Beyond the Individual and the Communal: Proposing ‘Narrative Identity’ as a Panacea

*Anshul Dalmia

It might be contended that, while structurally incompatible, the distinction remains functionally sound, in that the differentiation caters to two distinct functions of identity. Individual identity, on this view, aids the growth of a person separate from the larger community and is owed to developing an inherent personality, that is, to the individual herself, whereas communal identity functions to situate an individual within a community and is owed to society at large. Such an argument favours the distinction strongly, since it views the two identities as functionally distinct.

Functionally Disadvantageous: Deconstructing the Distinction

In this backdrop, I respond by arguing that the emergence of allies and solidarity identity groups muddles the distinction functionally as well. Allies and solidarity groups are those who, while not part of a group, identify with or work towards the interests of that group.This identification by association creates forms of solidarity that subsequently concretise into an identity. LGBTQIA+ allies, for instance, may not themselves be part of the LGBTQIA+ community but are heterosexual persons who work towards its betterment and associate closely with an LGBTQIA+-supportive identification. Their solidarity is thus functionally dependent not on their own membership of the group but on someone else's. Isaiah Berlin captures this functionality when he argues that individuals come to perceive themselves through association, which leads to empowerment. Allies and solidarity groups thus blur the functional distinction as well: while structurally separate (heterosexual persons and LGBTQIA+ persons), they further the same cause and serve the same function, namely the betterment of the LGBTQIA+ community.

Additionally, such a rigid distinction fails to accommodate intersectional identity, which may inherently combine individual and communal identity. The distinction fails to engage with such intersections or to acknowledge their function and practical consequence. An individual is an amalgamation of several identities: individual identities that are communally created, communal identities that are individually adopted, and identities that are both communal and individual at once. Eekelaar's distinction fails to capture this spectrum, viewing identity instead through a parochial binary lens.

Showcasing the Practical Legal Implications

Article 8 of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child provides for the right to preserve a child's identity. However, the Convention does not specify the type, form, structure, or function of the identity to be protected. Eekelaar's distinction would not be a helpful plug-in here either: an individual-identity reading would protect only those features resembling personal characteristics, while a communal-identity reading would extend protection to external relationships. Both dimensions are, in truth, equally vital and closely linked, and ought to be preserved together. India's own statutory framework illustrates exactly this difficulty. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 requires resources to be mobilised towards, among other things, facilitating the development of a child's identity, while the Adoption Regulations, 2022 frame that same right chiefly in individual terms, allowing an adult adoptee to conduct a 'root search' for information about their biological origins. A regime built on Eekelaar's binary would have to choose whether this is a matter of individual self-knowledge or of communal reconnection with a birth family; in truth, as with the ECtHR's approach to genetic origin discussed above, it is inescapably both, which is precisely why the distinction offers little practical guidance to the drafters or interpreters of such provisions.

I argue that the adoption of 'narrative identity' would be the more workable solution—as a conceptual alternative undertaken either through judicial or legal interpretation—to this difficulty. This form of identity is dynamic and changes over a person's lifetime as new experiences and understandings accumulate. Narrative identity concerns individuals constructing an "integrated life story" by reconstructing their autobiographical past and imagining their future in a manner that gives life some degree of unity, purpose, and meaning. It links who a person is now, how they came to be that way, and where their life may be going. This form of identity recognises that political, social, and cultural structures interact with personal biography to create a meaningful subjectivity.

Operationalising this model within Indian family law would not require a wholly new statute so much as a shift in interpretive posture towards the provisions already in place. The JJ Act's mandate to facilitate the "development of identity", CARA's root-search mechanism under the Adoption Regulations, and the Supreme Court's recognition of self-identified gender in NALSA contribute to a single narrative record that the individual is entitled to build and revise over her lifetime. Concretely, Specialised Adoption Agencies and Child Welfare Committees could be required to compile, alongside the biological particulars already maintained under the Adoption Regulations, a life-story record that the adoptee may access and supplement as she grows, one that holds her genetic origin and her lived family history together rather than treating a request for the former as a departure from the latter. Family courts adjudicating custody, guardianship, or surrogacy-related disputes could, in turn, be guided to weigh the narrative coherence of a child's upbringing, her continuity of relationships, care, and self-understanding, alongside, rather than subordinate to, questions of genetic or legal parentage. Such a shift would allow Indian family law to hold together an individual's biological origin, her lived social relationships, and her own developing self-understanding within a single evolving account, offering a more holistic view of identity than Eekelaar's binary, however read, could ever provide.

Conclusion

This piece has sought to demonstrate that Eekelaar's distinction between individual and communal identity is unhelpful on several grounds. The reasoning behind the distinction fails owing to the interconnected nature of the two identities, which makes it structurally difficult to sustain two separate categories. It has shown the extent of societal influence over even the most inherent personal characteristics, such as gender and race, and has highlighted the functional difficulties the distinction poses for defining legal responsibilities, whether through allyship, solidarity, or intersectional identity. Finally, it has proposed a model of narrative identity that amalgamates both dimensions, better captures the realities of social life, and provides greater clarity in an otherwise confusing paradigm, one that may equally inform how Indian family law approaches questions of gender, adoption, and donor-conceived identity.

*Anshul Dalmia is a Lecturer at Jindal Global Law School, O.P. Jindal Global University, where he teaches Constitutional Law and Legislative Interpretation. His research interests include constitutionalism, the functioning of judicial bodies, and public law. He holds a Bachelor of Civil Law (LLM-equivalent) from the University of Oxford and a B.A. LL.B. (Hons.) from the West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences.

The views expressed above are the author's alone and do not represent the beliefs of Family Law Chronicle: The CFL Blog.