*by Rohan Yadav Introduction  A landmark event occurred in the regulation of personal laws in India when the Uniform Civil Code (UCC), enshrined under Article 44   of the Indian Constitution, was enforced in Uttarakhand on January 27th, 2025. This watershed moment marked the first time in Independent India, when a civil code was enforced to regulate all the matters related to personal laws such as marriage, divorce, adoption, succession and inheritance, for everyone in a uniform manner, irrespective of religion, caste or creed. A unique feature of this law is its application under  Part III of the Act, which regulates Live-in relations in Uttarakhand and among the residents of the state living elsewhere in India. This code also marks only the second time the Uniform Civil Code has been enforced in any part of India, after the Portuguese Civil Code   of 1867 in Goa. Although   the  UCC Act in Uttarakhand   seeks to holistically regulate the legal framework governing marriage, live-in relationships, succession, divorce and matters incidental thereto as reflected in its long title , it poses serious concerns regarding autonomy, privacy and the viability of government involvement in intimate relationships such as live-in relationships. Concerns about the enforcement of the UCC Code on Live-in relationships:  The UCC defines a live-in relationship as a relationship between a man and a woman, both of whom have achieved 21 years of age. All Uttarakhand residents, including those who reside outside the state, as well as non-residents who live together in Uttarakhand, are covered by the Uttarakhand UCC Act of 2024. It mandates young couples who are currently in a live–in relationship or considering the same to register themselves with the registrar of their respective jurisdiction by giving “a statement of live-in relationship”, which is defined as per section 3(4)(d).   The enforceability of the Uniform Civil Code of 2024 in Uttarakhand, especially on the Live-in relationship couples, has some very beneficial impacts, such as the fact that children born to them are now as legitimate  under  Section 379   and it prioritises consent as well as the overall well-being of women by including maintenance under  Section 388 .  In spite of these benefits, it still raises some serious concerns regarding the regulation of Live-in relationships, a concept whose legal contours were discussed in principle by the Honourable Supreme Court in Indra Sarma vs. V.K.V. Sarma 2013 . It is pertinent to note that the judgment primarily focused on examining the scope and limits of protection provided under the   Domestic Violence Act 2005 , rather than granting an affirmative and universal legitimacy to every form of live-in arrangement. The UCC  indirectly overlooks the established jurisprudence on Live-in relationships as laid down by the Apex Court, comprising principles of dignity, autonomy and privacy by provisions such as mandating registration and parental consent before the age of 21.  Some of the most essential gaps and concerns in the newly enforced code are as follows:  Exclusion of the LGBTQIA+ community: One of the most striking gaps in the formation of this code is the exclusion of LGBTQIA+ people or those who do not fall under the category of binary, thereby undermining the very notions of inclusivity, uniformity and equality, which the code seeks to achieve. The UCC Act in Uttarakhand in entirety excludes non-binary and explicitly recognises only heterosexual unions between a “male” and a “female” as defined under Section 3(4)(b) of the code. This straightforward exclusion of the LGBTQIA+ community is particularly regressive in light of the recent landmark Supreme Court judgments that have upheld the rights of queer communities to cohabitate freely with consent, such as Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018)  and Supriyo v. Union of India (2023) .  Several contradictions between the law related to marriage and Live-in relationships:  There are some key dichotomies between the laws and statutes governing the institution of marriages and those of UCC  regulating live-in relationships in Uttarakhand such as the legal age of marriage for girls is 18 as per Hindu Marriage Act 1955 and Special Marriage Act 1954   whereas under the Uttarakhand UCC , girls have to wait until the age of 21 years to get the legal recognition of their live-in relationships. There has been neither a rational justification given to explain this flaw by the lawmakers, nor is there any record of Assembly debate addressing the legislative inconsistency whereby a girl legally permitted to marry at 18 must nevertheless wait until 21 to enter a legally recognised live-in relationship without parental consent. Moreover, non-registration of marriages has no serious penalties or imprisonment, while the same is not the case with live-in relationships. Another important contradiction is that Rule 6(4)(f) under the UCC Rules  makes compliance impractical for live–in relationship couples, falling within prohibited degrees of relationship, due to the condition of having a certificate by the partners, certified by a religious head stating that the customs and norms which govern the respective partners allow them to marry. The secularism outlined in the  Preamble   gets undermined as such a requirement introduces religious validation into a secular civil framework. Another major concern arises that neither the legislation nor the judiciary has, to date not satisfactorily disclosed how to ascertain the date from which a live-in relationship is considered to have started, as people who fail to submit the statement of such a relationship within a month of entering such a relationship may be punished under Section 387(1) . Dignity and Privacy of Live-in relationships couples: The Fundamental Right to Privacy, as enshrined in the Justice K.S.Puttaswamy (Retd) vs Union of India (2018)   and the Fundamental Right to Dignity under Article 21 ,   get seriously undermined under this code, especially for live-in couples. Mandatory live-in relationship registration is an invasive state intrusion into people’s personal lives, where couples are forced to divulge sensitive personal information to the government apparatus. The right to privacy is violated when the state puts a similar degree of restrictions upon the live-in relationships as those under marriage, by equating the two. The sharing of registration details with local police authorities is mandatorily required by the UCC  . Police involvement in confirming the legitimacy of relationships might deter couples from registering or living together due to the possibility that sensitive personal information being misused or shared without authorisation can cause people to experience discrimination, blackmail, or targeted harassment, which undermines confidence in government agencies. Such measures even strike at the heart of the Right to Dignity as enshrined under Article 21 , which comprises Individual Autonomy and the freedom to make intimate personal decisions free from disproportionate state interference. The present regulatory framework risks undermining the dignity of consenting live-in relationship couples by institutionalising coercive surveillance, stigma and moral scrutiny through mandatory verification mechanisms. Also, there is a great chance that family members who don’t support interfaith, inter-caste or nonmarital relationships will engage in moral policing and intrusion. Even via obtaining information from landlords, people may attempt to harass these couples by making fictitious complaints to the local police. Moreover, the dignity of young adults (18-20 years) also gets violated due to the mandatory condition of obtaining parental consent, thus obstructing their independent decision-making power about their personal relationships .  Hardships created by the UCC Act for Women in live-in relationships:   The live-in relationship provisions under the Uttarakhand UCC , especially related to mandatory registration, a wide range of verification powers to the registrar and denial of registration on grounds such as "public policy" and "morality," which are vaguely defined, have the potential risk of being enforced more as surveillance rather than as recognition. The Code violates the privacy and dignity of the couple by putting an obligation upon them to disclose their personal information to the officials. This can lead to women being subjected to increased family pressure and societal stigma in situations wherein the concept of live-in relationships is still not accepted by society . The provisions related to making non-registration illegal and giving wide discretionary powers to the registrar   negatively obstruct the dignity, privacy and autonomy of a woman as well as make it difficult for her to engage in an interfaith live-in relationship. This is because often women are construed as being responsible for maintaining the sanctity of a family and sexual morality, which eventually leads to the defeat of one of the main provisions of this code, i.e. ensuring greater dignity and autonomy for women.  Moving towards bridging the gaps and concerns under the Uttarakhand UCC Act for live-in couples:  Replace Mandatory Policing with Incentivised Registration:  An amendment should be made to replace compulsory registration of live-in relationships with a voluntary but beneficial model which encourages participation without coercion. This approach reflects the 21st Law Commission’s Report  that cautioned against over-interference by the State into private unions. Moreover, registration should provide benefits such as providing simplified joint tenancy, easier access to maintenance and automatic nomination rights in banking and insurance to the live-in couple by drawing inspiration from the Portuguese Civil Code of 1867.   This ensures compliance with the registration process by providing benefits rather than fear and also ensures dignity and legal protection to Live-in relationship couples.  Modify the Age of autonomy from 21 to 18 years:  The age requirement for independent registration and applicability of this act should be changed for both partners from the present 21 years to 18 years in order to comply with marriage laws and the legal age of majority as per the Portuguese Civil Code of 1867  and  the Indian Majority Act 1875.   This eliminates the paradoxical requirement that women who are otherwise legally able to vote and get married upon attaining the age of 18 have to obtain parental consent to enter into a live-in relationship. Bring Gender-Neutral Terminology by modifying "man and woman" to "two persons" : This change in definition under Section 3(4)(b)   of the present Code would immediately give statutory recognition and legal protections in matters of maintenance and succession to LGBTQIA+ couples. This shall ensure that the UCC Act becomes compliant with various Supreme Court rulings, such as Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018)   and   Supriyo v. Union of India (2023)   and promote uniformity and inclusivity.   Secular Affidavit over Religious Certification: There should be an amendment made that states that religious leaders should no longer be required to certify the allowance and this should be substituted by a Self-Declaration Affidavit in which Live-in relationship partners attest to their consent and unmarried single status. This amendment is also in line with the   Portuguese Civil Code of 1867 , which prioritised a civil registrar over religious authorities. This reform is crucial in order to ensure that live-in relationships are not impeded due to traditional religious norms and strengthen the notion that the Uniform Civil Code must be based on constitutional morality rather than religious consent and customs. Protecting Privacy and Dignity along with empowerment of women: There needs to be an amendment that prevents sharing personal data with the police without a court order, which ensures privacy and dignity by preventing misuse of state machinery. Women-led Fast Track tribunals can be established under Section 388   in order to empower women more financially. This amendment is also in consonance with the fundamental right to Dignity, which was laid down in the   Justice K.S.Puttaswamy (Retd) vs Union of India (2018) . Conclusion In conclusion, although Uttarakhand’s UCC   aspires to fulfil the constitutional mandate as given under Article 44 , its current framework regulating live-in relationships risks transforming a shield of protection into a sword of state surveillance. The Code creates a constitutional paradox by institutionalising moral policing and violating the autonomy as well as privacy of live-in relationship couples, which ultimately contradicts the progressive jurisprudence laid down by Justice K.S.Puttaswamy (Retd) vs Union of India (2018)   and   Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) .  The Code must draw inspiration and adopt the secular inclusivity from the 21st Law Commission’s Report   and   Portuguese Civil Code of 1867   to truly reflect the constitutional moralities of ensuring dignity, privacy and autonomy to the couple and preventing state overreach in the private matters of its citizens under the altar of legislative uniformity. *Rohan Yadav is a 2nd Year Law Student pursuing B.A. LL.B (Hons.) at Maharashtra National Law University, Mumbai. The views expressed above are the author's alone and do not represent the beliefs of Family Law Chronicle: The CFL Blog.

*by Y. Leela Krishna Reddy & Udit Jain The right to inherit property has traditionally been a privilege accorded to sons , deeply rooted in India's patriarchal history. The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, passed in 2005, aimed to rectify the discrimination against daughters by granting them equal coparcenary rights under the Hindu Succession Act. However, pursuant to Section 2 (2) of the Act, members of Scheduled Tribes were explicitly excluded, unless the Central Government issued a special notification bringing the Act into force for these tribes. Accordingly, tribal women remained governed by customary practices, depriving them of inheritance rights. These customs remain deleterious to women because of their patrilineal nature, and women of tribes often find their property rights subordinated.   The present blog reflects on the issue of tribal women’s right to inheritance, analysing the recent Supreme Court judgment in Ram Charan v. SukhRam and Ors  (Ram Charan). The judgment serves as a turning point, advancing gender justice for women belonging to the Scheduled Tribes. The constitutional guarantee provided within Article 14 is given due regard while interpreting that the judiciary must accord women equal inheritance rights unless a contrary custom specifically excludes. Thus, the article argues that Ram Charan represents a constitutionally significant precedent for gender justice within tribal communities.  Part A examines the historical legal framework governing the inheritance rights of women. Part B argues for the pre-eminence of constitutional provisions and values over discriminatory customary law. Part C analyses the rationale adopted by the Supreme Court in the Ram Charan  case while granting tribal women inheritance rights. Part D discusses the barriers to implementation and proposes possible administrative solutions to ensure the realisation of tribal women’s inheritance rights. A. Historical Legal Framework Inheritance under traditional Hindu Law has been structured through the dual lenses of the Mitakshara and Dayabhaga schools of thought. Both were patriarchal, though in distinct ways: the prevalent Mitakshara system was patrilineal, and women were not allowed to be coparceners. The property devolved according to survivorship, and with each birth and death, the share of the surviving male either diminished or enlarged. Whereas the Dayabhaga school of thought allowed widows to inherit property when there was no male heir, but that right ceased to exist as soon as the widow who got the property died, ensuring property eventually reverted to male lines. Innumerable attempts were made thereafter to provide women with their property rights, culminating in the HSA, 1956, which made widows and sons equal heirs. The 1956 Act, however, did not recognise daughters as coparceners, preventing women from having equal rights to ancestral property. The  2005 amendment  corrected this injustice, granting daughters equal rights to ancestral property, marking a historic recognition of gender parity in inheritance rights.   Yet, for tribal women, Section 2(2) of the HSA remained an impenetrable barrier. This meant that, despite the 2005 amendment granting equal coparcenary rights to daughters, tribal women can not claim inheritance as a statutory right. Instead, they are governed by their own customary law, which has historically been exclusionary to women, only allowing them limited rights over property. While customary practices vary among different tribes, the underlying framework remains predominantly patrilineal . In the Angami and Adibasi community, women were expressly excluded from inheriting clan land, legitimised by the notion that daughters would join their husband’s household, where property rights lay with men. Interestingly, in matrilineal tribes like the Garo or Khasi, where daughters ostensibly inherited ancestral property, the real control of such property was often exercised by the male relatives, relegating women to mere custodians rather than proper owners. Thus, through the 2005 amendment, Hindu women continued enjoying statutory relief and protection, but tribal women’s situation remained pernicious on account of exclusionary customs. B.     Constitutional Principles Governing Gender and Custom The Constitution of India meticulously prioritises fundamental rights over discriminatory customs, securing constitutional promises precedence over archaic traditions. Articles 14  and 15  affirm equality before the law and prohibit discrimination on the grounds of sex. Article 38  and Article 46  direct states to preclude inequalities and concomitantly to endeavour for the protection and promotion of economically and socially disadvantaged individuals, thus discharging their duty as per the parens patriae  concept. Consequently, these provision mandates states and the judiciary with positive obligations in establishing that customs and personal law do not contribute to perpetuating gender inequality.  The Indian judiciary has consistently applied these principles in its interaction with exclusionary tribal customs. In the judgment of Madhu Kishwar v. State of Bihar ,  it was observed by Justice Ramaswamy that local customary law is biased and denying women inheritance would reinforce existing inequalities. In the State of Nagaland & Anr v. Rosemary Dzuvichu  (Naga Mothers case), the Gauhati High Court clarified that customs cannot be ossified dogmas undermining constitutional guarantees. Similarly, in Sarwango v. Urchamin , the absence of a binding exclusionary custom allowed the Court to uphold the daughters’ inheritance on the grounds of equity, justice, and good conscience. In Bahadur v. Bratiya , the Himachal Pradesh High Court, adopting a revisionist approach, held that customs excluding females from inheritance are manifestly contrary to public policy and such arbitrary customary practices cannot be upheld under the guise of tradition.  The Rajasthan High Court grappled with the social and economic impact of the exclusion of tribal women from inheritance rights and the protection of the HSA in the case of  Manni Devi v Rama Devi . In this case, the claim of a woman belonging to the Meena community seeking inheritance rights over property that her father had alienated through a gift deed had been dismissed by the Board of Revenue basis of section 2(2) of the HSA. Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand called Section 2(2) a “formidable barrier” and “manifestly unjustified”   when compared to the rights of non-tribal daughters. The court strenuously restored Manni Devi’s claim and urged Parliament to act so that women of the Scheduled Tribes are not dependent on judicial discretion. Contrastingly, the judiciary in Butaki Bai v. SukhBati  developed the problematic ‘ Test of Hinduization ’ – to claim benefits under the HSA, a tribal woman must prove with proper legal evidence that she has abandoned her customary succession law and has fully adopted Hindu law to be governed by it in matters of inheritance. Yet, the larger jurisprudential trend has been towards maintaining constitutional equality as the standard against which customs must be judged. By the time the Ram Charan  case reached the Supreme Court, this trajectory of cases clearly indicates that gender-exclusionary customs have been interpreted as antithetical to constitutional morality. C. The Pivotal Supreme Court Judgment in Ram Charan & Ors. v. Sukhram & Ors. (2025) The Supreme Court’s decision in Ram Charan marked a progressive approach towards reconciling customary law with constitutional guarantees of gender equality in matters of succession in tribal communities. The case concerned ancestral property belonging to a Gond family, in which the legal heirs of Dhaiya, a tribal woman, were excluded from succession on the grounds of a customary prohibition against women inheriting property. Both the trial court and the High Court upheld this exclusion, reasoning that customary law governed tribal succession and that HSA was inapplicable to Scheduled Tribes by virtue of Section 2(2). The issue before the Supreme Court, therefore, was whether such a custom could withstand constitutional scrutiny and displace the equal rights of women and their heirs. The Court reaffirmed the principle that customs must be strictly proved and cannot be presumed merely based on sporadic practice. It held that the defendants had failed to demonstrate the existence of a uniform, obligatory custom barring women from succession. More fundamentally, the Court emphasised that customs are not static but must evolve in consonance with constitutional morality. It rejected the argument that exclusionary practices, even if claimed as custom, could survive the scrutiny of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. The Court further clarified that the statutory exclusion in Section 2(2) of the HSA cannot legitimise sex-based discrimination in succession, particularly when such practices undermine fundamental rights. In allowing the appeal, the Court declared that Dhaiya’s legal heirs are entitled to an equal share in the ancestral property. Further, the apex court also urged Parliament to consider extending the Hindu Succession Act to Scheduled Tribes to prevent similar exclusions in the future ( See   LiveLaw Report ). The judgment thus reaffirms the constitutional morality that customs, however longstanding, cannot be permitted to perpetuate discrimination against women. D. Barriers to Implementation, and the pathway to realisation of Rights The judgment in Ram Charan  carries profound implications for tribal communities and gender parity through women's empowerment. By recognising tribal women and their heirs as entitled to equal succession rights, the Court has not only delivered justice in an individual dispute but also set a precedent with the potential to reshape succession in tribal societies. Secure inheritance rights are closely linked with economic agency, enabling women to access land, credit, and state entitlements. ( See   generally OHCHR Report ) In the Indian society where land ownership is the basis of livelihood and identity, the recognition of women’s rights represents both material empowerment and a symbolic break from entrenched patriarchy. Legislative action could provide uniformity and certainty, while ensuring that tribal women are not deprived of rights available to women elsewhere. Yet, the path to effective implementation is fraught with challenges ( See   here ). Local revenue systems often fail to capture women’s claims, and enforcement of court decrees may be hindered by administrative inertia. Moreover, resistance from traditional leaders and patriarchal community structures is foreseeable, as the decision disrupts power hierarchies embedded in customary governance, while justifying their opposition under the garb of ‘cultural preservation.’ This unrest can escalate tensions, leading to conflict and reluctance to execute court orders recognising female heirs. Further, many tribal women lack awareness of their rights post the Court’s ruling. Even if they were aware, they face immense familial and social pressures discouraging assertion of their inheritance rights. Alongside legal reform, sustained efforts toward raising legal literacy and sensitising tribal communities about gender equality will be essential to translate the ratio of Ram Charan  into meaningful social change. Such initiatives can empower tribal women to claim their rightful inheritance, advancing their autonomy and social status. Sensitisation campaigns, paralegal support, and accessible legal aid are necessary to translate rights into reality. Equally important is the training of revenue and judicial officers to ensure fidelity to the Supreme Court’s constitutional reasoning at the grassroots. Ram Charan is an important breakthrough, but it is only the beginning of a longer struggle for tribal women’s property rights. The judgment opens the constitutional door to equality, yet it does not by itself dismantle the deep legal, social, and administrative barriers that still restrict tribal women’s lives. Clear legislative reform, and sustained efforts to change social attitudes are necessary to ensure that the promise of this judgment is fulfilled. * Y. Leela Krishna Reddy is a fourth-year law student pursuing B.B.A. LL.B (Hons.) at National Law University, Jodhpur. *Udit Jain is a third year law student pursuing B.A. LL.B (Hons.) at National Law University, Jodhpur. The views expressed above are the author's alone and do not represent the beliefs of Family Law Chronicle: The CFL Blog.

*by Khushi Jain What happens if a Sikh solemnises marriage through Anand Karaj only to be told later that they can get their marriage registered solely under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955  ( “HMA” ). This dissonance exposes a deeper structural issue within India’s personal law regime. It remarks the persistent gap between symbolic recognition and substantive legal autonomy. There have been widespread debates centred on comprehensive legal frameworks for asserting their religious and cultural identity and obtaining complete legal protection. The Anand Marriage Act, 1909  ( “The Act” ) was thus enacted to recognise the validity of marriages solemnised through the Sikh religious ceremony known as Anand Karaj. However, the statute initially lacked a framework for registration. Parliament amended the Act in 2012 to address certain gaps. It directed states to frame rules for registering Anand Karaj marriages, maintain a Marriage Register, and issue certified extracts, while clarifying that non-registration does not affect the validity of the marriage. Despite this mandate, several States and Union Territories failed to notify the required rules. In light of the debate, in Amanjot Singh Chadha v. Union of India & Ors. ,  the Supreme Court directed states and UTs to frame rules of registration of Sikh marriages.  The blog analyses the framework and provision of the Anand Marriage Act post- 2012 Amendment . Centred on the precise conundrum, the blog addresses whether the interim requirement that couples be allowed to register Anand Karaj marriages under existing registration laws until States notify rules unduly burdens the Act’s purpose or whether it is a necessary protective measure to prevent administrative denial. The piece highlights the limitations of the Act, including gaps in substantive matrimonial rights as well as administrative challenges arising from inconsistent state-level implementation. Towards the end, the blog analyses the practical and symbolic implications of the Act for the Sikh community and proposes reforms to transform it from a procedural recognition statute into a comprehensive, enforceable framework that balances religious identity with legal protection. FROM CEREMONY TO REGISTRATION: LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ANAND MARRIAGES The legal framework governing Sikh marriages in India is primarily shaped by the Anand Marriage Act, 1909, and its 2012 amendment, alongside HMA. Under Section 2 of the HMA , Sikhs are formally recognised as a community within its ambit, meaning that historically Sikh couples were required to marry according to the procedures established under the HMA. The Act particularly the post-2012 amendment, ensures that Sikh couples no longer need to fall back on the HMA for administrative recognition. It has two major implications. First, it reinforces the symbolic autonomy of the Sikh community by legally acknowledging its unique marriage rites. Second, it removes the practical inconsistencies created when couples had to navigate Hindu-centric provisions for something as basic as a marriage certificate. The jurisprudence surrounding the Anand Marriage Act has recently acquired sharper constitutional contours in Amanjot Singh Chadha v. Union of India & Ors . , where the Supreme Court addressed the long-standing administrative vacuum in implementing the 2012 Amendment. The Court took judicial notice of the fact that, despite Parliament’s mandate under Section 6 directing States and Union Territories to frame registration rules, several governments had failed to do so even a decade later. The Court observed that such inaction effectively rendered the amendment nugatory and denied Sikh citizens the ability to secure official recognition of their marriages solemnised through the Anand Karaj ceremony. Exercising its constitutional authority under Articles 32 and 142 , the Bench directed all States and Union Territories to notify their respective rules within a fixed timeframe and to ensure that registration officers were designated at the district level. This judgment repositions the Anand Marriage Act within the domain of enforceable constitutional compliance rather than symbolic legislative intent, transforming it into a living instrument of minority religious autonomy. The Court’s directive in Amanjot Singh Chadha  also marked a jurisprudential shift from treating the Act as a static declaratory statute to recognising it as a vehicle for operational equality under Article 14 . The decision implicitly extended the logic of Vineet Narain v. Union of India  by holding that continued executive inaction on statutory duties could invite judicial mandamus. Consequently, the case situates the Anand Marriage Act at the intersection of religious identity, administrative accountability, and constitutional governance. Earlier, in Dolly Rani v. Manish Kumar Chanchal , the Supreme Court has emphasised that ceremonies are essential to constitute a valid marriage and registration is insufficient if the former is absent. Section 2  also explicitly defines a Sikh marriage as one solemnised through the Anand Karaj, establishing the primacy of ceremony over mere registration affirming Section 25 of Constitution . The stance affirms that Anand Karaj is legally valid, but the absence of registration creates practical vulnerabilities. Similarly, in Aman Preet Kaur v. State of Punjab (2015),  the Punjab and Haryana High Court confronted the procedural lacunae arising from the absence of notified rules under the 2012 Amendment. The Court held that until such rules were framed, marriages solemnised through Anand Karaj could be registered under general marriage registration frameworks, though it acknowledged that this was only a stop-gap arrangement. The decision illustrated the legal uncertainty produced by executive inaction while the ceremony was recognised in substance, its administrative enforceability remained fragile. Read together, these cases trace an evolution from symbolic recognition of Sikh matrimonial customs to a constitutionally enforceable right to registration and equal treatment. The trajectory from Dolly Rani  to Amanjot Singh Chadha  reveals a gradual judicial effort to bridge the gap between religious autonomy and legal protection.             GAP BETWEEN CEREMONIAL VALIDITY AND CIVIL ENFORCEMENT While other personal laws like HMA, Special Marriage Act holistically covers registration, divorce, maintenance, alimony, and adoption, the scope of Act remains narrow. It fails to address related matrimonial issues such as divorce, maintenance, child custody, adoption, or inheritance. Thereby, even if marriage is registered under the act, parties have to rely upon HMA or civil law for dissolving other disputes. It creates a façade of legal completeness, when in reality it offers only a skeletal framework. Sikh would find themselves caught in a web of overlapping legal systems inculcating registration under the Anand Marriage Act, but dissolution or ancillary relief under the Hindu Marriage Act. This duality undermines legal certainty and adds to procedural burdens. Scholars such as Tahir Mahmood  and Flavia Agnes  have argued that personal laws which recognise ceremonial identity but withhold substantive remedies constitute what “ symbolic pluralism ”. It is a superficial form of recognition that neither empowers communities nor ensures justice. The Anand Marriage Act exemplifies this paradox. The Act’s provisions for registration are minimal and largely deferential to state governments, mandating that rules be framed under Section 6.  In practice, this has led to long delays, inconsistent procedures, or complete non-notification in many states. As a result, Sikh couples often lack a uniform administrative mechanism to obtain marriage certificates. Consequently, while the Act affirms the ceremonial validity of the Anand Karaj, it falls short of converting that legitimacy into enforceable civil recognition and tangible legal protection. Similarly, in Charanjit Kaur v. State of Punjab (2017),  the same court lamented that couples married under the Anand Karaj ritual often faced procedural obstacles in securing certificates, resulting in legal uncertainty during disputes relating to inheritance or matrimonial relief. The Act assumes that state-level compliance will suffice for uniformity. It raises a matter of concern under Article 14  since framing own rules risks inconsistent procedures, varying fees, and unequal access to registration. Such variation can lead to practical inequities for Sikh couples, undermining the Act’s intent to provide clear and enforceable legal recognition across the country. Thus, administrative divergence may erode both legal certainty and the principle of equality before the law without centralised guidelines or oversight.     CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS Analysing the current framework, following observations can be made. Reforms must proceed in three prong manner including statutory consolidation, administrative standardisation, and rights-based protection. Primarily, the Act should contain a clear non-obstante clause declaring its overriding applicability to Sikh marriages and transitional provisions to allow couples married under the HMA to shift to the Anand Marriage Act subject to their consent. The Act must also incorporate protective safeguards aligned with constitutional principles, especially gender equality, by guaranteeing equal rights in matters such as maintenance, guardianship, and property, while simultaneously preventing provisions that could perpetuate discrimination or conflict with constitutional morality. Second, directives must be operationalised through a central model framework of rules issued by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs, providing standard templates for registration procedures, timelines, and record formats. Each State and Union Territory could then adapt these rules to local conditions while maintaining core uniformity. A National Anand Marriage Registration Portal (NAMRP) should be developed under the National e-Governance Plan, interlinking State registries and ensuring that marriage certificates carry nationwide legal validity. This would prevent inter-state discrepancies, facilitate verification in inheritance or immigration matters, and enhance administrative transparency It needs to be complimented with strengthening of institutional mechanisms, with family courts being specifically empowered to adjudicate disputes under this Act with designated registration officers at the district level, under the supervision of family courts, can provide local accessibility and accountability. Third, awareness campaigns and legal literacy initiatives by Union and State Governments, in collaboration with the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC)  and community organisations within the Sikh community, would further enhance its practical utility, transforming it into a living piece of legislation rather than a relic of identity politics. In consonance, states must be bound by statutory deadlines to frame rules, and couples facing denial of registration must have access to quick grievance redressal mechanisms before family courts or tribunals. Finally, judicial clarity is equally essential in ensuring the effective functioning of the Anand Marriage Act. Currently, the absence of comprehensive provisions often forces courts to rely on the Hindu Marriage Act or general civil law, resulting in inconsistent outcomes and uncertainty for litigants. Courts must adopt a consistent interpretive approach in determining jurisdiction over disputes arising from marriages solemnised under the Act. Clear judicial reasoning on whether such disputes should be exclusively governed by the Anand Marriage Act or by parallel personal laws would create predictability, reduce procedural confusion, and protect parties from the hardships of navigating multiple legal frameworks. *Khushi Jain is a 2nd Year Law Student studying B.A. LL.B (Hons.) at Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, Lucknow. The views expressed above are the author's alone and do not represent the beliefs of Family Law Chronicle: The CFL Blog.

*by Shivansh Singh Having recognised the concurrence of NFTs with the existing property framework under HSA in the previous part  of the article, the second part of the article shall continue by inquiring into the legal roadblocks that hinder the incorporation of NFTs and blockchain-based digital assets at large within the Inheritance landscape in India.  I.     CHALLENGES IN APPLYING HINDU LAW TO NFT INHERITANCE? Unlike physical property, which is well-regulated under the HSA, digital assets exist in decentralised networks and beyond Indian jurisdiction, which delegitimises them under inheritance law. A.    The Decentralised Operational Framework of Blockchain The blockchain transaction log is kept in real-time synchronised on a decentralised network of autonomous computers or servers, otherwise known as nodes, which are like a database spread in thousands of identical copies on several systems. A block is only added to the blockchain when these nodes (computationally compelling blockchain network members) agree to its legitimacy. The blockchain acts as a dynamic and exhaustive ledger, whereby every transaction is irrevocably logged and gathered into blocks. However, before its inclusion in a prospective new block, the transaction must initially be validated  as genuine by every node in the network. To verify the integrity of the proposed block, there are dedicated participants known as miners who compete to solve complex cryptographic procedures. Thus, blockchain functions as an operating system with smart contracts created  for its practical use. It is also a self-maintaining database with an app development platform. Therefore, this eliminates the need for a traditional middleman, such as a bank, central authority, or other reliable third party, to track and store assets and transaction information.  B.    The Jurisdictional Dilemma in Blockchain and NFTs This aspect of blockchain technology gives rise to its lack of specific jurisdiction, owing to the highly dispersed nature of the nodes on a blockchain, which can be positioned anywhere around the globe, with no means to pinpoint its specific location  due to its algorithmic randomisation.  However, regarding legal considerations, the non-demarcated jurisdiction of blockchain-based assets like NFTs poses complex jurisdictional issues that require careful deliberation regarding the relevant legal relationships. The principles of title and ownership of assets differ across jurisdictions; therefore, identifying the appropriate governing law, especially regarding inheritance becomes paramount. Under ordinary circumstances, for instance, if a dispute arises in the inheritance of property situated in India, then irrespective of the mechanism of devolution of the property or the physical location of the heir, the courts having appropriate jurisdiction with respect to the area of the disputed property can be approached. The applicable laws of that jurisdiction within India would govern the dispute. However, identifying the applicable rules according to the appropriate jurisdiction becomes extremely difficult in a decentralised environment, which forms the backbone of NFTs and blockchain. Therefore, to regulate the breakups in the system, every transaction could fall under the jurisdiction of the location of every node in the network, resulting in a multiplicity of concurrent jurisdictions, yielding a vast number of legal and regulatory regimes. This means it may be challenging to identify the location of a disputed transaction inside the blockchain. Because blockchain deinstitutionalises the ledger  administrator and disperses the verification nodes globally, it becomes very challenging to determine whether a transaction was conducted on the blockchain. II.   THE PROBABLE ROAD AHEAD: FRACTIONALISATION SOLUTION The provisions for succession and inheritance are based on the divisible nature of property. Upon death, people devolve their properties, including their interests, to their legal heirs. This is known as the fractionalisation of property  concerning the property’s succession.   However, fractionalisation becomes particularly challenging for digital assets like NFTs due to their virtual and intangible nature. While Hindus can devolve their properties under HSA and ISA, there are no specific guidelines for digital assets. Therefore, if a Hindu dies intestate (without a will), the question surrounding the inheritance of their digital assets, like NFTS and how they should be distributed among Class I heirs remains unresolved and largely unexplored. For the transmission of intangible digital assets, traditional inheritance frameworks that are based on centuries-old property rights concepts are insufficient. When an owner passes away, these virtual properties risk of being lost , stolen, or falling into legal limbo without specific restrictions. The death of American billionaire Matthew Mellon  highlights the vulnerability of the existing laws in addressing the same. At the time of his death, Mellon held an estimated $1 Billion in Ripple (cryptocurrency), all of which remains inaccessible to his heirs as he did not leave the property with any instructions about its inheritance and the modalities for the same. A fractionalised NFT , or F-NFT, refers to dividing an NFT into smaller units for divided or fractional ownership of the original token. The fractionalisation is achieved by interlocking the larger, main-body NFT in a smart contract (self-executing arrangements based on blockchain, contingent on fulfilling pre-decided conditions), which divides the original NFT into a predetermined number of consecutive shares. NFTs are usually created  based on the ERC-721 template, which is locked in a smart contract, thereby splitting a single ERC-721 token into multiple ERC-20 tokens as per the instructions of the NFT owner. Each fraction or ERC-20 token created, therefore, represents divided ownership of the NFT.   This is analogous to the physical division of property as we understand it under classical HSA, wherein, for instance, a single unit of property owned by a Hindu male when divided among his three offspring (Class I heir) would be divided into one-third equal units in accordance with Section 8  of HSA. Likewise, under fractionalisation of NFTs, a single unit of NFT can be divided into similar subunits as per the discretion of the owner of the property. III. WHERE DOES THE WORLD STAND: A GLOBAL OUTLOOK The United States, in this regard, has adopted the Revised Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act (RUFADAA), 2015 , which attributes legal recognition to digital assets, categorising them on the same footing as tangible property. Section 2(10) . However, RUFADAA doesn’t provide any statutory guidelines with respect to the inheritance of such assets, and keeps itself confined to the privacy of the information contained within such assets. However, it does create a caretaker relationship by nominating two classes of individuals eligible to handle the digital assets, viz , the custodian and the fiduciary. Furthermore, the judicial position in the US is heterogeneous in this regard. Whilst the case of Shin v. ICON Foundation has somewhat established preliminary guidelines attributing the legal recognition of cryptoassets to property considerations, the case of United States v. Chastain  restricts the wider interpretation of digital assets as property. The court in Shin has recognised assets hosted on blockchain as capable of being possessed using three metrics: a) precise definition, b) exclusive possession, and c) control and exclusivity claims. Whereas, in Chastain , the court has restricted the property rights to traditional forms of property, explicitly excluding digital assets from the same. The European Union has set up the Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA) Regulation , its very first major regulatory regime for crypto-assets, their issuers, and their service providers. With the aim of introducing coherence and consistency into the regulation of cryptoassets throughout all EU member states, under the proposed regulation, any provider of services relating to crypto-assets within the EU will be obligated to obtain authorisation from national authorities. This authorisation will allow them to lawfully issue and sell digital tokens across the EU.  This creates the interpretation of cryptoassets, very close to that of legal property. The United Kingdom, through the case of AA v Persons Unknown & Ors, Re Bitcoin , has officially recognised Bitcoin, a type of cryptoasset, as property for the purpose of granting proprietary injunctions following a cyberattack. Moreover, the Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Amendment) Regulations 2019 have brought cryptoasset firms, i.e., those engaged in the exchange or holding of cryptoassets, into the regulatory framework ( Section 52B ). Furthermore, specifically w.r.t. NFTs, the London High Court, through the case of Lavinia Deborah Osbourne v Persons Unknown Category A & Ors , established that NFTs are equivalent to properties in English Law, through which the UK has recognised NFTs as legal property . IV. CONCLUSION India has largely remained dormant in legislating NFTs in both commercial and personal domains of law, leaving several prominent gaps unaddressed. The question over the inheritance of NFTs and other crypto/digital assets might not pose any significant legal discrepancy at the status quo; however, the application of legal enterprise towards bridging the gaps above, even when interpreted to be theoretical, for finding sound solutions is a vital step towards the future development of the law in this aspect, which would have a corollary impact on other avenues of law, as any inquisition over the inheritance of such properties would naturally require redefining and expanding the entire concept of property. Additional legislative recommendations towards the integration, in addition to the aforementioned fractionalisation model, include recognising digital assets under Indian succession laws, legalising blockchain-based wills, and formulating digital asset custodianship laws. *Shivansh Singh is a 2nd-Year law student pursuing B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) from Integrated Law Course (ILC), Faculty of Law, University of Delhi. The views expressed above are the author's alone and do not represent the beliefs of Family Law Chronicle: The CFL Blog.

*by Shivansh Singh This blog is a part of a special two-part issue. Stay tuned to read the next instalment of the blog. Introduction In 2022, Singapore, through the judgment of Janesh s/o Rajkumar v Unknown Person,  officially recognised the proprietary rights of NFTs. This legal recognition of NFTs is a natural first step in incorporating digital assets into the evolving economic framework of global property rights. However, this judgment also raises a pertinent question about the modalities of inheriting these digital assets, if they are to be treated as conventional properties. The engagement with this aspect of inheritance is largely lacking in India, where digital assets remain mostly unregulated by the Indian Courts and parliament. The rise of digital assets, such as cryptocurrencies and non-fungible tokens (NFTs), has reshaped the concepts of property, ownership, and wealth in contemporary times. In India, this change is being implemented within a legal regime of inheritance based on conventional concepts of physical property, particularly under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the HSA). NFTs and other distinct blockchain-authenticated digital tokens now form a considerable portion of wealth for many. Yet, the legal nature of such assets is uncertain, particularly in the context of inheritance and succession. Therefore, the first part  of this article explores this critical gap by first understanding NFTs and other digital assets in the Indian context, followed by examining how far NFTs and other digital assets are included (or excluded) in (or out of) the current Indian inheritance regime. Considering that a significant portion of the inheritance matters in India is governed by the HSA, the article shall carry forward this discussion to the same extent. The second part  of the article highlights the challenges deterring the adoption of NFTs in the Indian inheritance regime, following which it examines the fractionalization model of digital assets and delineates its utility in Indian inheritance law. In the concluding section, the article provides ancillary recommendations to address the policy gap.  Understanding NFTs And Digital Assets In The Indian Context A non-fungible token (NFT)  is a type of cryptographic asset used to verify digital ownership of unique assets. NFTs provide a secure record authenticated with a unique identifying code stored on the blockchain. It is characterised by its uniqueness , which makes it irreplaceable against any other virtual entity in the world. Blockchain acts as an immutable, shared ledger that records transactions and tracks assets in a business network. At a cumulative annual growth rate (CAGR) of 57%, the Indian Web3 market  is expected to reach $1.1 billion by 2032, up from $0.0049 billion in 2022. Accordingly, it is anticipated that the Indian NFT market will generate $ 9,247.9 million in net revenue by 2030, growing at a CAGR of 36.9%  from 2024 to 2030 . It is estimated to be valued at 77.5 million USD  in 2025. Even on the consumer side, the demand for exclusivity-based NFT ownership constantly increases. This is reflected in the increase in startup ventures, with 71 NFT startups launched in 2021, and more than 86 NFT startups operating outside of India . Additionally, 18 per cent of ultra-high-net-worth individuals in India have invested in crypto assets, with 10 per cent and 8 per cent invested in NFTs. Incidentally, there exists no concurrent legal framework to regulate NFTs and their commercial dealings, except for the I ncome Tax Act of 1961 , which includes NFTs under the definition of virtual digital assets (VDA)  following the introduction of this term through the 2022 amendments, which taxes them at 30 per cent. The government has attempted to regulate digital currencies by introducing the Cryptocurrency and Regulation of Official Digital Currency Bill, 2021 , to create a supervising framework monitored by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI); however, this bill has yet to become law. Therefore, the interplay between NFTs and other virtual assets, which don’t exist in terms of tangible and material possession, and the law of inheritance in India emerges as an exciting area of study, given the rapid inclusion of NFTs in the modes of wealth acquisition, as indicated by the figures mentioned before.  Defining Property Under Hindu Law, And Does It Cover Digital Assets? Hindu law is primarily governed by the general scheme of succession laid down under the HSA. The term property has not been explicitly defined in the HSA. The Indian Courts have, however, described the term ancestral property  under classical Hindu law as a property inherited by a person up to four generations of male lineage by birth. Furthermore, an HSA allows a person to make a will or testament  to transfer their separate property.  Section 8 of the HSA outlines the “general rules of succession for males”, stating that the property of a Hindu male who dies intestate passes into his Class I heirs, followed by Class II heirs, and agnates and cognates. Furthermore, a property in the name of any member of the joint family is ipso facto  presumed to have been acquired from out of family funds and to be part of the joint family property if the joint family has enough nucleus to develop it . on the date of acquisition, unless it is sufficiently demonstrated and proven that the acquisition was from separate funds and not the joint family funds. Section 8  of the HSA also provides that the property inherited by a Hindu male from his father after  1956 is his separate property. Therefore, a distinct definition of the term " property " for inheritance can be determined from two primary qualifications:  ●      Alienation Right  -  By distinguishing it from the ancestral property, a separate property can be understood as any property owned by a person exclusively with absolute powers over its disposal. NFTs aptly satisfy this qualification. ●      Mode of Acquisition - The property acquired through one’s earnings, predicated on one’s skills or effort, is deemed self-acquired . NFTs also qualify under this categorisation. Where there is no statutory definition, the word " property " under the interpretation of the HSA can be construed broadly to include inherited as well as self-acquired property, subject to the proviso that they do not form part of a coparcenary property, thereby making such property freely alienable and subject to testamentary or intestate succession under the Act. This interpretative approach becomes crucial in dealing with emerging forms of property like digital property and NFTs, whose classification and devolution under Hindu law must be based on an advanced and adaptive concept of " property ." *Shivansh Singh is a 2nd-Year law student pursuing B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) from Integrated Law Course (ILC), Faculty of Law, University of Delhi. The views expressed above are the author's alone and do not represent the beliefs of Family Law Chronicle: The CFL Blog. Editorial Note: This first part concludes the author's analysis of the conceptual compatibility between NFTs and the property framework under the Hindu Succession Act, laying the groundwork for a broader inquiry into the legal treatment of digital assets. The forthcoming second part will turn to the practical and doctrinal challenges that complicate the integration of NFTs and blockchain-based assets into the Indian inheritance regime. Readers interested in the intersection of technology and succession law are encouraged to follow the next installment of this two-part series.

*by Sunidhi Khabya Introduction Marriage as an Institution has been universally recognised as a sacred and lasting bond, though its meaning has evolved with the changing needs of society. In many cultural and religious contexts, alternative forms of marriages have emerged. Amongst one such evolved ‘meaning’ is the practice of “pleasure marriages”. The practice allows for temporary unions, which are often cloaked in religious or societal justifications. Although short in duration, these unions generate permanent legal-ethical conflicts and ambiguities raising the inevitable questions of consent, gender justice and protection of vulnerable individuals. Understanding Pleasure Marriages: Historical & Religious Context Marriages in Islam, by their very nature, are contractual. Historically, pleasure marriages have found mentions in Islamic traditions. Muta’h Marriage is one of the forms. The term Muta’h derives from the Arabic word meaning “pleasure” or “enjoyment”. Historians trace the practice back to the times when Arab women used to entertain Men in their tents; the men had to pay an entrance fee and could be kicked out anytime at the desire of the women. Such a union conferred no rights or responsibilities, and the objective of this marriage was just for pleasure. The practice involves various hazards and has been denounced by multiple Islamic scholars due to its inherent risks and unethical nature. Muta’h marriage is mostly practices by the followers of Ithna Ashari School under the Shia Muslims . Sunni Law however, does not consider it valid. In the Quran, such marriages have been permitted “ And you are allowed to seek out wives with your wealth in decorous conduct, but not in fornication, but give them their reward for what you have enjoyed of them in keeping with your promise. (4:24) ” Notably, Muta’h marriages can also be concluded by the representatives of the woman. If the father gives the daughter to a man through an oral promise, even then the marriage becomes concluded and valid. If a woman agrees to a declaration of marriage by a man, then also the contract becomes valid. By contrast, religions such as Hinduism and Christianity believe marriage to be a relatively permanent institution and view such practices as incompatible with their conception of marriage. In Hinduism, marriage is considered a sacred bond for seven lives. The purpose of this institution is broad and societal, not just the pleasure of individuals.  Legal Perspectives In India: Judicial Interpretations. Indian laws do not recognise such temporary marriages, and the courts have clarified the position of the law time and again. The meaning of Muta’h marriage was dwelled upon in “ Shoharat Singh v. Musammat Jafri Bibi ” , the court held that such marriage does not confer any rights upon the woman on her husband's property. Still, the courts consider any children conceived from such wedlock legitimate and capable of inheriting their father's property. The courts thus validated the status of children under personal laws whilst restricting their inheritance rights. In the case of “ Syed Amanuallah Hussain and Ors. v. Rajamma and Ors .”  The question of law was whether a Muta’h marriage lasted till the death of the husband, and upon the husband's death, the wife inherited the husband's properties. The husband’s brother challenged this. The court held that if the term for the “Muta’h marriage” is not specified in the contract, then the court treats it as a normal, permanent marriage. Previously, in the judgement of “ Shahzada Qanum v. Fakher Jahan ”,  it was clarified that if a muta’h marriage lacks a specified time period, it is treated as a permanent nikah. Thus, time duration becomes critical in distinguishing between a temporary alliance and permanent marriage. In “ Mohammed Abid Ali Kumar Kadar v. Ludden Sahiba (Minor) ” the court held that spouses do not have the right to divorce in Muta’h marriages. Nevertheless, there are alternative ways of disposing of the contract of marriage. If the parties cohabit even after the expiration of the fixed duration, then the court presumes that the duration has been extended. Thus, there can be an implied extension of the marriage if the partners continue to cohabit after the fixed duration of the alliance expires. In “ Luddun v. Mirza Kumar ” ,   the wife filed a petition under Section 536   of the Code of Criminal Procedure for obtaining maintenance. The court observed that personal laws do not take away the statutory right of maintenance under section 536 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, the wife could claim maintenance. Thus, the Indian courts have, upheld women’s rights from the very beginning in cases of Muta’h Marriages or pleasure marriages. However, the legal recognition of temporary marriages varies across jurisdictions owing to the divergence in religious doctrines, socio-cultural contexts, and state policies. International Practices: Contrasting Approaches While some of the Islamic nations incorporate these unions into their personal laws, many secular and non-Islamic legal systems outrightly reject such practices as they conflict with the constitutional rights of women and are glaringly opposed to public policy. In the Shia majority country of Iran, temporary alliances (Nikah mut’ah) are legally recognised   and codified under the civil law system. The Iranian Civil Code, under Chapter 6 ( Article 1075 to Article 1077 ) explicitly allows for temporary marriages, and the subsequent chapter sets out requirements for a specific duration and mahr  (dower). The woman in temporary marriage is entitled to maintenance within the duration of the marriage, while the children born out of such a union are considered legitimate and enjoy inheritance rights under Iranian law. However, these statutory protections are not uniform in implementation and lead to potential misuse of the provisions to circumvent adultery laws and facilitate exploitative relationships under the garb of religious sanction. In Iraq as well, pleasure marriages are illegally performed by some clerics, which is often child trafficking under the garb of muta’h marriage . Here, if a child under the age of 9 years is promised in marriage, then ‘sexual touching’ is considered to be religiously permitted . Thus, the practice has become a breeding ground for child trafficking and prostitution in Iraq. The lack of judicial protection, combined with the patriarchal interpretations of sharia law, often leaves women and children vulnerable to the assaults of men in power, especially when it comes to cross-border elements or undocumented marriages. In contrast to this, Sunni-majority countries, which follow the Hanafi jurisprudence of Sunni schools, generally regard such unions as invalid and akin to prostitution. India does accord statutory recognition to such an alliance, but the judiciary has constantly protected the rights of women and their children born through such an alliance. Most western jurisdictions do not recognise temporary marriages in any form; any such alliance is either treated as non-marital cohabitation or null and void in some cases for public policy reasons. The increasing global culture of pleasure marriages in the form of tourism in economically weak countries like Indonesia, Malaysia and parts of North Africa has drawn attention from      human rights organisations across the globe. Ethical and Social Concerns The practice of temporary pleasure marriages has many risks; the major problems include primarily the exploitation of women by forcing them into unwanted marriages and thereby into forced sexual intercourse with the temporary husband, with no legal recourse under the provisions for sexual offences. Such marriages might even lead to larger humanitarian issues, such as human trafficking of women for prostitution under the garb of marriage. Consent becomes an issue as it is hard to decipher whether or not it was given without coercion. The question arises regarding the maintenance of the children born out of such wedlock, including their inheritance and property rights. Such problems as bigamy, which is prohibited by the laws of many countries, might arise when the spouses are not aware of the background of their partners, thus violating the rights of the original wife. Pleasure marriage tourism, which has increased in recent times, also poses significant challenges as the husband leaves the country after such temporary marriage and cannot be contacted for maintenance or Alimony, thus leaving the women alone to deal with the consequences of such union. Problems of increased risks of sexually transmitted diseases and subjugation of women are another significant risk involved. This has been seen in the recent developments on pleasure marriage tourism in countries like Indonesia . These alliances blur the lines between marriage, prostitution and trafficking, raising serious questions on consent, dignity and autonomy of women; while these unions are defended on grounds of religious identity, their real-world implications must be considered. The Way Forward It is imperative that countries that recognise pleasure marriages must introduce stringent procedural safeguards with clear and mandatorily written contracts ensuring informed consent of both parties. Further, the socio-economic protection of women must be secured through the right to maintenance, healthcare, and education for children born out of such a union. It is of grave importance that cross-border pleasure marriage be criminalised to avoid sexual exploitation and human trafficking; bilateral and international agreements could be arrived at to hold perpetrators accountable across jurisdictions. Moreover, the government should mandate the registration of all marriages, regardless of their form, to prevent abuse; this would ensure legal protection to undocumented spouses and children. Conclusion In pluralistic legal systems, there is an increasing need to harmonise personal laws with constitutional safeguards; the institution of temporary alliance is a tool of subjugation which cannot be shielded under the veil of religious sanction. Thus, as societies evolve, legal systems must attempt to strike a balance between cultural pluralism and universal human rights. Lawmakers must regulate such practices, and protection must be provided to the vulnerable groups. Temporary unions may exist, but the questions they raise about consent, dignity, accountability and justice are far from temporary. They are permanent and critical.  *Sunidhi Khabya is a third-year law student pursuing a B.A. LL.B (Hons.) from National Law University, Jodhpur. The views expressed above are the author's alone and do not represent the beliefs of Family Law Chronicle: The CFL Blog.

*by Rajveer Singh Sachdev & Aman Anand Introduction The Surrogacy (Regulation) Act of 2021 [hereinafter “The Act”] banned commercial surrogacy in India. Defined under S2(g) of the Act, it occurs when surrogacy involves payments or incentives beyond medical expenses and insurance for surrogate mothers, which is explicitly prohibited. Permissible expenses typically include medical costs and other prescribed expenditures for the surrogate. The alternative proposed to this was the concept of altruistic surrogacy [ Section 2(b) ], which involves no payment or compensation other than the medical expenses and insurance coverage for the surrogate mother. This difference is very narrow, as the only  discernible difference  lies in the payment to the surrogate mother. While the intention behind this framework is to protect the surrogacy process and prevent the exploitation of surrogate mothers, scholars have argued that under-the-table transactions and the grey area involving altruistic surrogacy could lead to its commercialisation in the traditional sense without proper regulations [See Also:   Das and Maut (2014), Payne (2018), Kashyap and Tripathi (2018) ]. This blog will further delve into the idea of the commercialisation of surrogacy, and argue that potentially inefficient enforcement mechanisms could result in the formation of an unregulated market for the same. Commercial Surrogacy Commercial surrogacy was unregulated in India since 2002, until it was eventually banned in 2015 . Prior to the ban in 2015, India was a major hub for surrogacy and was often called the “ Baby Factory .” Due to low cost and favorable conditions, India attracted a lot of foreigners from countries like the UK and the USA. The lack of employment and high amount of compensation after 9 months made commercial surrogacy a popular practice in India. However, due to a lack of proper rules and regulations, unethical practices and exploitation of women  were prevalent. Ethical issues like treating women as ‘objects’ or ‘commodities’ were also brought up [ See Also : Clowes and Cantu (2023) , Kindo et. Al. (2023) , Saxena et. al. (2012) ]. A   study in 2012   estimated the size of the surrogacy industry to be 2 billion dollars per year . In 2015, commercial surrogacy was banned, and the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021, introduced altruistic surrogacy in India. The surrogate mother, being genetically related to the intending parents [ Sec. 2(zg) ] will be allowed to indulge in altruistic surrogacy. The surrogate mother must be married and should have a biological child [ Sec 4(iii)(b)(I) ]. The Act imposes a   ban   on foreigners, live-in couples, gay couples, overseas Indians and single parents from opting for commercial surrogacy. Commercial surrogacy was deemed immoral  as it treats women as a commodity, and sometimes the woman is not paid appropriately for her time, effort, pain, danger and suffering involved in the course of bearing the child [ See Also :   Arneson (2018) , Blazier and Janssens (2020) ]. The surrogate children often struggle for their nationality and are delivered without a recognised nationality [ See Also:   Baby Manji Yamada vs Union Of India (2008) , Jan Bazaz vs Anand Municipality and Ors (2009) ]. The safety of the surrogate mother was often compromised, and there were no regulations or safety provisions for the mother. The lack of a proper legal system and rules led to the ban on commercial surrogacy in India. However, as the blog will argue, this complete ban on commercial surrogacy doesn’t serve its intended purpose. Arguments 1.     Demand for commercial surrogacy won’t disappear due to it being banned Rooted in basic economic theory, the banning of something won’t automatically cause its  demand to be extinguished  from the market. As long as there is a demand, the supply for the same will continue to rise in an unregulated sector. Despite the US’s prohibition on alcohol during the 1920s, the demand remained the same, which resulted in  illegal speakeasies . The war on drugs is another example where the demand won over the ban, and the war was won by drugs [See Also:  Esquivel-Suárez (2018) ]. The  demand for surrogacy in India is high , not only amongst infertile couples, but same-sex couples, live-in couples, etc [See Also:  Horsey (2023) ] Combine that with the economic incentive the surrogate mother receive as compensation through  under-the-table transactions, the supply  will likely remain steady. As this will fall under the category of commercial surrogacy, the same will exist in an unregulated market despite being banned. Not going into the constitutional aspects of right and freedom to trade, this unregulated market will lead to more exploitation of the surrogate mothers. 2.     Lack of Altruistic Options While the demand for surrogacy is high, altruistic surrogacy remains an option. However, the stringent requirements for the surrogate mothers render the potential candidates for the same very narrow. As per the requirements listed in sub-clause (b) of clause (iii) of Section 4 , the surrogate mother needs to be between the ages of 25-35, genetically related to the intending couple. ever-married, must have one biological child of her own and can only become a surrogate once in her lifetime. This narrows down the candidate pool. Further, most women are unwilling to undergo pregnancy, with all its risks and burdens, without compensation [ See Also :   Shenfield et al. (2025) , Saliu (2025) , Lieber (1992) ]. It risks exploiting women’s goodwill by expecting them to undergo this without compensation. In a   study done by Hibino , it was observed that women in lower strata preferred undergoing surrogacy for a compensatory sum of Rs 3 lakh to 4 lakh, which they quoted as “big money for poor families,” but held the belief that the surrogate mothers could be paid more. The attitude towards the commercialisation of surrogacy when the difference between commercial and altruistic is too simplistic to enforce correctly.   3.     Ambiguities in law and enforcement difficulties The definition of altruistic surrogacy under section 2(b) of the Act entitles the surrogate mother to medical and prescribed expenses, which have not been defined in the Act or the rules. This creates a grey area, where intended parents can compensate surrogates under the guise of “medical expenses.” Without strict guidelines or disclosure requirements, these payments can effectively become commercial transactions in all  but name [ See Also :   Jain (2024) , Stuhmcke (2017) , Bannerjee (2006) ]. Furthermore, surrogacy arrangements are deeply personal and private, typically involving only a few individuals. State authorities have limited capacity to monitor private relationships, financial transactions, or informal agreements. Even when commercial intent is suspected, proving it is difficult without clear documentation or a whistleblower, especially when both parties benefit and are unlikely to report each other. As a result of this legal vagueness and limited enforcement, an informal surrogacy market can emerge, where payments are made discreetly, in cash or non-traceable ways, contracts may be drawn up informally, outside legal scrutiny, and intermediaries and agencies operate in a semi-legal capacity, connecting intended parents and surrogates while skirting regulation. This undermines the very purpose of banning commercial surrogacy, which is often to prevent exploitation and commodification — yet those risks increase in an unregulated, underground environment.   Recommendations Some recommendations can be made to ensure smooth regulation of the same if commercial surrogacy is legalised. Firstly, a transparent framework can be made that allows commercial surrogacy under a licensed practitioner. Only registered practitioners and clinics could operate. Establishing a centralized regulatory body (e.g., National Surrogacy Board) to oversee compliance, licensing, and grievances, and mandate strict accreditation for clinics and practitioners, with regular audits could prevent exploitation. Secondly, allow all consenting women (married, unmarried, single parents, etc.) to become surrogates, provided they pass medical and psychological screenings, undergo mandatory counselling on legal, health, and emotional risks and provide informed consent without coercion. Opening up surrogacy access to single individuals, LGBTQ+ couples, and live-in partners could ensure equity. Thirdly , clarifying and broadening the difference between what commercialised and altruistic stand for could help. Vague terms like “medical expenses” and “prescribed expenses” allow room for interpretation and could lead to under-the-table transactions. Replacing them with transparent compensation structures, including base payment for the surrogate, medical, insurance, and maternity coverage, post-delivery support (if needed) would ensure transparency in payments.   Conclusion The Surrogacy Act’s outright ban on commercial surrogacy is a well-intentioned but fundamentally flawed policy. By ignoring the persistent demand for surrogacy—from infertile couples, LGBTQ+ individuals, and single parents—the law has not eliminated the practice but driven it underground, where exploitation thrives unchecked. The current altruistic model is unworkable: few women will endure pregnancy’s physical and emotional toll without compensation, and vague definitions of "medical expenses" invite covert payments. The result? A shadow market with no safeguards, no oversight, and no justice for surrogates. India has a choice—cling to an unenforceable ban that endangers women, or establish a transparent, regulated system that ensures fair compensation, medical protections, and legal accountability. Regulation won’t encourage commodification—it will prevent it by bringing surrogacy into the light, where contracts are enforced, clinics are monitored, and surrogates are empowered. The 2021 Act’s moralistic approach has failed. It’s time for a pragmatic, rights-based solution—one that prioritizes safety over symbolism, and dignity over denial. The law must change, or the exploitation will continue. The stakes are too high to ignore. * Rajveer Singh Sachdev is a second-year law student pursuing a B.A. LL.B (Hons.) from Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab. * Aman Anand is a second-year law student pursuing a B.A. LL.B (Hons.) from Rajiv Gandhi National University of Law, Punjab. The views expressed above are the author's alone and do not represent the beliefs of Family Law Chronicle: The CFL Blog.

*by Sri Janani Seenivasan & Meemansha Choudhary Introduction Refugees today encounter a complex set of challenges related to property ownership and inheritance, often stemming from their displacement and growing legal complexities. While certain rights are recognized by international conventions, domestic frameworks vary significantly. In India, refugees can obtain citizenship after fulfilling specific criteria, which in theory, entitles them to the same inheritance rights as that of Indian nationals. However, various administrative hurdles and a keen focus on regularization instead of a rights-based approach, creates significant barriers in realizing this goal. Despite a broad interpretation of Article 300A  of the Constitution of India, the Indian framework remains glaringly inadequate in addressing the property acquisition and inheritance rights of refugees. The interplay of refugee laws and property rights is often an overlooked subject matter. In India, refugees are treated as ‘foreigners’ under the general immigration regulations, relegating them to a state of uncertainty. For millions of stateless refugees, a chance to live with dignity and self-reliance hinges upon them possessing  economic stability .  The lack of a consistent legal framework complicates their ability to acquire, own and inherit property, further marginalizing them. This article attempts to, firstly, assess India’s legal framework governing property acquisition and inheritance for refugees. Secondly, it delves into the challenges faced by specific groups of refugees, like the Tibetan refugees and the recent moves by the Maharashtra and Delhi governments in granting a freehold status to the Punjabi and Sindhi refugees. Thirdly, it also addresses the implications of the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019, on property and inheritance rights. Lastly, the authors emphasize the urgent need for an all-inclusive domestic refugee law that broadly addresses the rights of refugees, with a focus on streamlining the administrative process for acquiring citizenship and securing inheritance rights. India’s Approach to Property Ownership & Inheritance Rights of Refugees The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1951  (‘ Refugee Convention ’) and the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1967  (‘ Refugee Protocol ’) defines a refugee as a person fleeing across the international borders because of the horrors of being victimized in one’s own country on the grounds of race, nationality, religion, political opinion or social group. However, India is not a signatory to the Refugee Convention and the Protocol. Further, it does not recognize the contribution of the United Nations Human Rights Commission (‘ UNHCR ’) and prefers to handle the issue of refugees on a piece-meal basis unilaterally, avoiding a one-size-fits-all approach. In the absence of a specific refugee legislation, the Foreigners Act, 1946  (‘ The Act ’) can be best said to govern the entry, stay and exit of foreigners, including refugees. The Act does not distinctively recognize a person as a ‘refugee’ but rather treats all non-citizens as foreigners, granting broad powers to the government to regulate their movement. Further, India is known to discriminate between different marginalized groups. The Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019 (‘ CAA, 2019 ’), has made religion the formal criterion for citizenship whereby all non-Muslim refugees from Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Pakistan are made eligible for Indian citizenship. Under the current regime, refugees, categorized as ‘non-citizens’, face significant limitations when it comes to owning immovable property. Although the Supreme Court  has extended the constitutional right to property under Article 300A to non-citizens, its practical application is severely restricted by the Foreign Exchange Management Act, 1999  (‘ FEMA ’), which governs property acquisition and transfer by non-citizens in India. Under FEMA, only non-resident Indians (NRI); i.e., citizens of India who are residents outside India and persons of Indian origin (PIO), who has held Indian passport at any point of time or if their father or grandfather was a citizen of India, could hold immovable property in India. Citizens of countries sharing land borders with India, such as Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, China, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iran or Bhutan, cannot purchase immovable property. The general permission  extends only to commercial and residential property, excluding agricultural and plantation land.  Refugees, as foreign nationals, cannot purchase any sort of immovable property, unless the property comes by virtue of inheritance through a person resident in India. This means that they can inherit property from a person resident in India, but this is also subject to the approval from the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). This rule, again, does not apply to the citizens of countries sharing land boundaries  with India, meaning that refugees like the Rohingyas from Myanmar and Bangladesh are effectively barred from inheriting property. In contrast, refugees from countries that do not share land borders may have limited inheritance rights, subject to RBI approval. Further, they may be permitted to take residential accommodation on lease for not more than five years, beyond which specific RBI permission is required. Therefore, refugees, as such, have very limited rights to own and inherit property in India.  The Case of Tibetan Refugees & Punjabi and Sindhi Refugees Under the Citizenship (Amendment) Act of 1986  (‘CAA, 1986’), Tibetan refugees born in India between 1950 and 1987 are eligible  for Indian citizenship. Although various rulings  by the judiciary mandate the government to grant citizenship to individuals who meet the criteria outlined under the Act, 1986, they face multiple administrative hurdles in obtaining the same, making the process difficult despite their eligibility. For instance, conditions such as cancelling their Identity Certificate (IC), not residing in Tibetan refugee settlements, and not receiving assistance from the Tibetan govt-in-exile, etc., discourages them from applying for citizenship. In light of the challenges faced by the Tibetan refugees, the Central Government brought the Tibetan Rehabilitation Policy of 2014 , which has resulted in several progessive changes ensuring property rights of refugees. By way of this policy, issuance of standardised lease agreements has been made mandatory for the state governments. This has allowed them limited rights to land use. State governments must sign a lease agreement for twenty years with the Central Tibetan Relief Committee (‘CTRC’),  through which the refugees can get access to land for residential, commercial and agricultural usage. However, the ownership of the land remains with the Government of India, which obstructs the inheritance of such property. In light of these administrative obstacles, the only way to ensure continous usage of the land is repeated lease renewal. A positive step has recently been taken by the governments of Maharashtra and Delhi in this regard. The Maharashtra government  has decided to grant ownership of the property allotted to the refugees under the Displaced Person (Compensation & Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 . In a similar manner, the Delhi Development Authority (DDA) offers ownership titles  to the families of refugees who migrated to India between 1950-60. The intention behind granting these ownership deeds is to resolve the ambiguous status of property of refugees. This step highlights the eagerness of the administration to regularise the ownership of properties across the territory. With ownership rights officially recognised, these families can now legally transfer these properties to their heirs. However, by remaining silent on clarifications regarding the stance of personal law, these decisions will have a limited impact, and the ambiguity surrounding inheritance continues to persist. Impact of the Citizenship Amendment Act, 2019, on Property Inheritance Rights The CAA, 2019, alters India’s approach to refugees by enforcing a religious criterion. It offers a fast-track path to citizenship for non-Muslim refugees from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh who arrived before December 31, 2014. Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs, Jains, Parsis, and Christians granted citizenship under the CAA, 2019 are eligible to acquire and inherit property under the same laws as Indian citizens after five years of residency in India, as compared to the previous twelve-year requirement. This provides them with significant economic stability and improved property rights. However, refugees who do not qualify under the CAA, 2019, particularly Muslims, and those who have arrived after 2014, face stricter restrictions. As non-citizens, their ability to inherit immovable property is limited as compared to residents of India and requires prior RBI approval. The exclusion of Muslim refugees, such as Rohingyas and Bangladeshi Muslims, raises concerns about discrimination, leaving them without a clear path to citizenship or secure property rights. Thus, the CAA, 2019, enhances property prospects for certain groups, while reinforcing legal and economic challenges for others. Conclusion The decision of granting land ownership to the refugees in India is done by way of policies, schemes and other delegated legislations, rather than a statutory instrument, which questions the effectiveness of such a tool in presence of the capacity to pass a legislation otherwise. Furthermore, these policies are framed based on administrative convenience, rather than a focus on the rights of refugees. Hence, the authors suggest that the emphasis has to be shifted from administrative convenience to a rights-based approach. For this, India must enact a national refugee law that clearly encapsulates the rights of refugees, including their right to property, which can eventually get translated into inheritance and ownership. This law should also ensure that refugees are treated as right holders, and not as ‘passive recipients’ of administrative dynamics. Additionally, the prospect of getting inheritance rights through Indian citizenship is nothing less than an illusion for many refugees. Though citizenship opens up direct access to property and inheritance rights, the complex bureaucratic and administrative processes, such as the requirement to cancel refugee documents and give up benefits , makes it increasingly difficult for most refugees to navigate and realise their rights. A framework that is ‘refugee-friendly’, taking into consideration the limitation of these communities is needed for addressing this grey area. It remains to be seen how the government will take stock of the situation and address it effectively. * Sri Janani Seenivasan is a fourth-year law student pursuing a B.A. LL.B (Business Law Hons.) at the National Law University, Jodhpur. * Meemansha Choudhary is   a fourth-year law student pursuing a B.A. LL.B (Criminal Law Hons.) at the National Law University, Jodhpur. The views expressed above are the author's alone and do not represent the beliefs of Family Law Chronicle: The CFL Blog.

*by Y. Leela Krishna Reddy and Saachi Minocha. “ Sometimes, by upholding equal rights for a few, courts necessarily must require others to forebear some prior conduct or restrain some personal instinct. Here, that would not seem to be the case. Assuring equal protection for same-sex couples does not diminish the freedom of others to any degree. Thus, same-sex couples’ right to marry seems to be a uniquely ‘free’ constitutional right. Hopefully, even those opposed to or uncertain about same-sex marriage will see it that way in the future. ” - US District Judge John Heyburn, Timothy Love v. Steve Beshear Introduction Rights for the LGBTQ+ community are not merely about the right to exist in private spaces but about the freedom to be visible, to live authentically, and to have one's love and identity recognized in the public sphere. Although the legal recognition of same-sex marriage is but a part of the broader movement towards the full legal recognition of queer individuals as equal human beings, it is a vital step in dismantling centuries of systemic exclusion and discrimination. Marriage as a social institution not only grants same-sex couples visibility and personal fulfilment but also grants a host of rights that flow from the legal recognition of marriage such as inheritance, adoption, spousal benefits, and medical decision-making rights.   The global movement towards legal recognition of same-sex marriage has gained significant momentum in recent decades. Initially spearheaded by Western countries, the movement began with the Netherlands , which became the first country to legalize same-sex marriage in 2001. Since then, numerous countries  across Europe, the Americas, and parts of Oceania have followed suit. Despite the progress, many regions, including large parts of Africa, the Middle East, and Asia, have been slower in embracing these changes due to cultural, religious, and political opposition. In South East Asia, the movement toward same-sex marriage has seen a more gradual and uneven trajectory. India does not currently recognize same-sex marriages, as marriage is traditionally defined under Indian law as a union between a man and a woman. The landmark judgment of Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India  (2018) decriminalized homosexuality by striking down Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code to the extent that it criminalized consensual same-sex relationships. While this was celebrated as a significant step for LGBTQ+ rights in India, this decriminalization did not extend to the recognition of same-sex marriages and there has been no progress in over half a decade. On the other hand, Thailand has emerged as a leader in LGBTQ+ rights within the region by making significant strides toward the legal recognition of same-sex relationships.  Thailand’s Progressive Step: Legalisation of Same-Sex Marriage “ Today love triumphed over prejudice, after fighting for more than 20 years. Today we can say that this country has marriage equality. ” - Plaifah Kyoka Shodladd, Member of the Parliamentary Committee on Same-Sex Marriage For decades, Thailand has been perceived as a relative haven for LGBTQ+ individuals in Southeast Asia, known for its vibrant queer culture and general atmosphere of tolerance. However, this social acceptance has long stood in contrast to the lack of legal recognition for same-sex partnerships. The struggle for marriage equality in Thailand spans over two decades, marked by persistent activism and political advocacy.  A major setback occurred in 2020 when the Constitutional Court  upheld the definition of marriage as exclusively between a man and a woman. Nevertheless, activists continued their campaign, gradually building support among lawmakers and the public. This persistent effort finally bore fruit in 2024 with a series of legislative victories. On March 27, 2024 Thailand's House of Representatives passed a marriage equality bill with overwhelming support. The Senate approved the final reading of the law on June 18, 2024  with 130 out of 152 senators voting in favor. The historic process culminated on October 13, 2024 , as King Maha Vajiralongkorn signed the bill into law, setting January 22, 2025, as its effective date.  The new legislation marks a significant departure from previous laws. It redefines marriage as a partnership between two individuals, replacing gender-specific terms with inclusive language. This law finally aligns the Thai law with societal acceptance and allows same-sex couples to enjoy full legal, financial, and medical rights, including the ability to adopt children, inherit property, and make medical decisions for incapacitated partners.  India’s tryst with the recognition of same-sex marriage “All queer persons have the right to choose their partners. But the State cannot be obligated to recognize the bouquet of rights flowing from such a Union. We disagree with the CJI on this aspect.”  - Justice Ravindra Bhatt, Supriyo @ Supriya v. Union of India The Supriyo @ Supriya v. Union of India   (hereinafter ‘ Supriyo’ ) judgement is the latest landmark Supreme Court [“ SC ”] judgment in India on the issue of same-sex marriage. While the court recognized the dignity of LGBTQ+ individuals and rejected the notion that queerness is unnatural or confined to urban areas, it ultimately refrained from legalizing same-sex marriage. The venerable judges stated that a gender-neutral interpretation of the Special Marriage Act may not be equitable and could result in women being exposed to vulnerabilities in an unintended manner. The Supreme Court, in refusing to recognise the fundamental right to marry has established a position contrary to international human rights law, particularly Article 16(1) of the International Declaration of Human Rights and Article 23(2) read with Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that guarantee all men and women the right to marry and a found family ( see  as argued here ).  While the court recognised that denial of the right to marry to queer couples would ultimately also result in a denial of benefits such as a PF, ESI, pension etc to same-sex couples which has an adverse and discriminatory effect, Justice Bhat opined that these concerns can be addressed by the parliament through a High-Powered Committee. This deferral of duty to the parliament to address the issues faced by the sexual minorities and the legalization of same-sex marriage is extremely problematic, largely due to the burdens of inertia that exist within the parliament.  As articulated by Rosalind Dixon, legislative bodies often face capacity constraints that hinder them from addressing rights-based claims of minority groups in a timely or prioritized manner. Even when a legislature intends to act constitutionally, the procedural and political realities make it difficult to allocate sufficient attention to claims lacking majoritarian support. In the context of the rights of the LGBTQ+ community, which have historically faced social ostracization and legal exclusion, the court's decision to “ pass the baton ” to Parliament overlooks the fact that progress in this domain in India has been largely court-driven ( see   here ) unlike Thailand where the legislature took a proactive role. One remedy that the court could have considered is a Suspended Declaration of Invalidity [“ SDI ”], a method developed in the Fourie case  and used in other jurisdictions to address the issue of same-sex marriage (as argued by several scholars see   here , here  and here ). Through an SDI, the court could have declared the existing legal framework on marriage to be unconstitutional on the grounds of violating equality, while simultaneously giving the legislature a reasonable time frame to amend the law, thus preserving the separation of powers. This approach would allow the necessary parliamentary debate while safeguarding the rights in question. Furthermore, marriage extends beyond simple legal recognition, involving an interconnected web of rights such as maintenance, adoption, and inheritance. Given the interconnectedness of these rights, judicial clarity on how these would apply to same-sex couples is essential, and an SDI would provide breathing space to have discussions and build a structured framework for such considerations. Parliament in Limbo “ Traditionally, liberty has been understood as an absence of State interference in a person’s right to make choices. However, contemporary scholars have come to the conclusion that the role of the State in perpetuating social prejudices cannot be ignored. In effect, where State does not intervene it automatically allows communities with social and economic capital to exercise dominance over communities who have been historically marginalised.” - CJI D.Y. Chandrachud while delivering the keynote address on “ Identity, the Individual and the State: New Paths to Liberty ” The Supriyo judgment reiterates the principle of strict separation of powers while declining to legally recognise same-sex marriage. The court has clearly delineated that is within the parliament’s purview to make a law on marriage, as it is a statutory right that flows from a legally enforceable customary practice. Subsequently, the central government vide gazette notification dated April 16, 2024 ,  has constituted the Committee to examine measures to prevent discrimination against the queer community in access to goods, services, and social welfare entitlements, ensuring protection from violence, harassment, or coercion, safeguarding queer individuals from involuntary medical treatments and surgeries and any other relevant issues that would empower the queer community. The government committee has taken several interim measures  such as the directions issued by the Department of Food and Public Distribution to states and Union Territories to treat queer partners as part of the same household for ration cards. The Department of Financial Services has clarified that there are no restrictions on queer individuals opening joint bank accounts or nominating their partners. The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare has issued letters to states on LGBTQ+ rights in healthcare, banning conversion therapy, ensuring access to sex reassignment surgery, and sensitizing healthcare staff. It is also developing guidelines for mental health and medical intervention for intersex children. While these measures address immediate concerns such as access to welfare benefits, healthcare, and protection from discrimination, they fall short of addressing the fundamental issue: the lack of legal recognition of same-sex marriage. By focusing on administrative reforms rather than granting marital rights, the government is sidestepping the central issue of equality for queer couples. Without the legal right to marry, queer individuals remain excluded from crucial protections and privileges, including inheritance rights, spousal benefits, and family rights. The committee’s actions, while a step forward, are ultimately insufficient to guarantee true equality for the LGBTQ+ community. In this context, the court's reliance on administrative measures and the formation of a committee is not a substitute for robust legal reform. While the committee's initiatives are a positive step, they are ultimately piecemeal solutions that do not address the systemic exclusion queer individuals face due to the lack of marriage equality. Conclusion Thailand's progressive leap toward the legal recognition of same-sex marriage offers a beacon of hope for LGBTQIA+ rights across Asia. It demonstrates that, with persistent activism and a responsive legal framework, true marriage equality can be achieved. For India, however, the struggle for same-sex marriage remains fraught with legislative inertia and judicial reluctance. While administrative reforms may address some immediate concerns, they cannot substitute the social and legal recognition that marriage provides. While India's journey towards equality for the LGBTQIA+ community has been slow and with many setbacks, the lessons from Thailand offer a roadmap—one that draws from sustained activism, unwavering commitment to human rights, and boldness in taking a leap towards a gender-neutral understanding of ‘marriage’. By embracing these lessons, India can turn its limp toward progress into a decisive stride, ensuring that equality is not just a promise, but a lived reality for all its citizens. *Y. Leela Krishna Reddy is a third-year law student pursuing a B.B.A. LL.B (Hons.) at the National Law University, Jodhpur. *Saachi Minocha is a second-year law student pursuing a B.A . LL.B (Hons.) at the National Law University, Jodhpur. The views expressed above are the author's alone and do not represent the beliefs of Family Law Chronicle: The CFL Blog.

*by Sneha Naresh and Archisa Ratn Introduction In Hindu culture, marriage is considered the sacred bond between a man and woman that lasts for seven lives. However, given the evolving landscape of the world, the concept of divorce, which used to be considered evil, has now been accepted to be part and parcel of the institution of marriage. Currently, Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955  only allows fault grounds for divorce which include cruelty, adultery, desertion, conversion, unsound mind, renunciation and disappearance. These fault grounds require proof and allegations, which leads to prolonged litigation and grave conflicts, highlighting the need for a different ground for divorce. Nevertheless, the ‘irretrievable breakdown of marriage’ has emerged as a significant judicial doctrine in recent times, which focuses on the reality that a marriage may have deteriorated beyond repair, making reconciliation impossible.   The article aims at understanding the historical context and origin of the concept of ‘irretrievable breakdown of marriage’, in both India and the United Kingdom, and its application by the Supreme Court of India during recent times. It further explains the significance of incorporating such a ground in the legislation itself due to the ambiguity surrounding its usage by the lower Family Courts which are usually most accessible to the general public.  Origins of ‘Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage’ in the United Kingdom: Historically, fault-based divorce was the norm in England, requiring parties to prove adultery, cruelty, or desertion to dissolve their marriage. One of the early cases reflecting the limitations of such a system was Masarati v. Masarati  (1895), [1]  where both spouses accused each other of adultery. This case shows how fault-based divorces fuelled contentions between spouses and complicated the legal process paving the way for an ‘irretrievable breakdown of marriage’ to be established as a ground for divorce. In response to the growing dissatisfaction with fault-based divorces, the Law Commission of England conducted a review, recommending reforms that would allow couples to divorce without assigning blame. These recommendations were implemented through the Divorce Reform Act of 1969 , which introduced the concept of ‘irretrievable breakdown of marriage’ as the ground for divorce. The Act came into force in 1971, allowing couples to prove this breakdown by demonstrating adultery, unreasonable behaviour, desertion, or a period of separation. In recent years, further reforms have been enacted to modernize divorce laws. The Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Act 2020  (The “ DDS Act ”) came into effect on April 6, 2022, introducing ‘no-fault divorce.’ This is the most significant reform since the 1970s. The DDS Act retains ‘irretrievable breakdown’ as the sole ground for divorce but removes the requirement to prove one of the five facts (adultery, desertion, unreasonable behaviour, or separation). A simple statement from one or both parties that the marriage has broken down irretrievably is sufficient. No-fault divorce has brought substantial benefits by reducing conflict between spouses, eliminating the need for blame, and promoting more amicable discussions about financial settlements and childcare arrangements. This approach has modernized divorce proceedings in England and Wales, reflecting the evolving understanding of marriage breakdowns. Similar reforms have been adopted in several countries, such as Sweden, Australia, and the U.S. states. Historical Context of ‘Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage’ in India: The concept of irretrievable breakdown of marriage has a long history in India, shaped by both legislative efforts and judicial decisions. The idea first gained prominence when the Law Commission of India submitted its 71st report  in 1978. It recommended that along with the fault grounds present in HMA, 1955, ‘irretrievable breakdown of marriage’ should also be inserted as a ground for divorce because the former often increased financial strain and emotional distress in couples seeking divorce. Along similar lines, the 217th Report  (2009) of the Law Commission recommended the same. In this report, the landmark case of Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli  was quoted wherein the Apex Court recommended the Union of India to consider introducing an amendment to incorporate the same.  The Marriage Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2013 , included ‘irretrievable breakdown of marriage’ as a ground for divorce in Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and the Special Marriage Act, 1954. However, this bill failed to be passed in the Lok Sabha. Nonetheless, over the years, various Indian courts have recognized irretrievable breakdown of marriage in a range of decisions. The Supreme Court in as early as 1996 invoked Article 142 to grant divorce under this ground, in the case of Kanchan Devi v. Pramod Kumar Mittal . Thus, it can be seen that even though irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not yet codified, it is being increasingly invoked by the courts in cases where reconciliation is impossible. Recent Supreme Court Jurisprudence of Irretrievable Breakdown of Marriage: In the case of Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan , the constitutional bench of the Supreme Court held that the Apex Court can grant no-fault divorce of the grounds ‘irretrievable breakdown of marriage’ using its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India , even if one party is against it.  The Supreme Court defined ‘irretrievable breakdown of marriage’ as, “ once every effort has been made to salvage the marriage and there remains no possibility of reunion and cohabitation… that the marriage has shattered beyond repair .”  Article 142 allows the Supreme Court to pass any order or decree which is required for achieving “ complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it… ”. It however set limits to this discretionary power and stated that such authority must be exercised in a responsible manner that is in line with “ fundamental general and specific principles ”. General principles refer to the aspects included in the basic structure of the Constitution, whereas specific principles can be interpreted to be those under the relevant legislations.  In the same case, the Court laid down a set of inclusive and illustrative factors to be considered while granting such divorce:  Period of cohabitation post-marriage. Period of separation, if it has been more than six years, will be relevant.  Substance of allegations made by each party against the other. Litigatory or mediatory attempts to settle issues between parties. Social, educational and economic status of parties. Presence of and number of children, their ages and education received. Financial dependence of one party on another. Best interest of children, in aspects of welfare and custody. Alimony for wife. Economic and financial rights of children. In the case of Rajib Kumar Roy v. Sushmita Saha , the Apex Court granted divorce on grounds of ‘irretrievable breakdown of marriage’ due to considerable factors such as “ continued bitterness, dead emotions and long separation .” In Poonam v. Surendra Kumar , divorce was granted by the Supreme Court as the period of separation was found to be sufficiently long (19 years).   However, the Court has also rejected relief under Article 142 exercising its discretion, such as where the period of cohabitation post marriage was only 40 days , and another case wherein the wife showed willingness to work on the marriage .  Conclusion and Recommendations: The Delhi High Court  recently held that Family Courts do not have the power to grant divorces on grounds of ‘irretrievable breakdown of marriage’, and warned that the lower courts must restrict themselves to provisions present in the statutes. It opined that such discretionary powers under Article 142 are vested only with the Supreme Court of India.  Interestingly, in the case of Prabhavathi v. Lakshmeesha , the Supreme Court declared a Family Court order of divorce granted on the grounds of ‘irretrievable breakdown of marriage’ as null and void. However, it did so because it did not agree with the factors considered by the lower court while granting such divorce and not because the latter did not have such powers. This can be taken as an implicit green signal by the Apex Court that lower courts can grant divorces under the ground of ‘irretrievable breakdown of marriage’ using Supreme Court judgements as precedents. However, the inconsistencies in the stance of the Supreme regarding the power of the lower courts to grant divorce under this doctrine complicates its application. Article 142 further states that such order or decree granted to do complete justice “ shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made… ” A Family Court in Patiala  granted no fault divorce (in 2023) considering the fact that the parties had contested the case in the Court for more than seven years. The Court observed that irrespective of the reason for which one party wants divorce, they are forced to allege baseless accusations against the other party in order to relieve themselves from the marriage. This results in immense suffering for both parties.  Therefore, to set aside such ambiguity in the law, the Parliament must introduce specific sections in the marriage laws to allow divorce on grounds of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. This codification of the doctrine would reduce financial and emotional burden on couples by eliminating the need for attributing blame on one or both of the spouses and promoting amicable resolution of marital disputes. Several appeals and monetary resources would be required to approach the Supreme Court for such a divorce, which again may or may not grant it as it is a discretionary power. Such hardship must not be caused to those parties who are already going through a difficult passage of time due to their failed marriages.  *Sneha Naresh is a fifth-year law student pursuing a B.A. LL.B ( Constitutional Law Hons.) at the National Law University, Jodhpur. *Archisa Ratn is a second-year l aw student pursuing a B.A. LL.B (Hons.) at the National Law University, Jodhpur. The views expressed above are the author's alone and do not represent the beliefs of Family Law Chronicle: The CFL Blog. [1] Masarati v. Masarati, (1969) 1 WLR 392.