Predeceased or Non-Existent: Inconsistency Between Statutory Text and Judicial Interpretation of Disqualified Murderers Under Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956

*Navdeep Singh

Introduction 

The landmark case of American Jurisprudence Riggs v. Palmer disallowed Elmer E. Palmer from inheriting his grandfather’s estate through will since he had intentionally poisoned and murdered his grandfather to ensure that the will made in his favour could not be revoked by the deceased. This case laid down a public policy:

“No one shall be permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own crime.” This rule was codified in Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (“HSA”), which provides:

“A person who commits murder or abets the commission of murder shall be disqualified from inheriting the property of the person murdered, or any other property in furtherance of the succession to which he or she committed or abetted the commission of the murder.”

In the context of this disqualification, the question arises about the status of such individuals who have been so disqualified: Whether they are considered to be predeceased of the intestate or whether they are considered to be non-existent or unborn for the purpose of devolving the property through intestate succession. In answering this very question, there seems to be an inherent conflict between the statutory mandate and the judicial Interpretation. 

Statutory Text and A Strange Interpretation

Section 27 of HSA provides an explicit answer to this question. It provides that individuals disqualified under the Act should be deemed to have died before the intestate. However, the broader, or more precisely, the contrary position was settled in Vellikannu v. R. Singaperumal (“Singaperumal”), holding that such murderers are to be construed as non-existent. It reasoned that prior to the enactment of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, such individuals were disqualified on the ground of public policyand justice, equity, and good conscience. Reliance was placed upon the decision of the Privy Council in Kenchava Kom Sanyellappa Hosmani and anr. v. Girimallappa Channaipa Somasagar (“Channaipa Somasagar”), wherein it was held that “The murderer should be treated as non-existent and not as one who forms the stock for a fresh line of descent.” Singaperumal, while acknowledging that, as per HSA, the murderer is to be treated as predeceased, placed reliance upon Statement of Objects and Reasons (“SOR”) of the Act, which cited the Channaipa Somasagar, which held that the murderers are disqualified based on justice, equity and good conscience and should be regarded as non-existent. Singaperumal settled that an individual guilty of murdering the deceased cannot have any relationship with the deceased’s estate, and therefore, under Sections 25 and 27 of HSA, a murderer is disqualified from inheritance, and the fresh stock of the line of descent ceases to exist. 

Therefore, the judicial interpretation preferred the pre-HSA jurisprudence based on justice, equity, and good conscience, rather than strictly interpreting the statutory mandate; accordingly, such individuals who have murdered the intestate shall be treated as non-existent, rather than as predeceased for intestate succession of his property. 

Implications of Treating Murderers As Non-Existent

The treatment of murderers as non-existent rather than predeceased does not merely disqualify the murderer, but also his heirs, who were entitled to such property under the Act. It essentially takes away the right of the murderer’s wife, children, and other heirs to inherit the property of the intestate. If the murderer had been strictly treated as predeceased of the intestate as contemplated in Section 27 of HSA, it would have led to his disqualification strictly, not of his heirs, and therefore, his heirs could have been qualified to inherit the deceased’s property as heirs of the predeceased. In Singaperumal, the wife of the murderer was not allowed to succeed to the property of her intestate father-in-law because her husband had murdered his father. In Smt. Janak Rani Chadha v. State (NCT of Delhi) and Anr., it was held that no right to the deceased’s estate can be claimed through the person who has been disqualified for murdering the intestate. Consequently, the parents of the man who had murdered his wife were held not entitled to succeed as per Section 15 of HSA since they had no independent locus to claim such inheritance. 

Critiquing The Judicial Interpretation

Firstly, the judicial interpretation is contrary to the text of Section 28 of HSA, which provides that, except on the grounds provided in HSA, no person shall be subjected to any other disqualification in inheriting the property on any other ground. However, the interpretation of murderers as non-existent has the effect of disqualifying anyone claiming through them, which is contrary to it since the Act does not specifically disqualify the heirs of the murderer, and merely provides for the disqualification of the murderer. The interpretation extends the disqualification to such individuals who have not been contemplated in the Act. 

Secondly, it is necessary to conjointly read Sections 25-28 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 to deduce the intent of the legislature. The disqualification contemplated in Section 25 disqualifies a murderer, particularly not his heirs, and the disqualification contemplated in Section 26 disqualifies a convert’s children and descendants specifically, not the convert. It reflects that the legislature, in a pinpointed manner, has clearly contemplated whom it intended to disqualify. 

Further, Section 27 explicitly deems disqualified individuals as predeceased, rather than non-existent or unborn, despite pre-act interpretations of Hindu Law that they are to be deemed as non-existent. It is also notable that Section 28 removed pre-act disqualifications like disease, defect or deformity and restricted disqualifications strictly to those contemplated in the act. It conveys the intention of the legislature that the Act intended to move away from pre-Act broad disqualifications under the Hindu law and wanted to confine disqualifications strictly to those contemplated in the Act. 

Consequently, by deeming the disqualified as predeceased specifically, not non-existent, it intended to merely disqualify the murderer, not the individuals claiming through him. 

Thirdly, Section 4 clarifies that the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, purports to be a complete code in matters of Hindu Succession, related to which provisions have been made and thereby enjoys an overriding effect upon prior interpretations of Hindu Law or customs or usages. As observed in Kuppu Alias Kuppammal v. Kuppuswami Mandiri and Ors., “The Hindu Succession Act, in so far as it covers the matters therein, is meant to be a complete Code relating to Hindu Succession and to that extent the Act prevails, and the Hindu Law in respect of it will cease to operate.” However, the reading of “died before the intestate” in Section 27 as non-existent imposes an extra-statutory, pre-act disqualification based on justice, equity and public policy upon the murderer’s act, which is contrary to provisions of HSA. 

Fourthly, the judgment in Singaperumal placed reliance upon the “principle of justice, equity and public policy” to deem the murderer as non-existent and disqualify his heirs. It was held in Ram Charan v. Sukhram that with the codification of the Hindu Law, the need to place reliance on justice, equity and good conscience has reduced in situations where doctrinal positions under statutes are capable of covering factual situations or where principles underlying the personal law can be definitely ascertained. These principles have a supplementary role. They should be relied upon where a particular personal law does not govern parties, or where such law is silent or it cannot be ascertained, where it contains a lacuna, or where a source of law fails, or it itself requires supplementation. In Rattan Lal v. Vardesh Chander & Ors., it was held that “concept of justice, equity and good conscience which, admittedly, comes into play in the absence of any specific legislative provision.” In Laxmidas Morarji (D) By Lrs v. Miss Behrose Darab Madan, while commenting upon the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s equity Jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution, it was held that the power to do complete justice cannot be used in a manner that ignores express statutory provisions or supplants substantive law. In Mohiuddin and Others v. Appellate Authority for Industrial & Financial Reconstruction and Others, it was held that equity follows the law, not vice versa. What the statute does not allow cannot be done by exercising the equity. The interpretation of Section 25 of HSA in the presence of definite and ascertainable principles, which is contrary to such principles, based on principles of public policy, justice and equity, cannot be construed as a correct approach. 

Finally, Singaperumal relied on the fact that the HSA’s SOR cited the Privy Council judgment of Channaipa Somasagar to affirm the judicial interpretation in question. It was held in the State of West Bengal v. the Union of India, that the SOR which accompanies a bill cannot be employed in understanding the meaning and effect of enacted statutes’ substantive provisions. Its use is limited to understanding the background and antecedents, and cannot be an aid in the enactment’s construction. It was held in S. C. Prashar, Income-Tax Officer, Market Ward, Bombay and Another v. Vasantsen Dwarkadas and Others, that where statutory language is clear enough, reliance cannot be placed upon the SOR in the interpretation of a statute. In State of Haryana & Anr v. Chanan Mal Etc., it was held that the SOR cannot override what logically flows from the explicit language of the provision. However, Singaperumal relied upon SOR to construct an interpretation which broadens the language of the statute. 

Conclusion

Hence, Singaperumal’s interpretation that murderers are to be treated as non-existent, rather than predeceased under Section 25 of HSA, stands in clear contradiction with what explicitly and logically flows from Section 25 read with Section 27 of HSA. Section 27 clearly contemplates that disqualified individuals are to be treated as predeceased of the intestate, but Singaperumal unnecessarily broadens this position by erroneously relying upon equitable principles and external aids. Such a position is not supported by the language and object of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

*The Author is a third- year law student pursuing B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) at National University of Study and Research in Law, Ranchi.

The views expressed above are the author's alone and do not represent the beliefs of Family Law Chronicle: The CFL Blog.