Beyond the Marriage Certificate: Deconstructing the Supreme Court’s Extension of 498A IPC to Live-In Partnerships

*Yash Jain

Introduction

It is pertinent to note that the judicial interpretation of Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (“IPC”) is usually related to the marital status of the persons involved in the matter. However, it is erroneous to contend that at all times there must be proof of the existence of a valid marriage so as to bring this section into force. In Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam, the Supreme Court adopted the purposive approach in cases where the man made the woman believe that she had been married to him and subsequently abused her. It is evident that this decision did not fall from the sky since the court had adopted the purposive approach in cases of void marriages.

However, in the recent case of Dr. Lokesh B.H. & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Anr., the Supreme Court ruled that Section 498A of the IPC can be used in live-in relationships. This is possible if the relationship is in the nature of marriage and if the couple intends to marry. The ruling looks at the real situation of a relationship in the country, not just its label attached to it, while simultaneously imposing additional conditions because Section 498A is a penal provision.

Genesis of the Ruling: Challenging Literal Statutory Interpretation

The Supreme Court took up the case after the Karnataka High Court refused to drop the criminal charges against Dr. Lokesh B.H under Section 498A of the IPC and other provisions. The Supreme Court heard that the person appealing the decision allegedly concealed a prior marriage, falsely presented himself as the complainant's husband, and caused her harm and distress linked to dowry demands.

The appellant submitted that Section 498A shouldn't apply because they weren't legally married. The High Court rejected this contention. Then, the Supreme Court had to figure out if the word "husband" in Section 498A could cover a man in a long-term relationship that acts like a marriage. The Court ultimately decided it could, but only if the relationship was between two adults who agreed to be together, resembled a marriage, and they both intended to marry each other.

The Court didn't just overlook the standard practice of strictly interpreting penal laws. Instead, it clarified that strict interpretation doesn't mean being overly literal or focusing on minor details. The Court explained that even when interpreting strictly, the purpose of a law should be considered if the wording allows for it. Consequently, the Court took into account the objectives of Section 498A, which are protection and reform, when determining the meaning of "husband" in this specific case.

 Purposive Construction and Judicial Precedents

The present decision needs to be understood in light of the existing precedents. In the case of Reema Aggarwal v. Anupam, it has been held by the court that an illegal marriage cannot be used as a ground for pleading in defense of Section 498A, particularly when the woman has been cheated in the process of being married. It must be kept in mind that in the present case, the court had earlier noted that if the word "husband" was narrowly interpreted, Section 498A would suffer.

Consequently, the cases of D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal and Indra Sarma v. V.K. Sarma have shaped the understanding of the notion of “relationship in the nature of marriage” under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

Namely, according to the Velusamy case, the key aspects to consider include the couple's marital status, a life together for a considerable period, permission to marry legally, and cohabitation. However, the case of Indra Sarma has added to these aspects, mentioning that all of them cannot be considered as the criteria. Thus, this case has taken into consideration the period of the relationship, its nature, presence of cohabitation and shared financial expenses, the person performing certain house duties, perceptions of society about the couple, intentions, and actions of the people. Still, neither the Velusamy nor the Indra Sarma case had any effect on Section 498A of the Act. However, in 2026, these definitions were used to determine when a live-in relationship could be recognized as a marital one for criminal law purposes.

The Two-Pronged Evidentiary Test: Safeguarding Against Overreach

One of the challenges in relation to the objectives and the method of doing so involves the criminalization of marriage, where it results in the merger of civil and criminal proceedings. To understand the protection from the arbitrary process of prosecution, this paper shall attempt to study the Court’s requirement of the same with two kinds of tests, namely “Functional Test” and “Mental Test”.

Firstly, the Functional Test checks whether the relationship looks like a marriage from an external perspective. This draws upon Section 2(f) of the Domestic Violence Act, along with judicial precedent in cases of Velusamy and Indra Sarma. These may include factors such as regular living together of a couple, presenting themselves as a couple, living life together, financial dependence, and social recognition of couples as married couples. There are other aspects that can show the existence of a stable relationship similar to marriage. The following could be such forms of evidence as joint bank accounts, joint rental agreement, utility bills, photographs, letters, and witnesses, among others, but they are only examples of possible types of evidence, rather than mandatory requirements. Even when there is a cohabitation arrangement, dating, lacking all the other elements of marriage, cannot be considered as having this required element.

Secondly, for the mental test, it's important that the relationship shows a real plan to get married. The court has made it clear that a woman invoking Section 498A must be the first to prove that intention. So, it's not enough if someone just vaguely thought about marriage at some point. The focus is on whether the relationship was started or developed with the clear understanding that marriage was the goal.

This could be understood through the way they act and also through the situation. One can understand this from the way they talk to each other, to their family members and friends, their future plans, marriage plans, or any such thing that tells us that they consider this relationship to be something that would end up in marriage. In case they both make it clear that they don’t want to get married in the future, then Section 498A might not become applicable. This requirement is what sets the criminal law standard apart from the broader protections under the Domestic Violence Act.

This dual approach, therefore, tries to guard against the following two errors: first, offering no protection whatsoever since there has been no marriage ceremony; and secondly, equating every cohabitation relationship with marriage where criminal liability is concerned. Its principal difficulty, however, is evidentiary. Proving both the objective nature of the relationship and the subjective intention behind it may become necessary on behalf of the woman requiring protection, especially in cases where documentary proof of the relationship is limited.

Procedural Safeguards and Mitigating the Risk of Misuse

The Court primarily ensured that the rules in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar were strictly followed. The case held that police and Magistrates must consider whether an arrest is truly necessary, even for serious crimes that don't automatically require a warrant. The 2026 ruling specifically said these steps must be strictly used in cases involving certain kinds of live-in relationships. The Arnesh Kumar rules were based on Section 41. Now, Section 35 of the BNSS is the law that covers arrests, including when to give a notice to appear. So, it's important not to confuse these: the Supreme Court applied the Arnesh Kumar rules, while Section 35 of the BNSS is the current law for arrests and notices under the new system.

The judgment was given in the context of the filing of an application for quashing criminal proceedings. There is a statutory provision equivalent to Section 482 CrPC in Section 528 BNSS. However, in the matter of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, the Supreme Court has relied upon the principle of quashing of cases decided in previous cases; however, no new principle was laid down that would be obligatory on the court to quash the charges in all cases involving distant relatives. Instead, the allegations were held to make out a case of prima facie commission of an offence. Similarly, Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand is relevant in the broader context of lavish and extensive allegations, but it can neither be quoted as a general principle to quash the allegation made against distant relations in the present case.

Conclusion

The significance of the Dr. Lokesh B.H. vs State of Karnataka case lies not in the fact that all live-in relations can be considered equivalent to marriage, but in the fact that some of the domestic relations can be differentiated from other domestic relations. It should be pointed out that, in interpreting the Court, the provisions of Section 498A IPC have crossed the limits of marriage and now apply to cases where two adults have marital relations and the intention of getting married. It is also pertinent to point out here that the Court has deliberately kept itself within the ambit of Section 498A IPC only.

However, the key point being raised is the shift from status to relationship, although not necessarily the removal of all legal restrictions. As mentioned earlier, the Functional and Mental Requirements are meant to restrict the application of the section to marriage-like relations, and the Arnesh Kumar guidelines are to make sure that the widened definition of the offense doesn’t lead to arbitrary arrests.

The key question left open is that of evidence, for although requiring that the complainant demonstrate the nature of the relationship and the intention to marry may safeguard against any abuse of process, it may also become an impossible burden for the victim. The significance of this decision is likely to be determined by the consistency with which courts adhere to these factors when distinguishing between marriages and cohabitation and maintaining processes in criminal cases.

*Yash Jain is a second-year B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) student at Dr. Ram Manohar Lohia National Law University, Lucknow.

The views expressed above are the author's alone and do not represent the beliefs of Family Law Chronicle: The CFL Blog.