtual properties risk of being lost , stolen, or falling into legal limbo without specific restrictions. The death of American billionaire Matthew Mellon  highlights the vulnerability of the existing laws in addressing the same. At the time of his death, Mellon held an estimated $1 Billion in Ripple (cryptocurrency), all of which remains inaccessible to his heirs as he did not leave the property with any instructions about its inheritance and the modalities for the same. A fractionalised NFT , or F-NFT, refers to dividing an NFT into smaller units for divided or fractional ownership of the original token. The fractionalisation is achieved by interlocking the larger, main-body NFT in a smart contract (self-executing arrangements based on blockchain, contingent on fulfilling pre-decided conditions), which divides the original NFT into a predetermined number of consecutive shares. NFTs are usually created  based on the ERC-721 template, which is locked in a smart contract, thereby splitting a single ERC-721 token into multiple ERC-20 tokens as per the instructions of the NFT owner. Each fraction or ERC-20 token created, therefore, represents divided ownership of the NFT.   This is analogous to the physical division of property as we understand it under classical HSA, wherein, for instance, a single unit of property owned by a Hindu male when divided among his three offspring (Class I heir) would be divided into one-third equal units in accordance with Section 8  of HSA. Likewise, under fractionalisation of NFTs, a single unit of NFT can be divided into similar subunits as per the discretion of the owner of the property. III. WHERE DOES THE WORLD STAND: A GLOBAL OUTLOOK The United States, in this regard, has adopted the Revised Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act (RUFADAA), 2015 , which attributes legal recognition to digital assets, categorising them on the same footing as tangible property. Section 2(10) . However, RUFADAA doesn’t provide any statutory guidelines with respect to the inheritance of such assets, and keeps itself confined to the privacy of the information contained within such assets. However, it does create a caretaker relationship by nominating two classes of individuals eligible to handle the digital assets, viz , the custodian and the fiduciary. Furthermore, the judicial position in the US is heterogeneous in this regard. Whilst the case of Shin v. ICON Foundation has somewhat established preliminary guidelines attributing the legal recognition of cryptoassets to property considerations, the case of United States v. Chastain  restricts the wider interpretation of digital assets as property. The court in Shin has recognised assets hosted on blockchain as capable of being possessed using three metrics: a) precise definition, b) exclusive possession, and c) control and exclusivity claims. Whereas, in Chastain , the court has restricted the property rights to traditional forms of property, explicitly excluding digital assets from the same. The European Union has set up the Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA) Regulation , its very first major regulatory regime for crypto-assets, their issuers, and their service providers. With the aim of introducing coherence and consistency into the regulation of cryptoassets throughout all EU member states, under the proposed regulation, any provider of services relating to crypto-assets within the EU will be obligated to obtain authorisation from national authorities. This authorisation will allow them to lawfully issue and sell digital tokens across the EU.  This creates the interpretation of cryptoassets, very close to that of legal property. The United Kingdom, through the case of AA v Persons Unknown & Ors, Re Bitcoin , has officially recognised Bitcoin, a type of cryptoasset, as property for the purpose of granting proprietary injunctions following a cyberattack. Moreover, the Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Amendment) Regulations 2019 have brought cryptoasset firms, i.e., those engaged in the exchange or holding of cryptoassets, into the regulatory framework ( Section 52B ). Furthermore, specifically w.r.t. NFTs, the London High Court, through the case of Lavinia Deborah Osbourne v Persons Unknown Category A & Ors , established that NFTs are equivalent to properties in English Law, through which the UK has recognised NFTs as legal property . IV. CONCLUSION India has largely remained dormant in legislating NFTs in both commercial and personal domains of law, leaving several prominent gaps unaddressed. The question over the inheritance of NFTs and other crypto/digital assets might not pose any significant legal discrepancy at the status quo; however, the application of legal enterprise towards bridging the gaps above, even when interpreted to be theoretical, for finding sound solutions is a vital step towards the future development of the law in this aspect, which would have a corollary impact on other avenues of law, as any inquisition over the inheritance of such properties would naturally require redefining and expanding the entire concept of property. Additional legislative recommendations towards the integration, in addition to the aforementioned fractionalisation model, include recognising digital assets under Indian succession laws, legalising blockchain-based wills, and formulating digital asset custodianship laws. *Shivansh Singh is a 2nd-Year law student pursuing B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) from Integrated Law Course (ILC), Faculty of Law, University of Delhi. The views expressed above are the author's alone and do not represent the beliefs of Family Law Chronicle: The CFL Blog.

*by Shivansh Singh This blog is a part of a special two-part issue. Stay tuned to read the next instalment of the blog. Introduction In 2022, Singapore, through the judgment of Janesh s/o Rajkumar v Unknown Person,  officially recognised the proprietary rights of NFTs. This legal recognition of NFTs is a natural first step in incorporating digital assets into the evolving economic framework of global property rights. However, this judgment also raises a pertinent question about the modalities of inheriting these digital assets, if they are to be treated as conventional properties. The engagement with this aspect of inheritance is largely lacking in India, where digital assets remain mostly unregulated by the Indian Courts and parliament. The rise of digital assets, such as cryptocurrencies and non-fungible tokens (NFTs), has reshaped the concepts of property, ownership, and wealth in contemporary times. In India, this change is being implemented within a legal regime of inheritance based on conventional concepts of physical property, particularly under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the HSA). NFTs and other distinct blockchain-authenticated digital tokens now form a considerable portion of wealth for many. Yet, the legal nature of such assets is uncertain, particularly in the context of inheritance and succession. Therefore, the first part  of this article explores this critical gap by first understanding NFTs and other digital assets in the Indian context, followed by examining how far NFTs and other digital assets are included (or excluded) in (or out of) the current Indian inheritance regime. Considering that a significant portion of the inheritance matters in India is governed by the HSA, the article shall carry forward this discussion to the same extent. The second part  of the article highlights the challenges deterring the adoption of NFTs in the Indian inheritance regime, following which it examines the fractionalization model of digital assets and delineates its utility in Indian inheritance law. In the concluding section, the article provides ancillary recommendations to address the policy gap.  Understanding NFTs And Digital Assets In The Indian Context A non-fungible token (NFT)  is a type of cryptographic asset used to verify digital ownership of unique assets. NFTs provide a secure record authenticated with a unique identifying code stored on the blockchain. It is characterised by its uniqueness , which makes it irreplaceable against any other virtual entity in the world. Blockchain acts as an immutable, shared ledger that records transactions and tracks assets in a business network. At a cumulative annual growth rate (CAGR) of 57%, the Indian Web3 market  is expected to reach $1.1 billion by 2032, up from $0.0049 billion in 2022. Accordingly, it is anticipated that the Indian NFT market will generate $ 9,247.9 million in net revenue by 2030, growing at a CAGR of 36.9%  from 2024 to 2030 . It is estimated to be valued at 77.5 million USD  in 2025. Even on the consumer side, the demand for exclusivity-based NFT ownership constantly increases. This is reflected in the increase in startup ventures, with 71 NFT startups launched in 2021, and more than 86 NFT startups operating outside of India . Additionally, 18 per cent of ultra-high-net-worth individuals in India have invested in crypto assets, with 10 per cent and 8 per cent invested in NFTs. Incidentally, there exists no concurrent legal framework to regulate NFTs and their commercial dealings, except for the I ncome Tax Act of 1961 , which includes NFTs under the definition of virtual digital assets (VDA)  following the introduction of this term through the 2022 amendments, which taxes them at 30 per cent. The government has attempted to regulate digital currencies by introducing the Cryptocurrency and Regulation of Official Digital Currency Bill, 2021 , to create a supervising framework monitored by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI); however, this bill has yet to become law. Therefore, the interplay between NFTs and other virtual assets, which don’t exist in terms of tangible and material possession, and the law of inheritance in India emerges as an exciting area of study, given the rapid inclusion of NFTs in the modes of wealth acquisition, as indicated by the figures mentioned before.  Defining Property Under Hindu Law, And Does It Cover Digital Assets? Hindu law is primarily governed by the general scheme of succession laid down under the HSA. The term property has not been explicitly defined in the HSA. The Indian Courts have, however, described the term ancestral property  under classical Hindu law as a property inherited by a person up to four generations of male lineage by birth. Furthermore, an HSA allows a person to make a will or testament  to transfer their separate property.  Section 8 of the HSA outlines the “general rules of succession for males”, stating that the property of a Hindu male who dies intestate passes into his Class I heirs, followed by Class II heirs, and agnates and cognates. Furthermore, a property in the name of any member of the joint family is ipso facto  presumed to have been acquired from out of family funds and to be part of the joint family property if the joint family has enough nucleus to develop it . on the date of acquisition, unless it is sufficiently demonstrated and proven that the acquisition was from separate funds and not the joint family funds. Section 8  of the HSA also provides that the property inherited by a Hindu male from his father after  1956 is his separate property. Therefore, a distinct definition of the term " property " for inheritance can be determined from two primary qualifications:  ●      Alienation Right  -  By distinguishing it from the ancestral property, a separate property can be understood as any property owned by a person exclusively with absolute powers over its disposal. NFTs aptly satisfy this qualification. ●      Mode of Acquisition - The property acquired through one’s earnings, predicated on one’s skills or effort, is deemed self-acquired . NFTs also qualify under this categorisation. Where there is no statutory definition, the word " property " under the interpretation of the HSA can be construed broadly to include inherited as well as self-acquired property, subject to the proviso that they do not form part of a coparcenary property, thereby making such property freely alienable and subject to testamentary or intestate succession under the Act. This interpretative approach becomes crucial in dealing with emerging forms of property like digital property and NFTs, whose classification and devolution under Hindu law must be based on an advanced and adaptive concept of " property ." *Shivansh Singh is a 2nd-Year law student pursuing B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) from Integrated Law Course (ILC), Faculty of Law, University of Delhi. The views expressed above are the author's alone and do not represent the beliefs of Family Law Chronicle: The CFL Blog. Editorial Note: This first part concludes the author's analysis of the conceptual compatibility between NFTs and the property framework under the Hindu Succession Act, laying the groundwork for a broader inquiry into the legal treatment of digital assets. The forthcoming second part will turn to the practical and doctrinal challenges that complicate the integration of NFTs and blockchain-based assets into the Indian inheritance regime. Readers interested in the intersection of technology and succession law are encouraged to follow the next installment of this two-part series.

*by Sunidhi Khabya Introduction Marriage as an Institution has been universally recognised as a sacred and lasting bond, though its meaning has evolved with the changing needs of society. In many cultural and religious contexts, alternative forms of marriages have emerged. Amongst one such evolved ‘meaning’ is the practice of “pleasure marriages”. The practice allows for temporary unions, which are often cloaked in religious or societal justifications. Although short in duration, these unions generate permanent legal-ethical conflicts and ambiguities raising the inevitable questions of consent, gender justice and protection of vulnerable individuals. Understanding Pleasure Marriages: Historical & Religious Context Marriages in Islam, by their very nature, are contractual. Historically, pleasure marriages have found mentions in Islamic traditions. Muta’h Marriage is one of the forms. The term Muta’h derives from the Arabic word meaning “pleasure” or “enjoyment”. Historians trace the practice back to the times when Arab women used to entertain Men in their tents; the men had to pay an entrance fee and could be kicked out anytime at the desire of the women. Such a union conferred no rights or responsibilities, and the objective of this marriage was just for pleasure. The practice involves various hazards and has been denounced by multiple Islamic scholars due to its inherent risks and unethical nature. Muta’h marriage is mostly practices by the followers of Ithna Ashari School under the Shia Muslims . Sunni Law however, does not consider it valid. In the Quran, such marriages have been permitted “ And you are allowed to seek out wives with your wealth in decorous conduct, but not in fornication, but give them their reward for what you have enjoyed of them in keeping with your promise. (4:24) ” Notably, Muta’h marriages can also be concluded by the representatives of the woman. If the father gives the daughter to a man through an oral promise, even then the marriage becomes concluded and valid. If a woman agrees to a declaration of marriage by a man, then also the contract becomes valid. By contrast, religions such as Hinduism and Christianity believe marriage to be a relatively permanent institution and view such practices as incompatible with their conception of marriage. In Hinduism, marriage is considered a sacred bond for seven lives. The purpose of this institution is broad and societal, not just the pleasure of individuals.  Legal Perspectives In India: Judicial Interpretations. Indian laws do not recognise such temporary marriages, and the courts have clarified the position of the law time and again. The meaning of Muta’h marriage was dwelled upon in “ Shoharat Singh v. Musammat Jafri Bibi ” , the court held that such marriage does not confer any rights upon the woman on her husband's property. Still, the courts consider any children conceived from such wedlock legitimate and capable of inheriting their father's property. The courts thus validated the status of children under personal laws whilst restricting their inheritance rights. In the case of “ Syed Amanuallah Hussain and Ors. v. Rajamma and Ors .”  The question of law was whether a Muta’h marriage lasted till the death of the husband, and upon the husband's death, the wife inherited the husband's properties. The husband’s brother challenged this. The court held that if the term for the “Muta’h marriage” is not specified in the contract, then the court treats it as a normal, permanent marriage. Previously, in the judgement of “ Shahzada Qanum v. Fakher Jahan ”,  it was clarified that if a muta’h marriage lacks a specified time period, it is treated as a permanent nikah. Thus, time duration becomes critical in distinguishing between a temporary alliance and permanent marriage. In “ Mohammed Abid Ali Kumar Kadar v. Ludden Sahiba (Minor) ” the court held that spouses do not have the right to divorce in Muta’h marriages. Nevertheless, there are alternative ways of disposing of the contract of marriage. If the parties cohabit even after the expiration of the fixed duration, then the court presumes that the duration has been extended. Thus, there can be an implied extension of the marriage if the partners continue to cohabit after the fixed duration of the alliance expires. In “ Luddun v. Mirza Kumar ” ,   the wife filed a petition under Section 536   of the Code of Criminal Procedure for obtaining maintenance. The court observed that personal laws do not take away the statutory right of maintenance under section 536 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, the wife could claim maintenance. Thus, the Indian courts have, upheld women’s rights from the very beginning in cases of Muta’h Marriages or pleasure marriages. However, the legal recognition of temporary marriages varies across jurisdictions owing to the divergence in religious doctrines, socio-cultural contexts, and state policies. International Practices: Contrasting Approaches While some of the Islamic nations incorporate these unions into their personal laws, many secular and non-Islamic legal systems outrightly reject such practices as they conflict with the constitutional rights of women and are glaringly opposed to public policy. In the Shia majority country of Iran, temporary alliances (Nikah mut’ah) are legally recognised   and codified under the civil law system. The Iranian Civil Code, under Chapter 6 ( Article 1075 to Article 1077 ) explicitly allows for temporary marriages, and the subsequent chapter sets out requirements for a specific duration and mahr  (dower). The woman in temporary marriage is entitled to maintenance within the duration of the marriage, while the children born out of such a union are considered legitimate and enjoy inheritance rights under Iranian law. However, these statutory protections are not uniform in implementation and lead to potential misuse of the provisions to circumvent adultery laws and facilitate exploitative relationships under the garb of religious sanction. In Iraq as well, pleasure marriages are illegally performed by some clerics, which is often child trafficking under the garb of muta’h marriage . Here, if a child under the age of 9 years is promised in marriage, then ‘sexual touching’ is considered to be religiously permitted . Thus, the practice has become a breeding ground for child trafficking and prostitution in Iraq. The lack of judicial protection, combined with the patriarchal interpretations of sharia law, often leaves women and children vulnerable to the assaults of men in power, especially when it comes to cross-border elements or undocumented marriages. In contrast to this, Sunni-majority countries, which follow the Hanafi jurisprudence of Sunni schools, generally regard such unions as invalid and akin to prostitution. India does accord statutory recognition to such an alliance, but the judiciary has constantly protected the rights of women and their children born through such an alliance. Most western jurisdictions do not recognise temporary marriages in any form; any such alliance is either treated as non-marital cohabitation or null and void in some cases for public policy reasons. The increasing global culture of pleasure marriages in the form of tourism in economically weak countries like Indonesia, Malaysia and parts of North Africa has drawn attention from      human rights organisations across the globe. Ethical and Social Concerns The practice of temporary pleasure marriages has many risks; the major problems include primarily the exploitation of women by forcing them into unwanted marriages and thereby into forced sexual intercourse with the temporary husband, with no legal recourse under the provisions for sexual offences. Such marriages might even lead to larger humanitarian issues, such as human trafficking of women for prostitution under the garb of marriage. Consent becomes an issue as it is hard to decipher whether or not it was given without coercion. The question arises regarding the maintenance of the children born out of such wedlock, including their inheritance and property rights. Such problems as bigamy, which is prohibited by the laws of many countries, might arise when the spouses are not aware of the background of their partners, thus violating the rights of the original wife. Pleasure marriage tourism, which has increased in recent times, also poses significant challenges as the husband leaves the country after such temporary marriage and cannot be contacted for maintenance or Alimony, thus leaving the women alone to deal with the consequences of such union. Problems of increased risks of sexually transmitted diseases and subjugation of women are another significant risk involved. This has been seen in the recent developments on pleasure marriage tourism in countries like Indonesia . These alliances blur the lines between marriage, prostitution and trafficking, raising serious questions on consent, dignity and autonomy of women; while these unions are defended on grounds of religious identity, their real-world implications must be considered. The Way Forward It is imperative that countries that recognise pleasure marriages must introduce stringent procedural safeguards with clear and mandatorily written contracts ensuring informed consent of both parties. Further, the socio-economic protection of women must be secured through the right to maintenance, healthcare, and education for children born out of such a union. It is of grave importance that cross-border pleasure marriage be criminalised to avoid sexual exploitation and human trafficking; bilateral and international agreements could be arrived at to hold perpetrators accountable across jurisdictions. Moreover, the government should mandate the registration of all marriages, regardless of their form, to prevent abuse; this would ensure legal protection to undocumented spouses and children. Conclusion In pluralistic legal systems, there is an increasing need to harmonise personal laws with constitutional safeguards; the institution of temporary alliance is a tool of subjugation which cannot be shielded under the veil of religious sanction. Thus, as societies evolve, legal systems must attempt to strike a balance between cultural pluralism and universal human rights. Lawmakers must regulate such practices, and protection must be provided to the vulnerable groups. Temporary unions may exist, but the questions they raise about consent, dignity, accountability and justice are far from temporary. They are permanent and critical.  *Sunidhi Khabya is a third-year law student pursuing a B.A. LL.B (Hons.) from National Law University, Jodhpur. The views expressed above are the author's alone and do not represent the beliefs of Family Law Chronicle: The CFL Blog.

*by Rajveer Singh Sachdev & Aman Anand Introduction The Surrogacy (Regulation) Act of 2021 [hereinafter “The Act”] banned commercial surrogacy in India. Defined under S2(g) of the Act, it occurs when surrogacy involves payments or incentives beyond medical expenses and insurance for surrogate mothers, which is explicitly prohibited. Permissible expenses typically include medical costs and other prescribed expenditures for the surrogate. The alternative proposed to this was the concept of altruistic surrogacy [ Section 2(b) ], which involves no payment or compensation other than the medical expenses and insurance coverage for the surrogate mother. This difference is very narrow, as the only  discernible difference  lies in the payment to the surrogate mother. While the intention behind this framework is to protect the surrogacy process and prevent the exploitation of surrogate mothers, scholars have argued that under-the-table transactions and the grey area involving altruistic surrogacy could lead to its commercialisation in the traditional sense without proper regulations [See Also:   Das and Maut (2014), Payne (2018), Kashyap and Tripathi (2018) ]. This blog will further delve into the idea of the commercialisation of surrogacy, and argue that potentially inefficient enforcement mechanisms could result in the formation of an unregulated market for the same. Commercial Surrogacy Commercial surrogacy was unregulated in India since 2002, until it was eventually banned in 2015 . Prior to the ban in 2015, India was a major hub for surrogacy and was often called the “ Baby Factory .” Due to low cost and favorable conditions, India attracted a lot of foreigners from countries like the UK and the USA. The lack of employment and high amount of compensation after 9 months made commercial surrogacy a popular practice in India. However, due to a lack of proper rules and regulations, unethical practices and exploitation of women  were prevalent. Ethical issues like treating women as ‘objects’ or ‘commodities’ were also brought up [ See Also : Clowes and Cantu (2023) , Kindo et. Al. (2023) , Saxena et. al. (2012) ]. A   study in 2012   estimated the size of the surrogacy industry to be 2 billion dollars per year . In 2015, commercial surrogacy was banned, and the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021, introduced altruistic surrogacy in India. The surrogate mother, being genetically related to the intending parents [ Sec. 2(zg) ] will be allowed to indulge in altruistic surrogacy. The surrogate mother must be married and should have a biological child [ Sec 4(iii)(b)(I) ]. The Act imposes a   ban   on foreigners, live-in couples, gay couples, overseas Indians and single parents from opting for commercial surrogacy. Commercial surrogacy was deemed immoral  as it treats women as a commodity, and sometimes the woman is not paid appropriately for her time, effort, pain, danger and suffering involved in the course of bearing the child [ See Also :   Arneson (2018) , Blazier and Janssens (2020) ]. The surrogate children often struggle for their nationality and are delivered without a recognised nationality [ See Also:   Baby Manji Yamada vs Union Of India (2008) , Jan Bazaz vs Anand Municipality and Ors (2009) ]. The safety of the surrogate mother was often compromised, and there were no regulations or safety provisions for the mother. The lack of a proper legal system and rules led to the ban on commercial surrogacy in India. However, as the blog will argue, this complete ban on commercial surrogacy doesn’t serve its intended purpose. Arguments 1.     Demand for commercial surrogacy won’t disappear due to it being banned Rooted in basic economic theory, the banning of something won’t automatically cause its  demand to be extinguished  from the market. As long as there is a demand, the supply for the same will continue to rise in an unregulated sector. Despite the US’s prohibition on alcohol during the 1920s, the demand remained the same, which resulted in  illegal speakeasies . The war on drugs is another example where the demand won over the ban, and the war was won by drugs [See Also:  Esquivel-Suárez (2018) ]. The  demand for surrogacy in India is high , not only amongst infertile couples, but same-sex couples, live-in couples, etc [See Also:  Horsey (2023) ] Combine that with the economic incentive the surrogate mother receive as compensation through  under-the-table transactions, the supply  will likely remain steady. As this will fall under the category of commercial surrogacy, the same will exist in an unregulated market despite being banned. Not going into the constitutional aspects of right and freedom to trade, this unregulated market will lead to more exploitation of the surrogate mothers. 2.     Lack of Altruistic Options While the demand for surrogacy is high, altruistic surrogacy remains an option. However, the stringent requirements for the surrogate mothers render the potential candidates for the same very narrow. As per the requirements listed in sub-clause (b) of clause (iii) of Section 4 , the surrogate mother needs to be between the ages of 25-35, genetically related to the intending couple. ever-married, must have one biological child of her own and can only become a surrogate once in her lifetime. This narrows down the candidate pool. Further, most women are unwilling to undergo pregnancy, with all its risks and burdens, without compensation [ See Also :   Shenfield et al. (2025) , Saliu (2025) , Lieber (1992) ]. It risks exploiting women’s goodwill by expecting them to undergo this without compensation. In a   study done by Hibino , it was observed that women in lower strata preferred undergoing surrogacy for a compensatory sum of Rs 3 lakh to 4 lakh, which they quoted as “big money for poor families,” but held the belief that the surrogate mothers could be paid more. The attitude towards the commercialisation of surrogacy when the difference between commercial and altruistic is too simplistic to enforce correctly.   3.     Ambiguities in law and enforcement difficulties The definition of altruistic surrogacy under section 2(b) of the Act entitles the surrogate mother to medical and prescribed expenses, which have not been defined in the Act or the rules. This creates a grey area, where intended parents can compensate surrogates under the guise of “medical expenses.” Without strict guidelines or disclosure requirements, these payments can effectively become commercial transactions in all  but name [ See Also :   Jain (2024) , Stuhmcke (2017) , Bannerjee (2006) ]. Furthermore, surrogacy arrangements are deeply personal and private, typically involving only a few individuals. State authorities have limited capacity to monitor private relationships, financial transactions, or informal agreements. Even when commercial intent is suspected, proving it is difficult without clear documentation or a whistleblower, especially when both parties benefit and are unlikely to report each other. As a result of this legal vagueness and limited enforcement, an informal surrogacy market can emerge, where payments are made discreetly, in cash or non-traceable ways, contracts may be drawn up informally, outside legal scrutiny, and intermediaries and agencies operate in a semi-legal capacity, connecting intended parents and surrogates while skirting regulation. This undermines the very purpose of banning commercial surrogacy, which is often to prevent exploitation and commodification — yet those risks increase in an unregulated, underground environment.   Recommendations Some recommendations can be made to ensure smooth regulation of the same if commercial surrogacy is legalised. Firstly, a transparent framework can be made that allows commercial surrogacy under a licensed practitioner. Only registered practitioners and clinics could operate. Establishing a centralized regulatory body (e.g., National Surrogacy Board) to oversee compliance, licensing, and grievances, and mandate strict accreditation for clinics and practitioners, with regular audits could prevent exploitation. Secondly, allow all consenting women (married, unmarried, single parents, etc.) to become surrogates, provided they pass medical and psychological screenings, undergo mandatory counselling on legal, health, and emotional risks and provide informed consent without coercion. Opening up surrogacy access to single individuals, LGBTQ+ couples, and live-in partners could ensure equity. Thirdly , clarifying and broadening the difference between what commercialised and altruistic stand for could help. Vague terms like “medical expenses” and “prescribed expenses” allow room for interpretation and could lead to under-the-table transactions. Replacing them with transparent compensation structures, including base payment for the surrogate, medical, insurance, and maternity coverage, post-delivery support (if needed) would ensure transparency in payments.   Conclusion The Surrogacy Act’s outright ban on commercial surrogacy is a well-intentioned but fundamentally flawed policy. By ignoring the persistent demand for surrogacy—from infertile couples, LGBTQ+ individuals, and single parents—the law has not eliminated the practice but driven it underground, where exploitation thrives unchecked. The current altruistic model is unworkable: few women will endure pregnancy’s physical and emotional toll without compensation, and vague definitions of "medical expenses" invite covert payments. The result? A shadow market with no safeguards, no oversight, and no justice for surrogates. India has a choice—cling to an unenforceable ban that endangers women, or establish a transparent, regulated system that ensures fair compensation, medical protections, and legal accountability. Regulation won’t encourage commodification—it will prevent it by bringing surrogacy into the light, where contracts are enforced, clinics are monitored, and surrogates are empowered. The 2021 Act’s moralistic approach has failed. It’s time for a pragmatic, rights-based solution—one that prioritizes safety over symbolism, and dignity over denial. The law must change, or the exploitation will continue. The stakes are too high to ignore. * Rajveer Singh Sachdev is a second-year law student pursuing a B.A. LL.B (Hons.) from Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab. * Aman Anand is a second-year law student pursuing a B.A. LL.B (Hons.) from Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab. The views expressed above are the author's alone and do not represent the beliefs of Family Law Chronicle: The CFL Blog.

*by Sri Janani Seenivasan & Meemansha Choudhary Introduction Refugees today encounter a complex set of challenges related to property ownership and inheritance, often stemming from their displacement and growing legal complexities. While certain rights are recognized by international conventions, domestic frameworks vary significantly. In India, refugees can obtain citizenship after fulfilling specific criteria, which in theory, entitles them to the same inheritance rights as that of Indian nationals. However, various administrative hurdles and a keen focus on regularization instead of a rights-based approach, creates significant barriers in realizing this goal. Despite a broad interpretation of Article 300A  of the Constitution of India, the Indian framework remains glaringly inadequate in addressing the property acquisition and inheritance rights of refugees. The interplay of refugee laws and property rights is often an overlooked subject matter. In India, refugees are treated as ‘foreigners’ under the general immigration regulations, relegating them to a state of uncertainty. For millions of stateless refugees, a chance to live with dignity and self-reliance hinges upon them possessing  economic stability .  The lack of a consistent legal framework complicates their ability to acquire, own and inherit property, further marginalizing them. This article attempts to, firstly, assess India’s legal framework governing property acquisition and inheritance for refugees. Secondly, it delves into the challenges faced by specific groups of refugees, like the Tibetan refugees and the recent moves by the Maharashtra and Delhi governments in granting a freehold status to the Punjabi and Sindhi refugees. Thirdly, it also addresses the implications of the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019, on property and inheritance rights. Lastly, the authors emphasize the urgent need for an all-inclusive domestic refugee law that broadly addresses the rights of refugees, with a focus on streamlining the administrative process for acquiring citizenship and securing inheritance rights. India’s Approach to Property Ownership & Inheritance Rights of Refugees The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951  (‘ Refugee Convention ’) and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1967  (‘ Refugee Protocol ’) defines a refugee as a person fleeing across the international borders because of the horrors of being victimized in one’s own country on the grounds of race, nationality, religion, political opinion or social group. However, India is not a signatory to the Refugee Convention and the Protocol. Further, it does not recognize the contribution of the United Nations Human Rights Commission (‘ UNHCR ’) and prefers to handle the issue of refugees on a piece-meal basis unilaterally, avoiding a one-size-fits-all approach. In the absence of a specific refugee legislation, the Foreigners Act, 1946  (‘ The Act ’) can be best said to govern the entry, stay and exit of foreigners, including refugees. The Act does not distinctively recognize a person as a ‘refugee’ but rather treats all non-citizens as foreigners, granting broad powers to the government to regulate their movement. Further, India is known to discriminate between different marginalized groups. The Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 (‘ CAA, 2019 ’), has made religion the formal criterion for citizenship whereby all non-Muslim refugees from Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Pakistan are made eligible for Indian citizenship. Under the current regime, refugees, categorized as ‘non-citizens’, face significant limitations when it comes to owning immovable property. Although the Supreme Court  has extended the constitutional right to property under Article 300A to non-citizens, its practical application is severely restricted by the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999  (‘ FEMA ’), which governs property acquisition and transfer by non-citizens in India. Under FEMA, only non-resident Indians (NRI); i.e., citizens of India who are residents outside India and persons of Indian origin (PIO), who has held Indian passport at any point of time or if their father or grandfather was a citizen of India, could hold immovable property in India. Citizens of countries sharing land borders with India, such as Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, China, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iran or Bhutan, cannot purchase immovable property. The general permission  extends only to commercial and residential property, excluding agricultural and plantation land.  Refugees, as foreign nationals, cannot purchase any sort of immovable property, unless the property comes by virtue of inheritance through a person resident in India. This means that they can inherit property from a person resident in India, but this is also subject to the approval from the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). This rule, again, does not apply to the citizens of countries sharing land boundaries  with India, meaning that refugees like the Rohingyas from Myanmar and Bangladesh are effectively barred from inheriting property. In contrast, refugees from countries that do not share land borders may have limited inheritance rights, subject to RBI approval. Further, they may be permitted to take residential accommodation on lease for not more than five years, beyond which specific RBI permission is required. Therefore, refugees, as such, have very limited rights to own and inherit property in India.  The Case of Tibetan Refugees & Punjabi and Sindhi Refugees Under the Citizenship (Amendment) Act of 1986  (‘CAA, 1986’), Tibetan refugees born in India between 1950 and 1987 are eligible  for Indian citizenship. Although various rulings  by the judiciary mandate the government to grant citizenship to individuals who meet the criteria outlined under the Act, 1986, they face multiple administrative hurdles in obtaining the same, making the process difficult despite their eligibility. For instance, conditions such as cancelling their Identity Certificate (IC), not residing in Tibetan refugee settlements, and not receiving assistance from the Tibetan govt-in-exile, etc., discourages them from applying for citizenship. In light of the challenges faced by the Tibetan refugees, the Central Government brought the Tibetan Rehabilitation Policy of 2014 , which has resulted in several progessive changes ensuring property rights of refugees. By way of this policy, issuance of standardised lease agreements has been made mandatory for the state governments. This has allowed them limited rights to land use. State governments must sign a lease agreement for twenty years with the Central Tibetan Relief Committee (‘CTRC’),  through which the refugees can get access to land for residential, commercial and agricultural usage. However, the ownership of the land remains with the Government of India, which obstructs the inheritance of such property. In light of these administrative obstacles, the only way to ensure continous usage of the land is repeated lease renewal. A positive step has recently been taken by the governments of Maharashtra and Delhi in this regard. The Maharashtra government  has decided to grant ownership of the property allotted to the refugees under the Displaced Person (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 . In a similar manner, the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) offers ownership titles  to the families of refugees who migrated to India between 1950-60. The intention behind granting these ownership deeds is to resolve the ambiguous status of property of refugees. This step highlights the eagerness of the administration to regularise the ownership of properties across the territory. With ownership rights officially recognised, these families can now legally transfer these properties to their heirs. However, by remaining silent on clarifications regarding the stance of personal law, these decisions will have a limited impact, and the ambiguity surrounding inheritance continues to persist. Impact of the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019, on Property Inheritance Rights The CAA, 2019, alters India’s approach to refugees by enforcing a religious criterion. It offers a fast-track path to citizenship for non-Muslim refugees from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh who arrived before December 31, 2014. Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, Jains, Parsis, and Christians granted citizenship under the CAA, 2019 are eligible to acquire and inherit property under the same laws as Indian citizens after five years of residency in India, as compared to the previous twelve-year requirement. This provides them with significant economic stability and improved property rights. However, refugees who do not qualify under the CAA, 2019, particularly Muslims, and those who have arrived after 2014, face stricter restrictions. As non-citizens, their ability to inherit immovable property is limited as compared to residents of India and requires prior RBI approval. The exclusion of Muslim refugees, such as Rohingyas and Bangladeshi Muslims, raises concerns about discrimination, leaving them without a clear path to citizenship or secure property rights. Thus, the CAA, 2019, enhances property prospects for certain groups, while reinforcing legal and economic challenges for others. Conclusion The decision of granting land ownership to the refugees in India is done by way of policies, schemes and other delegated legislations, rather than a statutory instrument, which questions the effectiveness of such a tool in presence of the capacity to pass a legislation otherwise. Furthermore, these policies are framed based on administrative convenience, rather than a focus on the rights of refugees. Hence, the authors suggest that the emphasis has to be shifted from administrative convenience to a rights-based approach. For this, India must enact a national refugee law that clearly encapsulates the rights of refugees, including their right to property, which can eventually get translated into inheritance and ownership. This law should also ensure that refugees are treated as right holders, and not as ‘passive recipients’ of administrative dynamics. Additionally, the prospect of getting inheritance rights through Indian citizenship is nothing less than an illusion for many refugees. Though citizenship opens up direct access to property and inheritance rights, the complex bureaucratic and administrative processes, such as the requirement to cancel refugee documents and give up benefits , makes it increasingly difficult for most refugees to navigate and realise their rights. A framework that is ‘refugee-friendly’, taking into consideration the limitation of these communities is needed for addressing this grey area. It remains to be seen how the government will take stock of the situation and address it effectively. * Sri Janani Seenivasan is a fourth-year law student pursuing a B.A. LL.B (Business Law Hons.) at the National Law University, Jodhpur. * Meemansha Choudhary is   a fourth-year law student pursuing a B.A. LL.B (Criminal Law Hons.) at the National Law University, Jodhpur. The views expressed above are the author's alone and do not represent the beliefs of Family Law Chronicle: The CFL Blog.