*Akshat Pundir and Dheer Vasani Introduction The tussle between personal laws that form part of religious identity and the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 15 and 17 has transformed over the decades. In the initial decades of independent India, the courts adopted a non-interventionist approach in matters of personal laws. Over the years, judicial activism has transformed this stance towards active constitutional scrutiny of personal laws. The courts have moved from a literal interpretation of Article 13 towards a purposive interpretation that attempts to support the real intent of the Constitution-makers. This blog examines how Indian courts have moved from shielding personal laws from constitutional review to cautiously testing their limits through interpretation, alternative statutes, and selective judicial scrutiny. The First Confrontation of Fundamental Rights & Personal Laws in Modern India: Non-Interventionist Approach State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali was the first post-independence judgement to directly address the aspect of the intersection of the Constitution and personal laws. The court held that personal laws deriving from religious scriptures are immune from scrutiny under the purview of fundamental rights. This conclusion was based on a literal interpretation of Article 13(3), which treats “customs and usages” separately from “personal laws”. The court justified its reasoning by noting that Articles 17, 25, 26, and 372 would be rendered redundant if Article 13 could invalidate all personal laws. For a newly independent nation where religion was a sensitive affair, the judiciary, for preserving peace, was compelled to keep itself in abeyance from the domain of personal laws. However, in the later years, while society modernised and adopted practices with new precedents emerging, the domain of personal laws remained untouched from any scope of scrutiny through social and legal reforms. The courts, whilst dealing with questions of personal laws, have to date avoided a direct confrontation with the doctrine established in Narasu. They derived alternative secular laws, the essential religious practice doctrine (ERP), etc., rather than withdrawing the immunity which personal laws enjoyed from constitutional rights like equality and liberty. In Ahmedabad Women Action Group v. Union of India, a PIL was filed that challenged discriminatory provisions in Hindu and Muslim personal laws relating to inheritance and polygamy. The Supreme Court reinforced the doctrine of judicial restraint in personal laws established by the State of Bombay v. Narasu Appa Mali. This strengthened the Narasu precedent. Following this, many High Court judgments cited the Ahmedabad case owing to its binding effect and refused to examine the constitutionality of personal laws. The court perceived that any contrary ruling would be deemed an attack on religious identity and chose to keep religious freedom above civil rights. This view has also been supported in the ruling of the Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar, where the Supreme Court introduced the doctrine of “Essential Religious Practices”, holding that "religion" covers all rituals and practices integral to a faith. The state should adopt a non-interventionist approach while handling such matters with respect to Article 26(b) of the Indian Constitution. First Challenge to the Old Order: Progressive Interpretation of Personal Laws While the courts maintained the hands-off approach from personal laws for decades after independence, the early 2000s witnessed a shift with the rise of judicial activism. Danial Latifi v. Union of India was among the earliest instances where the Supreme Court interpreted personal laws in light of constitutional values. The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 was believed to have weakened the rights of divorced Muslim women in the aftermath of the Shah Bano judgement, as an attempt to limit the husband’s responsibility of maintaining the spouse and her children till the iddat period. Further, in Danial Latifi, the court adopted the doctrine of “purposive interpretation” and read the act consistently with constitutional values, holding that although maintenance must be provided within the iddat period, it must be sufficient for the woman to sustain herself beyond that period. The court did not challenge the validity of the Act per se but shaped it in a way that upholds gender justice, marking a unique shift from its non-interference approach. The solution adopted in Danial Latifi was therefore not a permanent answer, but a careful exercise in judicial creativity. That makes the judgment important, but also limited. While a just result was achieved, the court did not revisit the jurisprudential standing of personal laws, showing that constitutional justice in personal law cases often depends not on a direct recognition of constitutional rights, but on whether the Court can find room to interpret an existing provision in a progressive way. Where no such room exists, the promise of equality becomes much harder to realize. Shayara Bano: The First Step Towards Direct Scrutiny of a Personal Law In Shayara Bano v. Union of India, the Supreme Court, in a rare move, directly set aside the personal law practice of triple talaq. The majority did this through two slightly different routes. One strand treated Section 2 of the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937 as “law in force” under Article 13 and struck down talaq‑e‑biddat as manifestly arbitrary and therefore violative of Article 14. While another strand of the bench held that talaq‑e‑biddat was itself contrary to Islamic tenets and therefore could not claim protection as an ERP under Article 25. Narasu was not formally overruled, but the fact that the Shariat Act could be treated as a statutory hook for review meant that, for the first time, a core aspect of Muslim personal law was invalidated on constitutional grounds. This shift has obvious implications beyond triple talaq. If the Shariat Application Act is “law in force” under Article 13, then other codified personal‑law provisions can, in principle, be tested against equality and dignity, even if Narasu still shields uncodified custom and usage. The case also fits into a longer story of courts inching closer to direct scrutiny. Earlier, in T. Sareetha v. T. Venkata Subbaiah, Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act was briefly struck down as an unconstitutional intrusion into personal privacy, only for that rights‑based reading to be rolled back in Harvinder Kaur and Saroj Rani. By contrast, Shayara Bano represents a more durable willingness to bring family‑law practices into the frame of arbitrariness, essential religious practice, and subject to Article 13 review. This resembles a pattern that resurfaces in recent fights over gender and religion, such as the hijab‑ban litigation. Yet the “ghost of Narasu” still lingers, such that had triple talaq remained a purely uncodified practice, the Court would likely have found it harder to intervene and overturn. Sabarimala Temple Entry Case: Can Constitutional Morality Win? In Indian Young Lawyers Association v. State of Kerala, a constitution bench of the Supreme Court ruled that the prohibition of entry for women undergoing menstruation (belonging to the age group 10-50) into the Sabarimala Temple violates their constitutional rights under Articles 14 & 25 of the Indian Constitution. This judgment’s significance, specifically Justice DY Chandrachud’s observation, lies in the fact that it treated a religious practice as open to constitutional scrutiny rather than as something automatically protected merely because it’s of a “customary nature” rooted in tradition. However, the recent review and reference proceedings before a nine-judge Bench have brought the ruling back into focus, especially because of the resistance it continues to face from sections of society. The debate now turns largely on two questions: whether Sabarimala is a separate religious denomination with autonomy under Article 26(b), and how far the judiciary can intervene in matters claimed to be religious. The purpose of Article 26 was to grant religious institutions autonomy in managing their affairs, but that autonomy cannot extend to categorising which class of devotees is barred from entering the temple premises. Looking towards this debate from a rights-based perspective, the arguments appear to be floating across the hearing that women are “not perpetually barred” and can enter Sabarimala once they are past menstruating age. As Indira Jaising has argued before the Court, excluding women in this age group effectively deprives them of entry during a significant and active period of their lives, turning a formal right to worship and equality into a largely illusory one. If equality and dignity are to mean anything in constitutional terms, can a woman’s access to a public place of worship be limited by her menstrual status? And when this restriction is justified through ideas of purity and exclusion, does it begin to resemble a form of gendered untouchability? One line of argument insists that Article 17 is confined to caste untouchability, but the counterview is that the constitutional text prohibits untouchability “in any form”, which makes a broader reading plausible where women are excluded on grounds concerning “purity”. The Sabrimala Review, therefore, opens several testing questions, not only of whether constitutional morality can “win” over social morality, but of whether the Court is willing to declare openly that such exclusions amount to a gendered form of untouchability that cannot be saved by invoking ERP. Conclusion The principle established in Narasu, despite multiple confrontations, has never been formally overruled by the Supreme Court. Developments such as progressive interpretation of personal laws, the provision of secular law alternatives, and the essential religious practices doctrine have formed an integral part of the progression beyond Narasu, but have failed to dismantle the unjust structure it created. Personal laws continue to occupy an uncertain constitutional space, as the status of these laws in relation to Article 13(3) of the Constitution remains ambiguous, leaving their relationship with constitutional protections unsettled. In this clash of the social and the individual, of faith and reform, the former continues to prevail over the latter. The overruling of Narasu is not a mere matter of judicial courage as it requires a changing society, and, in the words of Tagore, “where the mind is without fear and the head is held high; where free minds prevail without narrow domestic walls”. *Akshat Pundir is a third- year law student pursuing B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) at Maharashtra National Law University, Mumbai. *Dheer Vasani is a third- year law student pursuing B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) at Maharashtra National Law University, Mumbai. The views expressed above are the author's alone and do not represent the beliefs of Family Law Chronicle: The CFL Blog.

*Dhaani Bharat Anita Dave The Surrogacy (Regulation) Act 2021 is inherently discriminatory in its nature as it only includes and recognises two categories of people for surrogacy and excludes other couples from opting for the surrogacy process. The wording of the Act clearly indicates that “only Indian origin married couples and Indian single women who are widowed or divorced” are permitted to avail themselves of the process of surrogacy and excludes unmarried men and unmarried women, secondary infertile couples, live-in relationship couples and same-sex couples from opting for surrogacy and starting a family of their own. It is, on the face of it, that the Act discriminates among the people who can opt for surrogacy. Every individual who is a citizen of India has a set of fundamental rights which are guaranteed by the Constitution of India and cannot be violated in any circumstances. These fundamental rights form an integral part of an individual's life, which is available to everyone. This discrimination in the classification of a set of people for surrogacy is thus, in violation of the Constitutional provision Article 14 of the Constitution of India (hereinafter as ‘Article 14 COI’) and Article 21 of the Constitution of India (hereinafter as ‘Article 21 COI’). Exclusion of Unmarried Individuals Firstly, the exclusion of unmarried individuals from the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act 2021 raises significant legal and constitutional concerns. As, under the current statutory framework, marriage is made a necessary precondition for availing surrogacy. Thereby categorically denying access to single men and women. The Act has clearly failed to recognize that marriage is an individual choice rather than social or legal compulsion. Consequently, despite contemporary shifts in societal structures and progressive judicial recognition of diverse family units, the statute maintains a restrictive framework that effectively bars single individuals from exercising reproductive choices independently of their marital status. For instance, the exclusion of single men from accessing surrogacy services raises concerns regarding the consistency of the legal framework governing parenthood in India. While the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act 2021 restricts single men from commissioning surrogacy, Indian law permits single men to adopt children. Section 57 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, expressly recognises the eligibility of a single male to adopt a child, subject to the condition that he shall not adopt a girl child. In light of this statutory recognition of single men's capacity to assume parental responsibilities through adoption, the denial of access to surrogacy for single men appears to lack a clear and rational justification. Exclusion of Secondary Infertile Couples Secondly, the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act 2021 does not recognise secondary infertile couples for the purpose of availing surrogacy. Secondary infertile couples are those couples who are medically incapable of having more than one child. These couples are also excluded from opting surrogacy as stated under section 4(c) (II) that “the intending couple have not had any surviving child biologically or through adoption or through surrogacy earlier provided if intending couple has any child who suffers from any mental , physical disorder or life threatening disorders in such cases surrogacy can be granted to that couple but for that proper approval from the district medical Board is required”. Further, such restriction imposed by the Act is in violation of Article 14 of the COI as there is no equal treatment before the law of such couples as there is inherent discrimination and bias towards other categories of people. The act only classifies two categories of people who are eligible to avail surrogacy. The law fails to create an intelligible differentia, and there is no reasonable nexus for treating similarly situated persons differently. Further, there is a violation of Article 21 COI, as every individual has a right to privacy, which is recognised under the law, and from which the right to make reproductive decisions stems. The right to reproductive autonomy is recognised by various case laws under Article 21 of the COI. For instance, in the case of Suchita Srivastava & Anr .v. Chandigarh Administration, the court acknowledged the fundamental right to reproductive autonomy. Additionally, in the historic ruling in K.S. Puttaswamy & Ors. v. Union of India and Ors, the Supreme Court upheld the ruling in Suchita Srivastava & Anr .v. Chandigarh Administration, wherein the court explicitly emphasised women’s constitutional right to make reproductive decisions under Article 21 of the COI. Also, in the case of Meera Santosh Pal v. Union of India, the Supreme Court stated that “in accordance with Article 21 COI, a woman's right to choose her reproductive choice is a component of her personal liberty.” These are one of many rulings that emphasise reproductive choices as a crucial component of the right to privacy established under the said article of the Constitution. Hence, women, men and couples who want a second child but are incapable of having one are excluded from opting for surrogacy to get another child due to the provision enacted under the Surrogacy Law. Thus, it is stated that such provision enacted under the Surrogacy Law is in violation of Article 14 of the COI and Article 21 of the COI. Exclusion of Couples in Live-in Relationship Thirdly, the exclusion of live-in couples from the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act 2021 raises serious constitutional concern. As Article 21 of the COI grants the right to life and personal liberty to every individual. This fundamental guarantee inherently protects the right of individuals to cohabit with a partner of their choice and to define the nature of their relationship, irrespective of their marital status. As in the case of Madan Mohan Singh v. Rajni Kant, the court had stated that “there would be a presumption of marriage between the parties if such a relationship lasts for a significant amount of time and cannot be characterised as a “walk-in and walk-out” relationship.” Further, in the case of Deepika Singh v. Central Administrative Tribunal, Justice D.Y. Chandrachud stated that families should not be restricted to typical family structures. The family relationship is evolving, and the law must evolve with it. The Courts are now recognising that a family is no longer a traditional unit and must account for the social evolution of families/relationships. This broader understanding of the notion of family supports the recognition of non-traditional family units, including couples in live-in relationships. Consequently, it may be argued that such couples are entitled to equal recognition and protection of their reproductive rights, consistent with the constitutional principles of dignity, autonomy, and equality. Exclusion of Same-Sex Couples Lastly, the issue pertaining to the exclusion of same-sex couples from the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act 2021 is an important issue, as the legal status regarding surrogacy for same-sex couples remains invalid. The Supreme Court of India, in the landmark case of Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, decriminalised consensual homosexual acts under Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. But this ruling did not automatically translate into conferring broader family or reproductive rights to same-sex couples. Currently the Indian law does not recognize the legal validity of same sex marriages. This position was upheld in the case of Supriyo and Ors .v. Union of India, where the Supreme Court declined to recognise a fundamental right to marry for same-sex couples, effectively leaving the legal status of queer marriages unchanged. Despite the lack of formal marriage recognition, denying same sex couples the right to access surrogacy raises profound constitutional questions regarding the right of reproductive autonomy and equality. The rigid contemporary framework marks a sharp departure from earlier more progressive judicial observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Baby Manji Yamada v. Union of India, where the court acknowledged that surrogacy was a means of embracing parenthood and acknowledged that the parents might be a homosexual couple or a single parent. The strict implementation of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act 2021 has effectively reversed this progressive understanding by limiting surrogacy exclusively to legally married heterosexual couples. As the queer couples still categorically remain excluded from the definition of an eligible “couple” under Section 2(h) of the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act 2021. This statutory exclusion arguably infringes upon Article 14 COI by failing the judicially established “twin test” of reasonable classification, drawing an arbitrary and artificial division between married heterosexual couples and the rest of society. As marital status and sexual orientation bear no rational nexus to an individual’s emotional, financial or moral capacity to raise a child, such an exclusion of homosexual couples is wholly discriminatory. Further, there is state-sponsored discrimination which infringes Article 15 COI as the state has selectively denied essential reproductive healthcare technologies like surrogacy based on social prejudices surrounding an individual’s identity, marital status and sexual orientation. Lastly, there is infringement of Article 21 COI as the Act has clearly barred same-sex couples from opting for gestational surrogacy, which infringes an individual’s right to reproductive autonomy, which is an integral part of Article 21 COI. The Act denies a distinct segment of society the fundamental privilege of building a family based purely on sexual orientation and marital status. In conclusion, the Surrogacy (Regulation) Act, 2021 adopts a restrictive approach to parenthood by limiting access to surrogacy primarily to married heterosexual couples, thereby excluding unmarried individuals, secondary infertile couples, live-in relationship couples, same-sex couples, and other non-traditional family structures. Such exclusions fail to reflect the evolving social realities and diverse forms of families recognised by contemporary constitutional jurisprudence. The ability to make decisions concerning procreation and parenthood forms an essential aspect of individual autonomy and personal liberty. Therefore, a more inclusive legal framework is required, one that recognises the changing nature of families and ensures that the right to pursue parenthood through surrogacy is available to all individuals without arbitrary discrimination. *The Author is a recent graduate (Batch of 2026) of National Law University, Jodhpur, having completed her B.A. LL.B. (IPR Hons.) degree. The views expressed above are the author's alone and do not represent the beliefs of Family Law Chronicle: The CFL Blog.

*Ishmeet Kaur Sehgal Introduction The families in India are characterised by a huge wave of migration with members spreading across multiple jurisdictions. About 35.4 million citizens live as Overseas Indians abroad yet, the Indian Succession Act, 1925, limits itself to a domestic outlook, creating a ‘legal chasm’. The legislative gap manifests itself when an Overseas Indian attempts to execute foreign wills in India. The mechanism appears to be very facilitative initially; however, it is subsequently realised that a foreign probate is just an initial document that needs to be supplemented by apostille requirements in the Indian Jurisdiction, resulting in inaccessibility. Consequently, the beneficiary is expected to obtain an ancillary probate. This works not merely as a procedural safeguard but as an administrative hindrance and delay. This article contends that the treatment of foreign wills under Indian law, reflects insouciance towards reform with probates being treated as exclusion rather than a verification tool. The Working of NRI Will Execution - Ancillary Probates The execution of foreign wills in most of the Commonwealth nations is executed by a process called ‘resealing.’ The process, though not purely mechanical, warrants limited scrutiny and demands a lower cost when compared to India. The UK for instance, recognizes the grants of probate under the Colonial Probates Act. While the Courts do retain the power to scrutinise under Section 2. While the courts do retain the power to scrutinize under Section 2, these grounds are limited to a few narrow areas such as payment of debts and dues. However, in India, an entirely different procedure is followed. Section 57 of The Indian Succession Act, 1925, circumscribes the application of testamentary will execution to immovable property situated within India. On the question of dispensing with the wills executed and proved outside the territory of India, a special provision is laid down by the Act under Section 228. Section 228 implies that a foreign probate is not automatically recognised; the provision provides for obtaining ‘letters of administration’, making the process cumbersome in practice. In practical terms, the law requires the beneficiary to file a petition in the court of appropriate jurisdiction and to produce a copy of the original probated will annexed with other relevant documents. The Court then issues a public notice in a local newspaper to invite objections, Post the notification period, the court conducts a hearing to deal with objections, if any, and to ensure the suitability of the petition. Once the court is satisfied, letter of administration is issued to entitle the beneficiaries further to sell off the property or close the bank accounts. This was reaffirmed in Alagammai & 4 Ors. v. V Rakkammal 1991, wherein it was held that a probate granted by a Foreign Court, is not conferred authority in itself; it has to be supplemented by an ancillary probate. This procedure is burdensome for beneficiaries who are trying to execute the testamentary wills of the deceased. Why is this Process Problematic? “Succession is not about fighting the future in a courtroom, but honouring the past”. This procedure typically presents systemic difficulties for Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) since a foreign probate operates as more of a persuasive document rather than having an authoritative value for testamentary succession. The obstacles are not just procedural inefficiencies but a hindering block in access to justice. The article studies them to reflect deeply on how these inefficacies result in a disproportionate impact on those seeking testamentary succession. Trial De Novo Impact The process of obtaining letters of administration results in more or less a duplicative litigation. A decision by a competent foreign authority, already verified in a foreign jurisdiction, is scrutinised again for testamentary capacity and entitlement of a beneficiary. In India, where the familial ties are so inextricably linked, the estate becomes vulnerable to opportunist claims of long-lost shares by distant relatives, given the current procedure. This procedure fails to comply with the international concept of judicial comity, wherein the judiciary of different nations is expected to show a standard of mutual respect towards pronounced decisions. This issue particularly comes forth due to duplicative litigation started at the instance of opportunistic claims. This position can be observed in Mrs Aruna Bharathi v. Mrs M Manicka wherein the beneficiary of a will probated abroad was challenged by a relative in India, multiple issues were dealt with regarding the competence of the foreign court and of the beneficiary. Though the probate was ultimately granted a letter of administration by the Madras High Court, it still resulted in a lot of delay. Apostille Requirement The requirement for producing physical and personally verified documents from foreign registries is another crucial problem. A number of jurisdictions have shifted to a digitised mechanism, for instance, in the UK and Singapore, the process takes place through an e-litigation platform, resulting in less turn over times. In contrast Indian system still relies on manual filling and physical verification. The issue becomes particularly relevant since even a minor mistake in a signature can lead to months of bureaucratic delays or even the rejection of the entire petition in the country, further leaving the status of the concerned property in an uncertain stage. Furthermore, as highlighted in Mrs. M. Aruna Bharathi v. Mrs. M. Manickama, 2024, courts usually require the physical presence of the petitioner or the power agent thereof. Arguably, if the entire process had been streamlined via a digital channel, these bureaucratic uncertainties would not have found a place in the stream. Ad Valorem court fees and other fee burden The burden and implications of finances are another significant issue. To begin with the ad valorem court fees i.e. a percentage share of the estate or a fixed share charged by the court, fees paid to the counsel, and costs for retrieving documents have to be paid in addition to a huge sum already paid to obtain the probate in the initial country. The relevance of the same stems from the fact that succession is meant for orderly transfer not punitive costs. The costs incurred cumulatively render the process economically unviable. This leads to a significantly disproportionate impact on transnational families. International Mechanisms and Way Forward A comparative analysis of international mechanisms reveals that the latter follow a significantly advanced procedure, placing them at a better position than India. In the UK, for instance, the Colonies Probate Act, 1892 is followed, exemplifying an administrative approach to the process. The framework requires only the ‘resealing’ of a foreign probate by a UK probate registry. The scrutiny is limited to jurisdictional validity and procedural verification without a need for re-litigation. Consequently, the process is completed within weeks. The European Union takes a step forward by adopting the “Succession Passport” model, under which the EU Succession Regulation (Brussels IV) applies. This particularly allows legal certainty in transnational matters by entitling member nations to get the probate executed within the territory of the Union. They are better placed because of the clear distinction between adjudication and verification. India must take significant lessons from both these jurisdictions. The need of the hour is to make the process more efficient, cost-effective and globally relevant. The challenge today is to bridge the gap and streamline the framework. One of the most significant steps in this direction is to ratify the Washington Convention, 1973, which provides a uniform law on an international will. Such ratification can entirely bypass the rigid procedure under Section 228 by allowing probates from signatory nations to be accepted upon preliminary verification. Further, bilateral agreements with regional countries hosting a huge Indian diaspora would facilitate a streamlined and efficient procedure. Alternatively, at the procedural level, the role of the courts must be remodelled to a rather ministerial one, necessitating intervention only in the cases of prima facie fraud, preventing a full re-litigation of wills. Entire recalibration should be barred unless an outright defect is detected. Procedural reform must be implemented immediately. Technical reforms must also be catered to, digitising probate documents, integrating Indian authorities with overseas registrations, and recognising electronic authentication methods can significantly reduce delays and bureaucratic friction. Further, the framework can be streamlined by doing away with the apostilles through intergovernmental verification channels altogether. In the interim period, NRIs may prefer Indian wills to avoid the long procedure. However, this is only a temporary solution and must not be seen as an alternative to legislative adaptation and for systemic reform. Conclusion While significant reforms have been achieved in the governance of domestic wills, the international sphere governing foreign wills remains stagnant and is yet to witness an advancement. The object of succession becomes fraught when the law fails to address the needs of its diverse population spanning multiple jurisdictions. The process must be digitised so as to help in lower turnover times and streamline the process. Furthermore, it is important to take steps by enacting special legislation for NRIs like the Colonial Probate Act or a Succession Passport for the nations with a high diaspora. Additionally, the Washington Convention must be ratified. Therefore, Indian law must evolve with the increase in transnational families. *The Author is a second- year law student pursuing B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) at Rajiv Gandhi National Law University, Punjab. The views expressed above are the author's alone and do not represent the beliefs of Family Law Chronicle: The CFL Blog.

*Sandhyashree Karanth Introduction On the 24th of March, 2026, Gujarat became the second state in India to introduce the Uniform Civil Code, following Uttarakhand’s UCC in the year 2024. This is arguably the delayed implementation of Article 44 of the Indian Constitution pertaining to Directive Principles. However, the UCC is incomplete in the sense that the underlying spirit of Article 44 is silent about the process of uniformity, the competent authority to frame the UCC, the procedure, and the legitimacy of the UCC. This post argues that the UCC legislation is the conflation of the concept of uniformity with the process of uniformisation. The Competence Problem: Article 254 and the Limits of State-Level UCCs The basis for the government of Gujarat’s legislation of the UCC is Entry 5 of List III of the Seventh Schedule, which places marriage, divorce, and succession in the Concurrent List. The competence of the states to legislate on these subjects, therefore, cannot be questioned. The issue, therefore, is one of repugnancy. With the passing of Gujarat UCC any existing law, custom, or usage which is inconsistent with the UCC would cease to have effect. This would, without any explicit parliamentary sanction, negate a number of central laws, namely, the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937, the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, and the Indian Succession Act, 1925. Article 254(1) of the Constitution states that where a state legislation is repugnant to a central legislation on any subject in the Concurrent List, the central legislation would prevail to the extent of the repugnancy. The only way in which the government of Gujarat could have negated the central laws would have been by obtaining presidential assent, which does not seem to have been done. This is not a technical argument. It is a fundamental argument that goes to the very heart of India's federal structure. The very issue of whether personal laws are even subject to Part III of the Constitution is a matter of debate, and the Delhi High Court in the famous case of Harvinder Kaur v. Harmandar Singh resisted the introduction of constitutional principles into personal laws, describing it as like 'introducing a bull in a china shop'. The Supreme Court has always merely recommended the enactment of the UCC and not ordered it, realizing, as it did in Pannalal Bansilal v. State of Andhra Pradesh, that "uniform law, though high desirable, enactment thereof in on go perhaps may be counter-productive to unity and integrity of the nation.". A state government, outpacing Parliament in this area, passed the measure without proper scrutiny and despite opposition demands for deliberation. This does not appear to conform to that spirit. The Neutrality Illusion: Whose Norms Become the Universal Standard? If the previous concern was about who has the authority to enact a Uniform Civil Code, the present one is more fundamental: what exactly is being made uniform, and whose norms are being universalised in the process. The Gujarat UCC is claimed to be community-neutral. This assertion must be analyzed. While the provisions relating to marriage, divorce, and succession draw most heavily on the existing codified personal law applicable to the Hindu community, the key distinction between uniform and common law that is emphasized in the paper is immediately relevant in the context of the Gujarat UCC. S.P. Sathe’s interpretation of Article 44 of the Constitution is that the requirement of uniformity is met if all personal laws are subject to the same principles of social and gender justice, but the Gujarat UCC rules out this interpretation by replacing one code with another. The tribal exemption highlights this structural imbalance. The Gujarat UCC excludes Scheduled Tribes from the scope of the law, in conformity with the constitutional protection provided under Article 342 of the Indian Constitution and the Fifth Schedule of the Indian Constitution. This exemption may be justified in itself, but it weakens the claim of uniformity that the law is built on. If uniformity is truly the goal, and the state claims the power to override personal laws in the name of equality, then this selective exemption becomes difficult to explain. The same reasoning used to protect tribal customary law is also used by religious minorities to defend their own personal laws. By accepting one and rejecting the other, Gujarat suggests that uniformity is not the real goal. Instead, it begins to look like a matter of preferring the laws of one community over those of another. This exclusion of the LGBTQIA+ community only adds to this. The Gujarat UCC, like the Uttarakhand UCC, confines live-in relationships and marriage to heterosexual couples only. This is not a gap, but a positive action of exclusion that the legislation need not have taken. In light of Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India and the cohabitation rights that are inherent in Supriyo v. Union of India , the Gujarat UCC’s failure to deal with queer families is not neutral from a constitutional perspective. It merely entrenches the invisibility of queer families within the new uniform regime. A code that moves away from a multitude of personal laws but follows a general exclusion does not create uniformity, it standardizes discrimination. Compulsory Registration, Privacy, and the Proportionality Deficit Of the Gujarat UCC’s mandatory registration provisions, those relating to marriages and live-in relationships are the most susceptible to a challenge on constitutional grounds, specifically Article 21. The nine-judge bench of the Supreme Court in Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) v. Union of India held that any state action that invades individual privacy would need to meet a three-part test of proportionality. The state action would need to be sanctioned by law, have a legitimate aim, and be proportionate, i.e., the least restrictive means of achieving the legitimate aim. The mandatory registration of live-in relationships, coupled with criminal sanctions of up to three months of imprisonment or a fine of Rs.10,000 for non-compliance, fails the test of proportionality. The legitimate state aim of protecting women in live-in relationships and ensuring the right to claim maintenance could have been met by the state through less invasive measures, such as the creation of presumptions of relationship status from evidence of cohabitation. The surveillance element of this system is conceptually distinct from the privacy objection. The Gujarat UCC, following the Uttarakhand model, mandates sharing of live-in particulars with local law enforcement. It fundamentally transforms the district registrar’s office into a point of surveillance. Shafin Jahan v. Asokan K.M. upheld the right of adults to make adult choices in matters of intimacy in the absence of state or familial interference. This is a right that is firmly situated in Article 21’s guarantee of liberty. The mandatory intimation of parents in cases where couples are in the 18-21 age group is structurally antithetical to this. It arms parents, in worst-case scenarios even khap panchayats, with state-generated data on adult intimate choices. The impact on interfaith or intercaste couples is structurally predictable and legally cognizable. In Lata Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the Supreme Court acknowledged that adult couples entering inter-caste marriages often face threats, harassment, and even violence from their own families. In this legal context, any state-mandated disclosure of intimate relationship details to parents creates a real and immediate risk of coercion, surveillance, and harm for such couples. Another internal contradiction that may be highlighted is that, whereas criminal consequences are prescribed for unregistered live-in relationships, non-registration of marriages, as provided for in the very same legislation, does not invite any such consequence. In this way, the very hierarchy of recognition that this legislation sets out to establish appears to be turned on its head, as the more “formal” of the two relationships (marriage) appears to be treated more liberally than the less “formal” of the two (live-in relationships). No logical rationale for this apparent distinction appears to be provided in the legislative text, and this appears to be a punitive approach to cohabitation as a practice, which does not sit well with the equality guarantee of Article 14 of the Indian Constitution. Conclusion The Gujarat UCC reveals three distinct but connected failures in legal craftsmanship. From a constitutional point of view, it invokes state competence in List III but fails to comply with repugnancy requirements in Article 254, which could be fatal in any court. From a substantive viewpoint, it confuses form (a code) with content (equality in principles), creating a code that replaces minority personal law but excludes tribal law and queer families. From the viewpoint of its registration provisions, it uses the protective role of the state to build a surveillance state, which cannot be tested for proportionality in Puttaswamy. None of these is an argument against uniform civil law in principle. What is in dispute is the manner in which it is done. In reliance upon the Court’s reasoning in Pannalal Bansilal, uniform law enacted “in one go” is counter-productive and requires deliberation, community engagement, and incrementalism. If the UCC is to be an instrument of emancipation, and not of majoritarian consolidation, then its manner of making is as important as its substance. *The Author is a third- year law student pursuing B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) at RV University. The views expressed above are the author's alone and do not represent the beliefs of Family Law Chronicle: The CFL Blog.

*Rohan Yadav Introduction A landmark event occurred in the regulation of personal laws in India when the Uniform Civil Code (UCC), enshrined under Article 44 of the Indian Constitution, was enforced in Uttarakhand on January 27th, 2025. This watershed moment marked the first time in Independent India, when a civil code was enforced to regulate all the matters related to personal laws such as marriage, divorce, adoption, succession and inheritance, for everyone in a uniform manner, irrespective of religion, caste or creed. A unique feature of this law is its application under Part III of the Act, which regulates Live-in relations in Uttarakhand and among the residents of the state living elsewhere in India. This code also marks only the second time the Uniform Civil Code has been enforced in any part of India, after the Portuguese Civil Code of 1867 in Goa. Although the UCC Act in Uttarakhand seeks to holistically regulate the legal framework governing marriage, live-in relationships, succession, divorce and matters incidental thereto as reflected in its long title, it poses serious concerns regarding autonomy, privacy and the viability of government involvement in intimate relationships such as live-in relationships. Concerns about the enforcement of the UCC Code on Live-in relationships The UCC defines a live-in relationship as a relationship between a man and a woman, both of whom have achieved 21 years of age. All Uttarakhand residents, including those who reside outside the state, as well as non-residents who live together in Uttarakhand, are covered by the Uttarakhand UCC Act of 2024. It mandates young couples who are currently in a live–in relationship or considering the same to register themselves with the registrar of their respective jurisdiction by giving “a statement of live-in relationship”, which is defined as per section 3(4)(d). The enforceability of the Uniform Civil Code of 2024 in Uttarakhand, especially on the Live-in relationship couples, has some very beneficial impacts, such as the fact that children born to them are now as legitimate under Section 379 and it prioritises consent as well as the overall well-being of women by including maintenance under Section 388. In spite of these benefits, it still raises some serious concerns regarding the regulation of Live-in relationships, a concept whose legal contours were discussed in principle by the Honourable Supreme Court in Indra Sarma vs. V.K.V. Sarma 2013. It is pertinent to note that the judgment primarily focused on examining the scope and limits of protection provided under the Domestic Violence Act 2005, rather than granting an affirmative and universal legitimacy to every form of live-in arrangement. The UCC indirectly overlooks the established jurisprudence on Live-in relationships as laid down by the Apex Court, comprising principles of dignity, autonomy and privacy by provisions such as mandating registration and parental consent before the age of 21. Some of the most essential gaps and concerns in the newly enforced code are as follows: Exclusion of the LGBTQIA+ community: One of the most striking gaps in the formation of this code is the exclusion of LGBTQIA+ people or those who do not fall under the category of binary, thereby undermining the very notions of inclusivity, uniformity and equality, which the code seeks to achieve. The UCC Act in Uttarakhand in entirety excludes non-binary and explicitly recognises only heterosexual unions between a “male” and a “female” as defined under Section 3(4)(b) of the code. This straightforward exclusion of the LGBTQIA+ community is particularly regressive in light of the recent landmark Supreme Court judgments that have upheld the rights of queer communities to cohabitate freely with consent, such as Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) and Supriyo v. Union of India (2023). Several contradictions between the law related to marriage and Live-in relationships: There are some key dichotomies between the laws and statutes governing the institution of marriages and those of UCC regulating live-in relationships in Uttarakhand such as the legal age of marriage for girls is 18 as per Hindu Marriage Act 1955 and Special Marriage Act 1954 whereas under the Uttarakhand UCC, girls have to wait until the age of 21 years to get the legal recognition of their live-in relationships. There has been neither a rational justification given to explain this flaw by the lawmakers, nor is there any record of Assembly debate addressing the legislative inconsistency whereby a girl legally permitted to marry at 18 must nevertheless wait until 21 to enter a legally recognised live-in relationship without parental consent. Moreover, non-registration of marriages has no serious penalties or imprisonment, while the same is not the case with live-in relationships. Another important contradiction is that Rule 6(4)(f) under the UCC Rules makes compliance impractical for live–in relationship couples, falling within prohibited degrees of relationship, due to the condition of having a certificate by the partners, certified by a religious head stating that the customs and norms which govern the respective partners allow them to marry. The secularism outlined in the Preamble gets undermined as such a requirement introduces religious validation into a secular civil framework. Another major concern arises that neither the legislation nor the judiciary has, to date not satisfactorily disclosed how to ascertain the date from which a live-in relationship is considered to have started, as people who fail to submit the statement of such a relationship within a month of entering such a relationship may be punished under Section 387(1). Dignity and Privacy of Live-in relationships couples: The Fundamental Right to Privacy, as enshrined in the Justice K.S.Puttaswamy (Retd) vs Union of India (2018) and the Fundamental Right to Dignity under Article 21, get seriously undermined under this code, especially for live-in couples. Mandatory live-in relationship registration is an invasive state intrusion into people’s personal lives, where couples are forced to divulge sensitive personal information to the government apparatus. The right to privacy is violated when the state puts a similar degree of restrictions upon the live-in relationships as those under marriage, by equating the two. The sharing of registration details with local police authorities is mandatorily required by the UCC . Police involvement in confirming the legitimacy of relationships might deter couples from registering or living together due to the possibility that sensitive personal information being misused or shared without authorisation can cause people to experience discrimination, blackmail, or targeted harassment, which undermines confidence in government agencies. Such measures even strike at the heart of the Right to Dignity as enshrined under Article 21, which comprises Individual Autonomy and the freedom to make intimate personal decisions free from disproportionate state interference. The present regulatory framework risks undermining the dignity of consenting live-in relationship couples by institutionalising coercive surveillance, stigma and moral scrutiny through mandatory verification mechanisms. Also, there is a great chance that family members who don’t support interfaith, inter-caste or nonmarital relationships will engage in moral policing and intrusion. Even via obtaining information from landlords, people may attempt to harass these couples by making fictitious complaints to the local police. Moreover, the dignity of young adults (18-20 years) also gets violated due to the mandatory condition of obtaining parental consent, thus obstructing their independent decision-making power about their personal relationships. Hardships created by the UCC Act for Women in live-in relationships: The live-in relationship provisions under the Uttarakhand UCC, especially related to mandatory registration, a wide range of verification powers to the registrar and denial of registration on grounds such as "public policy" and "morality," which are vaguely defined, have the potential risk of being enforced more as surveillance rather than as recognition. The Code violates the privacy and dignity of the couple by putting an obligation upon them to disclose their personal information to the officials. This can lead to women being subjected to increased family pressure and societal stigma in situations wherein the concept of live-in relationships is still not accepted by society. The provisions related to making non-registration illegal and giving wide discretionary powers to the registrar negatively obstruct the dignity, privacy and autonomy of a woman as well as make it difficult for her to engage in an interfaith live-in relationship. This is because often women are construed as being responsible for maintaining the sanctity of a family and sexual morality, which eventually leads to the defeat of one of the main provisions of this code, i.e. ensuring greater dignity and autonomy for women. Moving towards bridging the gaps and concerns under the Uttarakhand UCC Act for live-in couples Replace Mandatory Policing with Incentivised Registration: An amendment should be made to replace compulsory registration of live-in relationships with a voluntary but beneficial model which encourages participation without coercion. This approach reflects the 21st Law Commission’s Report that cautioned against over-interference by the State into private unions. Moreover, registration should provide benefits such as providing simplified joint tenancy, easier access to maintenance and automatic nomination rights in banking and insurance to the live-in couple by drawing inspiration from the Portuguese Civil Code of 1867. This ensures compliance with the registration process by providing benefits rather than fear and also ensures dignity and legal protection to Live-in relationship couples. Modify the Age of autonomy from 21 to 18 years: The age requirement for independent registration and applicability of this act should be changed for both partners from the present 21 years to 18 years in order to comply with marriage laws and the legal age of majority as per the Portuguese Civil Code of 1867 and the Indian Majority Act 1875. This eliminates the paradoxical requirement that women who are otherwise legally able to vote and get married upon attaining the age of 18 have to obtain parental consent to enter into a live-in relationship. Bring Gender-Neutral Terminology by modifying "man and woman" to "two persons" : This change in definition under Section 3(4)(b) of the present Code would immediately give statutory recognition and legal protections in matters of maintenance and succession to LGBTQIA+ couples. This shall ensure that the UCC Act becomes compliant with various Supreme Court rulings, such as Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018) and Supriyo v. Union of India (2023) and promote uniformity and inclusivity. Secular Affidavit over Religious Certification: There should be an amendment made that states that religious leaders should no longer be required to certify the allowance and this should be substituted by a Self-Declaration Affidavit in which Live-in relationship partners attest to their consent and unmarried single status. This amendment is also in line with the Portuguese Civil Code of 1867, which prioritised a civil registrar over religious authorities. This reform is crucial in order to ensure that live-in relationships are not impeded due to traditional religious norms and strengthen the notion that the Uniform Civil Code must be based on constitutional morality rather than religious consent and customs. Protecting Privacy and Dignity along with empowerment of women: There needs to be an amendment that prevents sharing personal data with the police without a court order, which ensures privacy and dignity by preventing misuse of state machinery. Women-led Fast Track tribunals can be established under Section 388 in order to empower women more financially. This amendment is also in consonance with the fundamental right to Dignity, which was laid down in the Justice K.S.Puttaswamy (Retd) vs Union of India (2018). Conclusion In conclusion, although Uttarakhand’s UCC aspires to fulfil the constitutional mandate as given under Article 44, its current framework regulating live-in relationships risks transforming a shield of protection into a sword of state surveillance. The Code creates a constitutional paradox by institutionalising moral policing and violating the autonomy as well as privacy of live-in relationship couples, which ultimately contradicts the progressive jurisprudence laid down by Justice K.S.Puttaswamy (Retd) vs Union of India (2018) and Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India (2018). The Code must draw inspiration and adopt the secular inclusivity from the 21st Law Commission’s Report and Portuguese Civil Code of 1867 to truly reflect the constitutional moralities of ensuring dignity, privacy and autonomy to the couple and preventing state overreach in the private matters of its citizens under the altar of legislative uniformity. *Rohan Yadav is a 2nd Year Law Student pursuing B.A. LL.B (Hons.) at Maharashtra National Law University, Mumbai. The views expressed above are the author's alone and do not represent the beliefs of Family Law Chronicle: The CFL Blog.

*Y. Leela Krishna Reddy & Udit Jain The right to inherit property has traditionally been a privilege accorded to sons, deeply rooted in India's patriarchal history. The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, passed in 2005, aimed to rectify the discrimination against daughters by granting them equal coparcenary rights under the Hindu Succession Act. However, pursuant to Section 2 (2) of the Act, members of Scheduled Tribes were explicitly excluded, unless the Central Government issued a special notification bringing the Act into force for these tribes. Accordingly, tribal women remained governed by customary practices, depriving them of inheritance rights. These customs remain deleterious to women because of their patrilineal nature, and women of tribes often find their property rights subordinated. The present blog reflects on the issue of tribal women’s right to inheritance, analysing the recent Supreme Court judgment in Ram Charan v. SukhRam and Ors (Ram Charan). The judgment serves as a turning point, advancing gender justice for women belonging to the Scheduled Tribes. The constitutional guarantee provided within Article 14 is given due regard while interpreting that the judiciary must accord women equal inheritance rights unless a contrary custom specifically excludes. Thus, the article argues that Ram Charan represents a constitutionally significant precedent for gender justice within tribal communities. Part A examines the historical legal framework governing the inheritance rights of women. Part B argues for the pre-eminence of constitutional provisions and values over discriminatory customary law. Part C analyses the rationale adopted by the Supreme Court in the Ram Charan case while granting tribal women inheritance rights. Part D discusses the barriers to implementation and proposes possible administrative solutions to ensure the realisation of tribal women’s inheritance rights. Historical Legal Framework Inheritance under traditional Hindu Law has been structured through the dual lenses of the Mitakshara and Dayabhaga schools of thought. Both were patriarchal, though in distinct ways: the prevalent Mitakshara system was patrilineal, and women were not allowed to be coparceners. The property devolved according to survivorship, and with each birth and death, the share of the surviving male either diminished or enlarged. Whereas the Dayabhaga school of thought allowed widows to inherit property when there was no male heir, but that right ceased to exist as soon as the widow who got the property died, ensuring property eventually reverted to male lines. Innumerable attempts were made thereafter to provide women with their property rights, culminating in the HSA, 1956, which made widows and sons equal heirs. The 1956 Act, however, did not recognise daughters as coparceners, preventing women from having equal rights to ancestral property. The 2005 amendment corrected this injustice, granting daughters equal rights to ancestral property, marking a historic recognition of gender parity in inheritance rights. Yet, for tribal women, Section 2(2) of the HSA remained an impenetrable barrier. This meant that, despite the 2005 amendment granting equal coparcenary rights to daughters, tribal women can not claim inheritance as a statutory right. Instead, they are governed by their own customary law, which has historically been exclusionary to women, only allowing them limited rights over property. While customary practices vary among different tribes, the underlying framework remains predominantly patrilineal. In the Angami and Adibasi community, women were expressly excluded from inheriting clan land, legitimised by the notion that daughters would join their husband’s household, where property rights lay with men. Interestingly, in matrilineal tribes like the Garo or Khasi, where daughters ostensibly inherited ancestral property, the real control of such property was often exercised by the male relatives, relegating women to mere custodians rather than proper owners. Thus, through the 2005 amendment, Hindu women continued enjoying statutory relief and protection, but tribal women’s situation remained pernicious on account of exclusionary customs. Constitutional Principles Governing Gender and Custom The Constitution of India meticulously prioritises fundamental rights over discriminatory customs, securing constitutional promises precedence over archaic traditions. Articles 14 and 15 affirm equality before the law and prohibit discrimination on the grounds of sex. Article 38 and Article 46 direct states to preclude inequalities and concomitantly to endeavour for the protection and promotion of economically and socially disadvantaged individuals, thus discharging their duty as per the parens patriae concept. Consequently, these provision mandates states and the judiciary with positive obligations in establishing that customs and personal law do not contribute to perpetuating gender inequality. The Indian judiciary has consistently applied these principles in its interaction with exclusionary tribal customs. In the judgment of Madhu Kishwar v. State of Bihar, it was observed by Justice Ramaswamy that local customary law is biased and denying women inheritance would reinforce existing inequalities. In the State of Nagaland & Anr v. Rosemary Dzuvichu (Naga Mothers case), the Gauhati High Court clarified that customs cannot be ossified dogmas undermining constitutional guarantees. Similarly, in Sarwango v. Urchamin, the absence of a binding exclusionary custom allowed the Court to uphold the daughters’ inheritance on the grounds of equity, justice, and good conscience. In Bahadur v. Bratiya, the Himachal Pradesh High Court, adopting a revisionist approach, held that customs excluding females from inheritance are manifestly contrary to public policy and such arbitrary customary practices cannot be upheld under the guise of tradition. The Rajasthan High Court grappled with the social and economic impact of the exclusion of tribal women from inheritance rights and the protection of the HSA in the case of Manni Devi v Rama Devi. In this case, the claim of a woman belonging to the Meena community seeking inheritance rights over property that her father had alienated through a gift deed had been dismissed by the Board of Revenue basis of section 2(2) of the HSA. Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand called Section 2(2) a “formidable barrier” and “manifestly unjustified” when compared to the rights of non-tribal daughters. The court strenuously restored Manni Devi’s claim and urged Parliament to act so that women of the Scheduled Tribes are not dependent on judicial discretion. Contrastingly, the judiciary in Butaki Bai v. SukhBati developed the problematic ‘Test of Hinduization’ – to claim benefits under the HSA, a tribal woman must prove with proper legal evidence that she has abandoned her customary succession law and has fully adopted Hindu law to be governed by it in matters of inheritance. Yet, the larger jurisprudential trend has been towards maintaining constitutional equality as the standard against which customs must be judged. By the time the Ram Charan case reached the Supreme Court, this trajectory of cases clearly indicates that gender-exclusionary customs have been interpreted as antithetical to constitutional morality. The Pivotal Supreme Court Judgment in Ram Charan & Ors. v. Sukhram & Ors. (2025) The Supreme Court’s decision in Ram Charan marked a progressive approach towards reconciling customary law with constitutional guarantees of gender equality in matters of succession in tribal communities. The case concerned ancestral property belonging to a Gond family, in which the legal heirs of Dhaiya, a tribal woman, were excluded from succession on the grounds of a customary prohibition against women inheriting property. Both the trial court and the High Court upheld this exclusion, reasoning that customary law governed tribal succession and that HSA was inapplicable to Scheduled Tribes by virtue of Section 2(2). The issue before the Supreme Court, therefore, was whether such a custom could withstand constitutional scrutiny and displace the equal rights of women and their heirs. The Court reaffirmed the principle that customs must be strictly proved and cannot be presumed merely based on sporadic practice. It held that the defendants had failed to demonstrate the existence of a uniform, obligatory custom barring women from succession. More fundamentally, the Court emphasised that customs are not static but must evolve in consonance with constitutional morality. It rejected the argument that exclusionary practices, even if claimed as custom, could survive the scrutiny of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution. The Court further clarified that the statutory exclusion in Section 2(2) of the HSA cannot legitimise sex-based discrimination in succession, particularly when such practices undermine fundamental rights. In allowing the appeal, the Court declared that Dhaiya’s legal heirs are entitled to an equal share in the ancestral property. Further, the apex court also urged Parliament to consider extending the Hindu Succession Act to Scheduled Tribes to prevent similar exclusions in the future (See LiveLaw Report). The judgment thus reaffirms the constitutional morality that customs, however longstanding, cannot be permitted to perpetuate discrimination against women. Barriers to Implementation, and the pathway to realisation of Rights The judgment in Ram Charan carries profound implications for tribal communities and gender parity through women's empowerment. By recognising tribal women and their heirs as entitled to equal succession rights, the Court has not only delivered justice in an individual dispute but also set a precedent with the potential to reshape succession in tribal societies. Secure inheritance rights are closely linked with economic agency, enabling women to access land, credit, and state entitlements. (See generally OHCHR Report) In the Indian society where land ownership is the basis of livelihood and identity, the recognition of women’s rights represents both material empowerment and a symbolic break from entrenched patriarchy. Legislative action could provide uniformity and certainty, while ensuring that tribal women are not deprived of rights available to women elsewhere. Yet, the path to effective implementation is fraught with challenges (See here). Local revenue systems often fail to capture women’s claims, and enforcement of court decrees may be hindered by administrative inertia. Moreover, resistance from traditional leaders and patriarchal community structures is foreseeable, as the decision disrupts power hierarchies embedded in customary governance, while justifying their opposition under the garb of ‘cultural preservation.’ This unrest can escalate tensions, leading to conflict and reluctance to execute court orders recognising female heirs. Further, many tribal women lack awareness of their rights post the Court’s ruling. Even if they were aware, they face immense familial and social pressures discouraging assertion of their inheritance rights. Alongside legal reform, sustained efforts toward raising legal literacy and sensitising tribal communities about gender equality will be essential to translate the ratio of Ram Charan into meaningful social change. Such initiatives can empower tribal women to claim their rightful inheritance, advancing their autonomy and social status. Sensitisation campaigns, paralegal support, and accessible legal aid are necessary to translate rights into reality. Equally important is the training of revenue and judicial officers to ensure fidelity to the Supreme Court’s constitutional reasoning at the grassroots. Ram Charan is an important breakthrough, but it is only the beginning of a longer struggle for tribal women’s property rights. The judgment opens the constitutional door to equality, yet it does not by itself dismantle the deep legal, social, and administrative barriers that still restrict tribal women’s lives. Clear legislative reform, and sustained efforts to change social attitudes are necessary to ensure that the promise of this judgment is fulfilled. *Y. Leela Krishna Reddy is a fourth-year law student pursuing B.B.A. LL.B (Hons.) at National Law University, Jodhpur. *Udit Jain is a third year law student pursuing B.A. LL.B (Hons.) at National Law University, Jodhpur. The views expressed above are the author's alone and do not represent the beliefs of Family Law Chronicle: The CFL Blog.

*Khushi Jain What happens if a Sikh solemnises marriage through Anand Karaj only to be told later that they can get their marriage registered solely under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (“HMA”). This dissonance exposes a deeper structural issue within India’s personal law regime. It remarks the persistent gap between symbolic recognition and substantive legal autonomy. There have been widespread debates centred on comprehensive legal frameworks for asserting their religious and cultural identity and obtaining complete legal protection. The Anand Marriage Act, 1909 (“The Act”) was thus enacted to recognise the validity of marriages solemnised through the Sikh religious ceremony known as Anand Karaj. However, the statute initially lacked a framework for registration. Parliament amended the Act in 2012 to address certain gaps. It directed states to frame rules for registering Anand Karaj marriages, maintain a Marriage Register, and issue certified extracts, while clarifying that non-registration does not affect the validity of the marriage. Despite this mandate, several States and Union Territories failed to notify the required rules. In light of the debate, in Amanjot Singh Chadha v. Union of India & Ors., the Supreme Court directed states and UTs to frame rules of registration of Sikh marriages. The blog analyses the framework and provision of the Anand Marriage Act post-2012 Amendment. Centred on the precise conundrum, the blog addresses whether the interim requirement that couples be allowed to register Anand Karaj marriages under existing registration laws until States notify rules unduly burdens the Act’s purpose or whether it is a necessary protective measure to prevent administrative denial. The piece highlights the limitations of the Act, including gaps in substantive matrimonial rights as well as administrative challenges arising from inconsistent state-level implementation. Towards the end, the blog analyses the practical and symbolic implications of the Act for the Sikh community and proposes reforms to transform it from a procedural recognition statute into a comprehensive, enforceable framework that balances religious identity with legal protection. From Ceremony to Registration: Legal Framework of Anand Marriages The legal framework governing Sikh marriages in India is primarily shaped by the Anand Marriage Act, 1909, and its 2012 amendment, alongside HMA. Under Section 2 of the HMA, Sikhs are formally recognised as a community within its ambit, meaning that historically Sikh couples were required to marry according to the procedures established under the HMA. The Act particularly the post-2012 amendment, ensures that Sikh couples no longer need to fall back on the HMA for administrative recognition. It has two major implications. First, it reinforces the symbolic autonomy of the Sikh community by legally acknowledging its unique marriage rites. Second, it removes the practical inconsistencies created when couples had to navigate Hindu-centric provisions for something as basic as a marriage certificate. The jurisprudence surrounding the Anand Marriage Act has recently acquired sharper constitutional contours in Amanjot Singh Chadha v. Union of India & Ors., where the Supreme Court addressed the long-standing administrative vacuum in implementing the 2012 Amendment. The Court took judicial notice of the fact that, despite Parliament’s mandate under Section 6 directing States and Union Territories to frame registration rules, several governments had failed to do so even a decade later. The Court observed that such inaction effectively rendered the amendment nugatory and denied Sikh citizens the ability to secure official recognition of their marriages solemnised through the Anand Karaj ceremony. Exercising its constitutional authority under Articles 32 and 142, the Bench directed all States and Union Territories to notify their respective rules within a fixed timeframe and to ensure that registration officers were designated at the district level. This judgment repositions the Anand Marriage Act within the domain of enforceable constitutional compliance rather than symbolic legislative intent, transforming it into a living instrument of minority religious autonomy. The Court’s directive in Amanjot Singh Chadha also marked a jurisprudential shift from treating the Act as a static declaratory statute to recognising it as a vehicle for operational equality under Article 14. The decision implicitly extended the logic of Vineet Narain v. Union of India by holding that continued executive inaction on statutory duties could invite judicial mandamus. Consequently, the case situates the Anand Marriage Act at the intersection of religious identity, administrative accountability, and constitutional governance. Earlier, in Dolly Rani v. Manish Kumar Chanchal, the Supreme Court has emphasised that ceremonies are essential to constitute a valid marriage and registration is insufficient if the former is absent. Section 2 also explicitly defines a Sikh marriage as one solemnised through the Anand Karaj, establishing the primacy of ceremony over mere registration affirming Section 25 of Constitution. The stance affirms that Anand Karaj is legally valid, but the absence of registration creates practical vulnerabilities. Similarly, in Aman Preet Kaur v. State of Punjab (2015), the Punjab and Haryana High Court confronted the procedural lacunae arising from the absence of notified rules under the 2012 Amendment. The Court held that until such rules were framed, marriages solemnised through Anand Karaj could be registered under general marriage registration frameworks, though it acknowledged that this was only a stop-gap arrangement. The decision illustrated the legal uncertainty produced by executive inaction while the ceremony was recognised in substance, its administrative enforceability remained fragile. Read together, these cases trace an evolution from symbolic recognition of Sikh matrimonial customs to a constitutionally enforceable right to registration and equal treatment. The trajectory from Dolly Rani to Amanjot Singh Chadha reveals a gradual judicial effort to bridge the gap between religious autonomy and legal protection. Gap Between Ceremonial Validity and Civil Enforcement While other personal laws like HMA, Special Marriage Act holistically covers registration, divorce, maintenance, alimony, and adoption, the scope of Act remains narrow. It fails to address related matrimonial issues such as divorce, maintenance, child custody, adoption, or inheritance. Thereby, even if marriage is registered under the act, parties have to rely upon HMA or civil law for dissolving other disputes. It creates a façade of legal completeness, when in reality it offers only a skeletal framework. Sikh would find themselves caught in a web of overlapping legal systems inculcating registration under the Anand Marriage Act, but dissolution or ancillary relief under the Hindu Marriage Act. This duality undermines legal certainty and adds to procedural burdens. Scholars such as Tahir Mahmood and Flavia Agnes have argued that personal laws which recognise ceremonial identity but withhold substantive remedies constitute what “symbolic pluralism”. It is a superficial form of recognition that neither empowers communities nor ensures justice. The Anand Marriage Act exemplifies this paradox. The Act’s provisions for registration are minimal and largely deferential to state governments, mandating that rules be framed under Section 6. In practice, this has led to long delays, inconsistent procedures, or complete non-notification in many states. As a result, Sikh couples often lack a uniform administrative mechanism to obtain marriage certificates. Consequently, while the Act affirms the ceremonial validity of the Anand Karaj, it falls short of converting that legitimacy into enforceable civil recognition and tangible legal protection. Similarly, in Charanjit Kaur v. State of Punjab (2017), the same court lamented that couples married under the Anand Karaj ritual often faced procedural obstacles in securing certificates, resulting in legal uncertainty during disputes relating to inheritance or matrimonial relief. The Act assumes that state-level compliance will suffice for uniformity. It raises a matter of concern under Article 14 since framing own rules risks inconsistent procedures, varying fees, and unequal access to registration. Such variation can lead to practical inequities for Sikh couples, undermining the Act’s intent to provide clear and enforceable legal recognition across the country. Thus, administrative divergence may erode both legal certainty and the principle of equality before the law without centralised guidelines or oversight. Conclusion and Suggestions Analysing the current framework, following observations can be made. Reforms must proceed in three prong manner including statutory consolidation, administrative standardisation, and rights-based protection. Primarily, the Act should contain a clear non-obstante clause declaring its overriding applicability to Sikh marriages and transitional provisions to allow couples married under the HMA to shift to the Anand Marriage Act subject to their consent. The Act must also incorporate protective safeguards aligned with constitutional principles, especially gender equality, by guaranteeing equal rights in matters such as maintenance, guardianship, and property, while simultaneously preventing provisions that could perpetuate discrimination or conflict with constitutional morality. Second, directives must be operationalised through a central model framework of rules issued by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs, providing standard templates for registration procedures, timelines, and record formats. Each State and Union Territory could then adapt these rules to local conditions while maintaining core uniformity. A National Anand Marriage Registration Portal (NAMRP) should be developed under the National e-Governance Plan, interlinking State registries and ensuring that marriage certificates carry nationwide legal validity. This would prevent inter-state discrepancies, facilitate verification in inheritance or immigration matters, and enhance administrative transparency It needs to be complimented with strengthening of institutional mechanisms, with family courts being specifically empowered to adjudicate disputes under this Act with designated registration officers at the district level, under the supervision of family courts, can provide local accessibility and accountability. Third, awareness campaigns and legal literacy initiatives by Union and State Governments, in collaboration with the Shiromani Gurdwara Parbandhak Committee (SGPC) and community organisations within the Sikh community, would further enhance its practical utility, transforming it into a living piece of legislation rather than a relic of identity politics. In consonance, states must be bound by statutory deadlines to frame rules, and couples facing denial of registration must have access to quick grievance redressal mechanisms before family courts or tribunals. Finally, judicial clarity is equally essential in ensuring the effective functioning of the Anand Marriage Act. Currently, the absence of comprehensive provisions often forces courts to rely on the Hindu Marriage Act or general civil law, resulting in inconsistent outcomes and uncertainty for litigants. Courts must adopt a consistent interpretive approach in determining jurisdiction over disputes arising from marriages solemnised under the Act. Clear judicial reasoning on whether such disputes should be exclusively governed by the Anand Marriage Act or by parallel personal laws would create predictability, reduce procedural confusion, and protect parties from the hardships of navigating multiple legal frameworks. *Khushi Jain is a 2nd Year Law Student studying B.A. LL.B (Hons.) at Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya National Law University, Lucknow. The views expressed above are the author's alone and do not represent the beliefs of Family Law Chronicle: The CFL Blog.

*Shivansh Singh Having recognised the concurrence of NFTs with the existing property framework under HSA in the previous part of the article, the second part of the article shall continue by inquiring into the legal roadblocks that hinder the incorporation of NFTs and blockchain-based digital assets at large within the Inheritance landscape in India. Challenges in Applying Hindu Law to NFT Inheritance? Unlike physical property, which is well-regulated under the HSA, digital assets exist in decentralised networks and beyond Indian jurisdiction, which delegitimises them under inheritance law. A. The Decentralised Operational Framework of Blockchain The blockchain transaction log is kept in real-time synchronised on a decentralised network of autonomous computers or servers, otherwise known as nodes, which are like a database spread in thousands of identical copies on several systems. A block is only added to the blockchain when these nodes (computationally compelling blockchain network members) agree to its legitimacy. The blockchain acts as a dynamic and exhaustive ledger, whereby every transaction is irrevocably logged and gathered into blocks. However, before its inclusion in a prospective new block, the transaction must initially be validated as genuine by every node in the network. To verify the integrity of the proposed block, there are dedicated participants known as miners who compete to solve complex cryptographic procedures. Thus, blockchain functions as an operating system with smart contracts created for its practical use. It is also a self-maintaining database with an app development platform. Therefore, this eliminates the need for a traditional middleman, such as a bank, central authority, or other reliable third party, to track and store assets and transaction information. B. The Jurisdictional Dilemma in Blockchain and NFTs This aspect of blockchain technology gives rise to its lack of specific jurisdiction, owing to the highly dispersed nature of the nodes on a blockchain, which can be positioned anywhere around the globe, with no means to pinpoint its specific location due to its algorithmic randomisation. However, regarding legal considerations, the non-demarcated jurisdiction of blockchain-based assets like NFTs poses complex jurisdictional issues that require careful deliberation regarding the relevant legal relationships. The principles of title and ownership of assets differ across jurisdictions; therefore, identifying the appropriate governing law, especially regarding inheritance becomes paramount. Under ordinary circumstances, for instance, if a dispute arises in the inheritance of property situated in India, then irrespective of the mechanism of devolution of the property or the physical location of the heir, the courts having appropriate jurisdiction with respect to the area of the disputed property can be approached. The applicable laws of that jurisdiction within India would govern the dispute. However, identifying the applicable rules according to the appropriate jurisdiction becomes extremely difficult in a decentralised environment, which forms the backbone of NFTs and blockchain. Therefore, to regulate the breakups in the system, every transaction could fall under the jurisdiction of the location of every node in the network, resulting in a multiplicity of concurrent jurisdictions, yielding a vast number of legal and regulatory regimes. This means it may be challenging to identify the location of a disputed transaction inside the blockchain. Because blockchain deinstitutionalises the ledger administrator and disperses the verification nodes globally, it becomes very challenging to determine whether a transaction was conducted on the blockchain. II. The Probable Road Ahead: Fractionalization Solution The provisions for succession and inheritance are based on the divisible nature of property. Upon death, people devolve their properties, including their interests, to their legal heirs. This is known as the fractionalisation of property concerning the property’s succession. However, fractionalisation becomes particularly challenging for digital assets like NFTs due to their virtual and intangible nature. While Hindus can devolve their properties under HSA and ISA, there are no specific guidelines for digital assets. Therefore, if a Hindu dies intestate (without a will), the question surrounding the inheritance of their digital assets, like NFTS and how they should be distributed among Class I heirs remains unresolved and largely unexplored. For the transmission of intangible digital assets, traditional inheritance frameworks that are based on centuries-old property rights concepts are insufficient. When an owner passes away, these virtual properties risk of being lost, stolen, or falling into legal limbo without specific restrictions. The death of American billionaire Matthew Mellon highlights the vulnerability of the existing laws in addressing the same. At the time of his death, Mellon held an estimated $1 Billion in Ripple (cryptocurrency), all of which remains inaccessible to his heirs as he did not leave the property with any instructions about its inheritance and the modalities for the same. A fractionalised NFT, or F-NFT, refers to dividing an NFT into smaller units for divided or fractional ownership of the original token. The fractionalisation is achieved by interlocking the larger, main-body NFT in a smart contract (self-executing arrangements based on blockchain, contingent on fulfilling pre-decided conditions), which divides the original NFT into a predetermined number of consecutive shares. NFTs are usually created based on the ERC-721 template, which is locked in a smart contract, thereby splitting a single ERC-721 token into multiple ERC-20 tokens as per the instructions of the NFT owner. Each fraction or ERC-20 token created, therefore, represents divided ownership of the NFT. This is analogous to the physical division of property as we understand it under classical HSA, wherein, for instance, a single unit of property owned by a Hindu male when divided among his three offspring (Class I heir) would be divided into one-third equal units in accordance with Section 8 of HSA. Likewise, under fractionalisation of NFTs, a single unit of NFT can be divided into similar subunits as per the discretion of the owner of the property. Where Does the World Stand: A Global Outlook The United States, in this regard, has adopted the Revised Uniform Fiduciary Access to Digital Assets Act (RUFADAA), 2015, which attributes legal recognition to digital assets, categorising them on the same footing as tangible property. Section 2(10). However, RUFADAA doesn’t provide any statutory guidelines with respect to the inheritance of such assets, and keeps itself confined to the privacy of the information contained within such assets. However, it does create a caretaker relationship by nominating two classes of individuals eligible to handle the digital assets, viz, the custodian and the fiduciary. Furthermore, the judicial position in the US is heterogeneous in this regard. Whilst the case of Shin v. ICON Foundation has somewhat established preliminary guidelines attributing the legal recognition of cryptoassets to property considerations, the case of United States v. Chastain restricts the wider interpretation of digital assets as property. The court in Shin has recognised assets hosted on blockchain as capable of being possessed using three metrics: a) precise definition, b) exclusive possession, and c) control and exclusivity claims. Whereas, in Chastain, the court has restricted the property rights to traditional forms of property, explicitly excluding digital assets from the same. The European Union has set up the Markets in Crypto-Assets (MiCA) Regulation, its very first major regulatory regime for crypto-assets, their issuers, and their service providers. With the aim of introducing coherence and consistency into the regulation of cryptoassets throughout all EU member states, under the proposed regulation, any provider of services relating to crypto-assets within the EU will be obligated to obtain authorisation from national authorities. This authorisation will allow them to lawfully issue and sell digital tokens across the EU. This creates the interpretation of cryptoassets, very close to that of legal property. The United Kingdom, through the case of AA v Persons Unknown & Ors, Re Bitcoin, has officially recognised Bitcoin, a type of cryptoasset, as property for the purpose of granting proprietary injunctions following a cyberattack. Moreover, the Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Amendment) Regulations 2019 have brought cryptoasset firms, i.e., those engaged in the exchange or holding of cryptoassets, into the regulatory framework (Section 52B). Furthermore, specifically w.r.t. NFTs, the London High Court, through the case of Lavinia Deborah Osbourne v Persons Unknown Category A & Ors, established that NFTs are equivalent to properties in English Law, through which the UK has recognised NFTs as legal property. Conclusion India has largely remained dormant in legislating NFTs in both commercial and personal domains of law, leaving several prominent gaps unaddressed. The question over the inheritance of NFTs and other crypto/digital assets might not pose any significant legal discrepancy at the status quo; however, the application of legal enterprise towards bridging the gaps above, even when interpreted to be theoretical, for finding sound solutions is a vital step towards the future development of the law in this aspect, which would have a corollary impact on other avenues of law, as any inquisition over the inheritance of such properties would naturally require redefining and expanding the entire concept of property. Additional legislative recommendations towards the integration, in addition to the aforementioned fractionalisation model, include recognising digital assets under Indian succession laws, legalising blockchain-based wills, and formulating digital asset custodianship laws. *Shivansh Singh is a 2nd-Year law student pursuing B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) from Integrated Law Course (ILC), Faculty of Law, University of Delhi. The views expressed above are the author's alone and do not represent the beliefs of Family Law Chronicle: The CFL Blog.

*by Shivansh Singh This blog is a part of a special two-part issue. Stay tuned to read the next instalment of the blog. Introduction In 2022, Singapore, through the judgment of Janesh s/o Rajkumar v Unknown Person, officially recognised the proprietary rights of NFTs. This legal recognition of NFTs is a natural first step in incorporating digital assets into the evolving economic framework of global property rights. However, this judgment also raises a pertinent question about the modalities of inheriting these digital assets, if they are to be treated as conventional properties. The engagement with this aspect of inheritance is largely lacking in India, where digital assets remain mostly unregulated by the Indian Courts and parliament. The rise of digital assets, such as cryptocurrencies and non-fungible tokens (NFTs), has reshaped the concepts of property, ownership, and wealth in contemporary times. In India, this change is being implemented within a legal regime of inheritance based on conventional concepts of physical property, particularly under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the HSA). NFTs and other distinct blockchain-authenticated digital tokens now form a considerable portion of wealth for many. Yet, the legal nature of such assets is uncertain, particularly in the context of inheritance and succession. Therefore, the first part of this article explores this critical gap by first understanding NFTs and other digital assets in the Indian context, followed by examining how far NFTs and other digital assets are included (or excluded) in (or out of) the current Indian inheritance regime. Considering that a significant portion of the inheritance matters in India is governed by the HSA, the article shall carry forward this discussion to the same extent. The second part of the article highlights the challenges deterring the adoption of NFTs in the Indian inheritance regime, following which it examines the fractionalization model of digital assets and delineates its utility in Indian inheritance law. In the concluding section, the article provides ancillary recommendations to address the policy gap. Understanding NFTs and Digital Assets In The Indian Context A non-fungible token (NFT) is a type of cryptographic asset used to verify digital ownership of unique assets. NFTs provide a secure record authenticated with a unique identifying code stored on the blockchain. It is characterised by its uniqueness, which makes it irreplaceable against any other virtual entity in the world. Blockchain acts as an immutable, shared ledger that records transactions and tracks assets in a business network. At a cumulative annual growth rate (CAGR) of 57%, the Indian Web3 market is expected to reach $1.1 billion by 2032, up from $0.0049 billion in 2022. Accordingly, it is anticipated that the Indian NFT market will generate $ 9,247.9 million in net revenue by 2030, growing at a CAGR of 36.9% from 2024 to 2030. It is estimated to be valued at 77.5 million USD in 2025. Even on the consumer side, the demand for exclusivity-based NFT ownership constantly increases. This is reflected in the increase in startup ventures, with 71 NFT startups launched in 2021, and more than 86 NFT startups operating outside of India. Additionally, 18 per cent of ultra-high-net-worth individuals in India have invested in crypto assets, with 10 per cent and 8 per cent invested in NFTs. Incidentally, there exists no concurrent legal framework to regulate NFTs and their commercial dealings, except for the Income Tax Act of 1961, which includes NFTs under the definition of virtual digital assets (VDA) following the introduction of this term through the 2022 amendments, which taxes them at 30 per cent. The government has attempted to regulate digital currencies by introducing the Cryptocurrency and Regulation of Official Digital Currency Bill, 2021, to create a supervising framework monitored by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI); however, this bill has yet to become law. Therefore, the interplay between NFTs and other virtual assets, which don’t exist in terms of tangible and material possession, and the law of inheritance in India emerges as an exciting area of study, given the rapid inclusion of NFTs in the modes of wealth acquisition, as indicated by the figures mentioned before. Defining Property Under Hindu Law, And Does It Cover Digital Assets? Hindu law is primarily governed by the general scheme of succession laid down under the HSA. The term property has not been explicitly defined in the HSA. The Indian Courts have, however, described the term ancestral property under classical Hindu law as a property inherited by a person up to four generations of male lineage by birth. Furthermore, an HSA allows a person to make a will or testament to transfer their separate property. Section 8 of the HSA outlines the “general rules of succession for males”, stating that the property of a Hindu male who dies intestate passes into his Class I heirs, followed by Class II heirs, and agnates and cognates. Furthermore, a property in the name of any member of the joint family is ipso facto presumed to have been acquired from out of family funds and to be part of the joint family property if the joint family has enough nucleus to develop it. on the date of acquisition, unless it is sufficiently demonstrated and proven that the acquisition was from separate funds and not the joint family funds. Section 8 of the HSA also provides that the property inherited by a Hindu male from his father after 1956 is his separate property. Therefore, a distinct definition of the term "property" for inheritance can be determined from two primary qualifications: ● Alienation Right - By distinguishing it from the ancestral property, a separate property can be understood as any property owned by a person exclusively with absolute powers over its disposal. NFTs aptly satisfy this qualification. ● Mode of Acquisition - The property acquired through one’s earnings, predicated on one’s skills or effort, is deemed self-acquired. NFTs also qualify under this categorisation. Where there is no statutory definition, the word "property" under the interpretation of the HSA can be construed broadly to include inherited as well as self-acquired property, subject to the proviso that they do not form part of a coparcenary property, thereby making such property freely alienable and subject to testamentary or intestate succession under the Act. This interpretative approach becomes crucial in dealing with emerging forms of property like digital property and NFTs, whose classification and devolution under Hindu law must be based on an advanced and adaptive concept of "property." *Shivansh Singh is a 2nd-Year law student pursuing B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) from Integrated Law Course (ILC), Faculty of Law, University of Delhi. The views expressed above are the author's alone and do not represent the beliefs of Family Law Chronicle: The CFL Blog. Editorial Note: This first part concludes the author's analysis of the conceptual compatibility between NFTs and the property framework under the Hindu Succession Act, laying the groundwork for a broader inquiry into the legal treatment of digital assets. The forthcoming second part will turn to the practical and doctrinal challenges that complicate the integration of NFTs and blockchain-based assets into the Indian inheritance regime. Readers interested in the intersection of technology and succession law are encouraged to follow the next installment of this two-part series.

*by Sunidhi Khabya Introduction Marriage as an Institution has been universally recognised as a sacred and lasting bond, though its meaning has evolved with the changing needs of society. In many cultural and religious contexts, alternative forms of marriages have emerged. Amongst one such evolved ‘meaning’ is the practice of “pleasure marriages”. The practice allows for temporary unions, which are often cloaked in religious or societal justifications. Although short in duration, these unions generate permanent legal-ethical conflicts and ambiguities raising the inevitable questions of consent, gender justice and protection of vulnerable individuals. Understanding Pleasure Marriages: Historical & Religious Context Marriages in Islam, by their very nature, are contractual. Historically, pleasure marriages have found mentions in Islamic traditions. Muta’h Marriage is one of the forms. The term Muta’h derives from the Arabic word meaning “pleasure” or “enjoyment”. Historians trace the practice back to the times when Arab women used to entertain Men in their tents; the men had to pay an entrance fee and could be kicked out anytime at the desire of the women. Such a union conferred no rights or responsibilities, and the objective of this marriage was just for pleasure. The practice involves various hazards and has been denounced by multiple Islamic scholars due to its inherent risks and unethical nature. Muta’h marriage is mostly practices by the followers of Ithna Ashari School under the Shia Muslims. Sunni Law however, does not consider it valid. In the Quran, such marriages have been permitted “And you are allowed to seek out wives with your wealth in decorous conduct, but not in fornication, but give them their reward for what you have enjoyed of them in keeping with your promise. (4:24)” Notably, Muta’h marriages can also be concluded by the representatives of the woman. If the father gives the daughter to a man through an oral promise, even then the marriage becomes concluded and valid. If a woman agrees to a declaration of marriage by a man, then also the contract becomes valid. By contrast, religions such as Hinduism and Christianity believe marriage to be a relatively permanent institution and view such practices as incompatible with their conception of marriage. In Hinduism, marriage is considered a sacred bond for seven lives. The purpose of this institution is broad and societal, not just the pleasure of individuals. Legal Perspectives In India: Judicial Interpretations Indian laws do not recognise such temporary marriages, and the courts have clarified the position of the law time and again. The meaning of Muta’h marriage was dwelled upon in “Shoharat Singh v. Musammat Jafri Bibi”, the court held that such marriage does not confer any rights upon the woman on her husband's property. Still, the courts consider any children conceived from such wedlock legitimate and capable of inheriting their father's property. The courts thus validated the status of children under personal laws whilst restricting their inheritance rights. In the case of “Syed Amanuallah Hussain and Ors. v. Rajamma and Ors.” The question of law was whether a Muta’h marriage lasted till the death of the husband, and upon the husband's death, the wife inherited the husband's properties. The husband’s brother challenged this. The court held that if the term for the “Muta’h marriage” is not specified in the contract, then the court treats it as a normal, permanent marriage. Previously, in the judgement of “Shahzada Qanum v. Fakher Jahan”, it was clarified that if a muta’h marriage lacks a specified time period, it is treated as a permanent nikah. Thus, time duration becomes critical in distinguishing between a temporary alliance and permanent marriage. In “Mohammed Abid Ali Kumar Kadar v. Ludden Sahiba (Minor)” the court held that spouses do not have the right to divorce in Muta’h marriages. Nevertheless, there are alternative ways of disposing of the contract of marriage. If the parties cohabit even after the expiration of the fixed duration, then the court presumes that the duration has been extended. Thus, there can be an implied extension of the marriage if the partners continue to cohabit after the fixed duration of the alliance expires. In “Luddun v. Mirza Kumar”, the wife filed a petition under Section 536 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for obtaining maintenance. The court observed that personal laws do not take away the statutory right of maintenance under section 536 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Therefore, the wife could claim maintenance. Thus, the Indian courts have, upheld women’s rights from the very beginning in cases of Muta’h Marriages or pleasure marriages. However, the legal recognition of temporary marriages varies across jurisdictions owing to the divergence in religious doctrines, socio-cultural contexts, and state policies. International Practices: Contrasting Approaches While some of the Islamic nations incorporate these unions into their personal laws, many secular and non-Islamic legal systems outrightly reject such practices as they conflict with the constitutional rights of women and are glaringly opposed to public policy. In the Shia majority country of Iran, temporary alliances (Nikah mut’ah) are legally recognised and codified under the civil law system. The Iranian Civil Code, under Chapter 6 (Article 1075 to Article 1077) explicitly allows for temporary marriages, and the subsequent chapter sets out requirements for a specific duration and mahr (dower). The woman in temporary marriage is entitled to maintenance within the duration of the marriage, while the children born out of such a union are considered legitimate and enjoy inheritance rights under Iranian law. However, these statutory protections are not uniform in implementation and lead to potential misuse of the provisions to circumvent adultery laws and facilitate exploitative relationships under the garb of religious sanction. In Iraq as well, pleasure marriages are illegally performed by some clerics, which is often child trafficking under the garb of muta’h marriage. Here, if a child under the age of 9 years is promised in marriage, then ‘sexual touching’ is considered to be religiously permitted. Thus, the practice has become a breeding ground for child trafficking and prostitution in Iraq. The lack of judicial protection, combined with the patriarchal interpretations of sharia law, often leaves women and children vulnerable to the assaults of men in power, especially when it comes to cross-border elements or undocumented marriages. In contrast to this, Sunni-majority countries, which follow the Hanafi jurisprudence of Sunni schools, generally regard such unions as invalid and akin to prostitution. India does accord statutory recognition to such an alliance, but the judiciary has constantly protected the rights of women and their children born through such an alliance. Most western jurisdictions do not recognise temporary marriages in any form; any such alliance is either treated as non-marital cohabitation or null and void in some cases for public policy reasons. The increasing global culture of pleasure marriages in the form of tourism in economically weak countries like Indonesia, Malaysia and parts of North Africa has drawn attention from human rights organisations across the globe. Ethical and Social Concerns The practice of temporary pleasure marriages has many risks; the major problems include primarily the exploitation of women by forcing them into unwanted marriages and thereby into forced sexual intercourse with the temporary husband, with no legal recourse under the provisions for sexual offences. Such marriages might even lead to larger humanitarian issues, such as human trafficking of women for prostitution under the garb of marriage. Consent becomes an issue as it is hard to decipher whether or not it was given without coercion. The question arises regarding the maintenance of the children born out of such wedlock, including their inheritance and property rights. Such problems as bigamy, which is prohibited by the laws of many countries, might arise when the spouses are not aware of the background of their partners, thus violating the rights of the original wife. Pleasure marriage tourism, which has increased in recent times, also poses significant challenges as the husband leaves the country after such temporary marriage and cannot be contacted for maintenance or Alimony, thus leaving the women alone to deal with the consequences of such union. Problems of increased risks of sexually transmitted diseases and subjugation of women are another significant risk involved. This has been seen in the recent developments on pleasure marriage tourism in countries like Indonesia. These alliances blur the lines between marriage, prostitution and trafficking, raising serious questions on consent, dignity and autonomy of women; while these unions are defended on grounds of religious identity, their real-world implications must be considered. The Way Forward It is imperative that countries that recognise pleasure marriages must introduce stringent procedural safeguards with clear and mandatorily written contracts ensuring informed consent of both parties. Further, the socio-economic protection of women must be secured through the right to maintenance, healthcare, and education for children born out of such a union. It is of grave importance that cross-border pleasure marriage be criminalised to avoid sexual exploitation and human trafficking; bilateral and international agreements could be arrived at to hold perpetrators accountable across jurisdictions. Moreover, the government should mandate the registration of all marriages, regardless of their form, to prevent abuse; this would ensure legal protection to undocumented spouses and children. Conclusion In pluralistic legal systems, there is an increasing need to harmonise personal laws with constitutional safeguards; the institution of temporary alliance is a tool of subjugation which cannot be shielded under the veil of religious sanction. Thus, as societies evolve, legal systems must attempt to strike a balance between cultural pluralism and universal human rights. Lawmakers must regulate such practices, and protection must be provided to the vulnerable groups. Temporary unions may exist, but the questions they raise about consent, dignity, accountability and justice are far from temporary. They are permanent and critical. *Sunidhi Khabya is a third-year law student pursuing a B.A. LL.B (Hons.) from National Law University, Jodhpur. The views expressed above are the author's alone and do not represent the beliefs of Family Law Chronicle: The CFL Blog.